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i. 
INTERDIVISIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE 
SUMM 
The centralised control of any organisation becomes progressively more 
difficult as the size of the organisation and the length of its lines of 
communication grow. As a result, many organisations have found it necessary 
to decentralise the management of their activities into autonomous divisions 
or subsidiary companies. It is generally accepted that this process of 
decentralisation may result in financial benefit to the organisation as a 
whole, because the delegation of responsibility for profits to the 
management at divisional level provides an incentive which is not available 
to divisional managers in highly centralised organisations. 
Where a division makes a product which another divisi. on requires for 
incorporation in its production process, the question arises as to which 
transfer price should be applied. If this interdivisional trading accounts 
for a considerable part of the total manufacturing capacity of the divisions 
concerned, the transfer pricing mechanism employed may weaken the 
decentralised structure and lead to a return to a greater degree of 
centralisation. The determination of the correct transfer price is 
therefore only part of the problem, for the benefits accruing from its 
use may be more than offset by its adverse effects on the structure of the 
organisation. 
This thesis attempts to show the importance of the transfer pricing mechanism 
in relation to criteria such as divisional autonomy, objective performance 
evaluation and goal congruence, and why the price employed in practice may 
often differ from what may seem theoretically correct. The work of a 
number of authors on the subject is reviewed in Section A, two well known 
American case histories are considered in Section B and in Section C the 
writer describes studies he has made of tIr-transfer pricing mechanism 
operating in three British organisations, and the findings of two surveys 
or. Transfer Pricing. 
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4. 
3. INTRODUCTION 
As a result of the large number of business mergers and acquisitions 
which have taken place in recent years there has been a tendency for 
business organisations to increase in complexity. At the same time there 
has been a spread in the use of decentralisation or divisionalisation as 
a means of controlling large companies. As some of these large companies 
have been created from the fusion of several smaller businesses, in some 
instances the situation has now arisen in which-companies are attempting 
to derive the maximum benefit from their overall size, whilst at the same 
time trying to take full advantage of the smallness of the units of which 
they are composed. 
MAlst the economies to be derived from large scale production and distributiun 
are evident in many industries, it is generally agreed that the successful 
management of any organisation by a central group of people becomes 
increasingly difficult as'that organisation grows in size and spreads 
geographically. Decentralisation, in one form or another, to a greater or 
lesser extent, is therefore often the solýition. ' This decision to decentralisc 
is often reflected in a variety of benefits to the organisation as a whole, 
largely it is claimed be-cause the manager of a decentralised unit has a 
greater incentive to succeed if he is made responsible for the profitability 
of his unit, as opposed to being responsible for its cost performanceonly, 
the situation which normally exists in an organisation where control remains 
centralised. 
However, decentralisation often also brings a number of problems which are 
not present in centrally controlled organisations. One of the most 
important of these problems arises when a substantial part of the output of one 
division is transferred to another division within the same organisation, and 
a pricing structure has to be determined in respect of these transfers. 
Some -fcrm of 
inter-divisional pricing system has to be consýtructed, because 
the assessment of the profitability of each division is a necessary factor in 
any policy of decentralisation. In addition to ensurinG that the pricing 
sy s ten. 
5. 
system is equitable as far as the individual divisions are concerned, 
consideration must also be given to its effect on overall company policy 
and the profitability of the organisation as a whole. Mere central 
management wishes to ensure that the objectives of their divisional 
managers remain in accord with overall company policy, that objective 
performance evaluation of these managers is retained, and that the 
divisions retain the high degree of autonomy necessary to maintain a 
decentralised situation, careful consideration must be given to the 
difficulties involved in the creation and operation of the intra-compýny 
pricing mechanism. 
The purpose of this treatise is to analyse the problem, evaluate some of 
the writing which has been produced on this subject and describe the 
practical situations encountered by the writer in his study of the problem. 
6. 
4.1 THE BACKGROUND 
All organisations, except the very smallest, are made up of smaller 
organisational units. In a large organisation there is usually a 
hierarchy of divisions, then departments within these divisions and 
finally sections within these departments. As companies have grown 
it has becqme increasingly difficult for the control of the organisntion 
to remain centralised in the hands of only a small group of people, and 
as a result, varying degrees of delegation of responsibility have taken 
place. 
With this move towards decentralisation, companies have found what 
Sloane 
I has called "the capacity to enjoy the fruits of the division 
of labour and of specialisation, whilst simultaneously benefiting from 
integra tion to a greater or lesser degree". 
It is argued that a number of benefits usually result from the decision 
cess is evolved, to decentralise. Invariably, a better decision-making pro. 
because the manager of the division is better placed to react to information 
about local conditions in a timely way, because the load of decision making 
is spread, and because decision making on a wider basis will. provide 
valuable training*for staff who may ultimately become members of the 
central management team. The greater level of responsibility given to 
divisional managers increases their incentive to succeed because they have 
more control over the factors which affect the measures of their 
performance, they are required to study outside influences on finished 
goods prices and raw material costs continually and because the 
psychological benefit of being thpjir own bosses within their profit 
centres is c onsiderable. 
Sloane's Justification for a poiicy of decentralisation is confirmed by 
other writers. When it is remembered how strongly/ 
1. Alfred P. Sloane, Jnr. "My Years with General Motors" Pan 1967 
a 
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strongly centralised the Ford Motor Company was for many years, it is 
significant to note that Breech, in his capacity as controller, when 
speaking of developments in the structure of the Ford Company claims that 
under the profit centre systemq revenue control of intra-company sales 
between various divisions of the same company gives invaluable guidance 
in make or buy decisions, provides a check on supplier prices and is a 
valuable test of performance. lie states that the producing divisions in 
Ford are required to sell competitively to the end product divisions and 
that this requirement has contributed enormously to the improved overall 
profit position of the company. Similarly, in one of the earliest articles 
on Transfer Pricing, Joel Dean 
1 
extols the advantages of decentralisation. 
lie claims that a multiproduct company functions best if it is made into a 
sort of a miniature of a competitive, free enterprise system. In his view 
the company should be made up of independent operating units which act 
like economic entities and which are free to trade outside the company 
as weil as inside. 
There are of course varying degrees of decentralisation and most 
organisations are located at varying points along a line between the two 
extremes of complete centralisation and decentralisation. A division will 
move. from the category of a cost centre and become a profit centre when its 
management becomes responsible for revenue as well as expenses. When the 
success of its management is measured not only by its profits but, also by 
relating these profits to its invested capital, it becomes in fact an 
investment centre, but in practice theterm profit centre is used 
indiscriminately to-describe both categories. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that the interpretations placed on the term 
decentralisation can vary considerably. In one organisation, which is 
reviewed in the third section of this thesis, central management considered 
that/ 
Joel. Dean "Decentralisation and Intracompany Pricing" Harvard Business 
Review July/August 1955. 
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that they were operating a policy of decentralisation, yet their 
divisional managers were completely fettered by head office, which had 
imposed rigid controls on inputs without any monetary valuation of outputs. 
The other extreme was found in another case where head office professed to 
retain control yet permitted a buying division to buy outside rather than 
buy from a selling division whose idle capacity was more than 50% of its 
total capacity. 
Whilst it must be wrong to generalise it would seem that the profit 
incentive does encourage divisional managers to increase the level of- 
production more than any incentive based on cost. Where, for example, 
head office assessments of. divisional management have been based on their 
ability to achieve production quotas and to remain within pre-determined 
standard costs, it has been found that the fear of exceeding the quota by 
too great a margin, and as a result receiving an increase in the quota 
for the following year, has been almost as great as the fear of not reaching 
the target output. In these circumstances, management did not have the 
profit incentive and as a result production capacity was not maximised. 
When such cost centres have been converted into profit centres, perhaps 
simply by transferring goods at cost-plus prices, sub-unit managers continue 
to worry about costs, but they start worrying too about boosting produc-tion 
and also about possible marketing needs. In these situations, no-one can 
pretend that the"'profit centre" is reallyýan independent unit, but top 
management'are often more successful in achieving what is termed "goal 
congrýuencell -'i. e. I ensuring that the objectives of their divisional 
managers are the same as their own - through such profit centres more 
readily than through cost centre3., 
The advocates of profit centres repeatedly maintain that being responsible 
for profit centre performance rather than cost performance, probably provides 
more'incentive, because it is one thing to meet budgeted costs and another 
to increase profits by bettering pertormance on sales. 
Sometimes/ 
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Sometimes an imperfectly designed profit centre, with all of its defects, 
may have better motivational effects than a cost centre. 
Nevertheless, the work done by each of these units should contribute to 
the attainment of the objectives of the organisation of which it is a 
part. The purpose of any system of management control should be therefore 
to ensure that when the manager or head of any of these units ismotivated 
to act in his own best interests lie will also act in the best interests of 
the whole organisation, so far as this is possible - i. e. that there should 
be as much congruence as possible between the objectives of say the manager 
of a division and the overall objectives of the company as a whole - hence 
the use of the term "goal congruence". 
In addition to this need for goal congruence, two other criteria are helpful 
in the design and application of an accounting system in a decentralised 
setting'. These are Performance Evaluation and Autonomy. Evaluation 
of Performance is required in order to help make predictions for future 
decisions, to apprai se the abilities of the divisional managers and to 
assess the profitability of the capital invested in the division as an 
economic investment. Autonomy is also necessary because central management 
must respect the individual divisions as decentralised entities, if it 
wishes to preserve the basis of the decentralised structure. 
As - already stated goal congruence focuses on the harmonising of 
(a) the interests of the managers and 
(b) the interests of, the organisation as a whole. 
In a number of circumstances, perfect congruence of these sectional 
interests and overall company interests is not possible, so that a more 
practical statement of the situation is that: 
11 thp., system of management control should minimise the amount of 
conflict between-the goals of the heads of individual units and 
i 
til, '4-, goals of the whole organisation". 
if / 
i 
I 10, 
If the system increases the conflict - as would happen if a certain 
ccurse of action makes the reported performance of say a divisional 
manager appear good, even although it has an adverse effect on the 
overall interests of the company, then something is wrong with the 
Management Control System - i. e. if the system is so structured that a 
particular decision increases the profits of a division and at the same 
time lessens the profits of the company as a whole, then clearly the 
system is not serving the best interests of the organisation. 
11. 
5. INTER-DIVISIONAL PRICING POLICY 
Goods which are moved from one department to another or from one division 
to another within the same organisation are traditionally valued at 
accumulated cost to the'time of the transfer. Bowever, with the trend 
towards decentralisation, the problem of setting prices for transactions 
within the company has arisen. This problem could be eliminated if the 
divisions had no dealings of any kind with each other, but with it would 
go the great advantage of being able to benefit from the division of 
labour and specialisation, whilst benefiting simultaneously from 
integration to a greater or lesser degree. A company decentralises 
because it expects to increase its profitability by giving direct profit 
incentives and evaluations to more people in m. -nagemcnt - as stated in the 
introduction, if this policy is to succeed, the company must ensure that 
one profit centre is not led to increase its profits at the cost of reducing 
I 
the. profits of the company as a, whole. 
A company's internal transfer price policy is of fundamental importance 
in determining whether the profit centres are'led towards such actions or 
not. A transfer price will only achieve its objectives if it leads the 
management of the profit centres to make the same decisions as the 
management at head'office would make, -if it had the time to study the 
problem and if it had full access to all the data a7ailable to the 
management of both the buying and selling divisions. If the transfer 
price leads to departures from this ideal, it will cause suboptimisation 
(i. e. the profit centres will seek to maximise profits for themselves as 
separate entities). 
For example, a division supplying another with a product which the receiving 
division will process further, may be in the position of a monopolist 
supplier. By taking advantage of its own position it could hold the 
division it supplies to ransom. The manaScment at headquarters could 
perhaps afford to take a detached view of the situation if the amount 
which/ 
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which the transferor division could add to its own profit merely offset 
the diminution in the profit of the transferee division. But it is 
possible for the buying division to lose more than the selling division 
gains, meaning that the profits of the organisation as a whole will be 
adversely affected. 
e. g. Division A of a company is the sole supplier of a product 
which Division B of the same company processes further before sale to 
outside customers. 
If a part of Division A's costs is fixed, then its total costs per 
day will increase as its volume of production increases but not as 
quickly. If we assume: 
1. that its total costs are E250 per day for any output up to 500 
units per day, and that total costs increase by E50 per day 
for every additional 500 units made, 
and2. that the manager of this division has decided that his 
operating results will be optimised if he sets his selling 
price to Division B at EO. 30 per unit. (i. e. his TRANSFER PRICE 
at EO. 30 per unit). 
the relevant figures will be as shown in Table I. 
13. 
TABLE I 
Value of 
Division A's Division A's 
Transfers Transfers Division A's Division A's 
to Division B to Division B Total CoTt Profit 
(in units) (at EO. 30 per unit) 
E E E. 
500 150 250 (100) 
10000 300 300 - 
19500 450 350 100 
2,000 600 400 200 
2,500 750 450 300 
3,000 900 500 400 
14. 
Similarly, if we assume - 
1. that Division B incurs processing costs of E625 for any output 
up to 500 units per day, and E125 per 500 for outputs in excess 
of 600, 
and 2. that Division B's selling price per unit to outside customers 
declines as the vol=e of sales increaseis, the situation will 
be as shown in Table II. 
TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
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TABLE II 
Division A's 
B Charge to Division B's Division B's Division B's 
Division B Processing Total Selling Price Total Profit or 
(or Sub-assembly Costs Costs (per unit) Loss 
at 30p per unit) 
E E E E E E 
500 150 625 775 1.50 750 25) 
:L 
'000 
300 750 IoO50 1.25 1,250 200 
9500 
450 875 1,325 1.10 1,650 325 
$000 
600 1,000 1,600 1.00 2,000 400 
Z, 500 750 1,125 1,875 0.90 29250 375 
000 900 1,250 2,150 0.70 2,100 50) 
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It can be seen from Table II that the most profitable policy for 
Division B is to set its output at 2,000 units per day, thereby earning 
a profit of E400 per day. If Division A supplies 2,000 units per day to 
Division B, Division A's sales will be worth E600 and its total costs E400. 
Its profits will be E200, giving a total profit for the company as a whole 
of E600. 
However, it can also be seen from Table I that a greater demand from 
Division B, i. e. 3,000 units per day rather than only 2,000 units per day 
would have resulted in an increased profit for Division A. However, the 
manager of Division B will not increase his demand because as Table II 
shows, such a decision will operate against his personal interests. 
If instead of having two profit centres, the company abandons its 
divisionalised structure and combines both divisions into a single profit 
centrej the situation would be as shown in Table III. 
17. 
Output 
(in units) 
500 
19000 
19500 
2#000 
2,500 
31000 
Cost of 
produqýng 
Sub-Assmebly 
E 
250 
300 
350 
400 
450 
500 
TABLE III 
Cost of 
Processing 
to completion 
E 
625 
750 
875 
1,000 
1,125 
19250 
Total Total 
Cost Sales 
E E 
875 750 
1,050 1,250 
1,225 1,650 
1,400 2,000 
1,575 21250 
1,750 2,100 
Prof it 
E 
(125) 
200 
425 
600 
-675 
350 
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It can be seen that the single profit centre will operate more profitably 
than the two divisions together - by making and selling 2,500 units per 
day, it can earn a profit of E675 as opposed to E600 when the company is 
decentralised. 
In the original decentralised situation, Division B's management has reacted 
to the transfer price of EO. 30 pcr unit by restricting its demand for the 
sub-assembly and therefore its own output of the finished product. An 
unsatisfactory result has been created for the company as a whole, yet if 
the divisional manager has been following an instruction to maximise his 
division's separate profit, he has fulfilled his objective. 
It may therefore be assumed that it is Division A's management who have 
been responsible for the overall profit falling below the optimum, yet here 
again the divisional management cannot be faulted for it established a 
transfer price of EO. 30 per unit in the belief that sales at that price 
would produce a better divisional profit than an increased level of sales 
at a smaller price. It is important to note that the transfer price in 
such a situation from the viewpoint of the supplying division, has been 
constructed on the basis of variable cost plus an element to cover fixed 
cost plus profit, yet as far as the purchasing division is concerned it is 
a wholly variable cost - the total cost of the sub-assemblies purchased 
from Division A willary directly with the number of units purchased. 
on the other hand, let us assume that a supplying division can transfer 
its product A internally to another of the company's divisions for use as 
a raw material in the manufacture of product B at E110 per ton. Alternatively, 
it can sell product A to a customer outside the company at E100 per ton and 
will incur E15 selling costs. If the buying division's selling price of 
product B to an outside customer is E180, after incurring processing and 
selling costs of E85, product A will not be bought from the supplying 
division because: 
Selling/ 
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Selling price of product B- E180 
Costs - Product A 110 
Processing and 
Selling 85 195 
Loss 15 
IMIC"W" 
If all the above information was available to top level managemento 
however, the decision would be that the interdivisionaltransfer was in 
the company's best interests because: 
Sales value of Product B C180 
Less sales value of Product A 
Increase in sales value 
100 
80 
Processing and selling costs 
Product B 
Less Selling Costs 
Product A 15 
Increase in Profits 
85 
70 
10 
If the supplying division had priced its output to the buying division 
at E85 (the outside sqles'value of A les's selling cost), the manager of 
the buying division would have arr*ived at the profit'maxivising solution: 
Sales value Product B- E180 
Costs Product A 85 
Processing and 
Selling 85 170 
Increase in profits 10 
Similarly, if we assume now: 
1. that the supplying division has adequate'capacity to supply both the 
internal and external customers and that, if it did, its processing 
cost would be E50 for each of them, 
2. that the supplying division cannot find a customer for the second 
unit of product A at a net price in excess of E50, 
and 3.11 
, lo. 
and 3. that the buying division could obtain only E150 from its outside 
customers for product B. 
In these circumstances, the buying division would not buy product A at 
a cost of E85 because: - 
Sales Value Product B 
Costs - Product A 
Loss 
Processing and 
Selling 
85 
E150 
85 170 
20 
Again, however, if all the information is taken into consideration, the 
transfer should take place, because: - 
Sales Value Product B E150 
Costs - Product A 50 
Processing. and 
Selling 85 135 
Profit 15' 
In this instance, the difficulty arises because E85 is not a good measure 
of the opportunity cost of a unit of product A. 
. 
The manufacture of a unit 
of A for transfer to the buying division would require an expenditure of 
E50 7,. it would not force the supplying qivision, to sacrifice a sale to an 
outside customer at any higher price. The result is that f5O and not E85 
is therefore the appropriate measure of opportunity cost in this situation. 
These examples indicate that a company can pay a price forýthe luxury of 
divisionalisation. In-seeking maximum profits for themselves asýseparate 
entities, divisions can cause-a company to make less than the optimum 
profits. It is clear that if the divisional management was instructed to 
maximise the division's separate profit, adherence to this instruction in 
the circumstances given above would have an advarse effect on the overall 
profits of the company. 
The buying division can only doýwhat is bcst -for the company when deciding 
whether/ 
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whether or not to take the supplying division's production, if it has 
knowledge of the other division's incremental costs. The implication 
is therefore that the transferor division should offer its production 
to other responsibility centres at a figure not in excess of the 
incremental cost of producing it. 
Although this implication may appear to differ considerably from the 
commonly used method of transferring the product. at its price on the 
outside marketp in point of fact, if the transferred product can be 
bought and sold in a competitive market, the opportunity cost basis and 
the market price basis do not conflict. If there is a competitive market 
for the transferred products, a buying division can meet its need9for 
the intermediate product by buying them outside at the going rate. it Will 
be in the company's interest to do so to prevent another division from 
incurring incremental coses of a greater amount in supplying the intermediate* 
If it did otherwise, the company would incur a greater cost in the production 
of the intermediate than in buying it. If the transfer PrIce of the 
intermediate is set at its market price, the transferor division can supply 
as much as it wishes (which will be as much as it can produce without 
incurring incremental costs in excess of the price it will get) leaving the 
transf eree division to acquire any additional supplies it may need by outside 
purchase. Alternatively, the transferor division may be able and willing 
to supply more of the intermediate at the market price than the consuming 
division can use. In that case, the correct course is for the supplying 
division to go on producing so long as its incremental cost is below the 
market price. It can sell on the market any output not taken up by the other 
division. 
The outcome of situations such as those illustrated in the examples might 
lead to a questioning of the validity of a policy of decentralisation w%, ere 
there is a ccnsidcrablc volume of interdivisional trading. it might be felt 
that the price paid for the luxury of divisionalisation is excessive, and 
that/ 
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that the most profitable outcome would be a reversion to a policy of 
centralisation. As we have seen the volume of losses arising from the 
circumstances outlined, (sub-optimisation)- would, however, have to be 
very high before the benefits of decentralisation would be given up. 
Transfer prices may therefore be viewed as constraints on decentralisation 
because they are designed to link at least two divisions or sub-systems, 
. whereas by definition all sub-systems in a totally decentralised system 
should act as though they were independent. At its extreme, 
decentralisation means complete freedom to make local decisions in the 
best interasts of a sub-unit as if the unit were independent. 
The major cost of such decentralisation is this'dysfunctional decision 
making - e. g. buying outside when purchases should be made inside. 
23. 
ADVANTAGES OF INTER-DIVISIONAL PRICING 
It will be appreciated from the foregoing that if a policy of 
decentralisation has been adopted by an organisation, and inter- 
divisional trading is taking place, it follows that some form of 
transfer pricing mechanism has to be adopted. 
In advancing the need for a Transfer Pricing Policy Joel Dean 
describes the outcome of the decision made to drop transfer prices by 
an oil company. As a result, this company no longer had knowledge of 
the cost and value of its products at the various stages of refining 
and distribution. The abolition of transfer prices meant that the 
profits of the individual operating units could no longer be measured 
meaningfully and also prevented accurate estimates of the earnings on 
proposed. capital projects. In addition, basic decisions about market 
penetrations pricing and capital expenditures were cut adrift from cost 
or profit moorings. Finally, there was no way of ensuring that 
the product would be directed where it would produce the highest returns 
either as among alternative processes or as among alternative channels 
and levels of distribution. Clearly, abolition was not the correct 
answer. 
in the Diversified Products Corporation case (one of a series of cases 
on Management Control Systems which have been produced by the Harvard 
Case Studies Unit 
1, 
the president is quoted as saying: 
"Our executive team is one big happy family. If we put in 
profit centres and transfer pricing this would surely increase 
friction, competition and argument. I'm not. sure that we want 
to do this. " 
1-7hilst his team may be happy, there is an indication that they may also be 
complacent. The omission of profit centres may mean less arguments, but 
it also means that the organisation has to forego the following zdvantages: 
a/ 
Anthony, Dearden and Vaincil - "Management Control Systems" IRWIN. . 
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(a) Better long run decisions are no longer available. 
(b) Each division is less likely to be so alert. 
(c) In an expense centre, the manager is a cost operator, 
whereas in a profit centre he is an entrepreneur. 
(d) There will be a decline in competitive spirit as well 
as aggressiveness. 
(e) Whilst controls on expense will remain, the yardstick 
by which output-can be assessed will be lost. 
In Dean's view the correct solution is transfer prices which have been 
determined competitively, and he claims that the hodge-podge of 
intra-company, pricing methods which are found in many large companies 
can be avoided and an economically realistic basis for intra-company 
pricingýapplied uniformly throughout the whole 'company can be found 
where'these competitive transfer prices are'brought together with profit 
centres in a new system of executive control. 
In his article Dean states that if a division is to meet'the definition 
of a profit centre, it'must have four characteristics which will distinguish 
it from a service centre: - 
Operational Independence 
Each manager must have considerable discretion in determining 
'the volume of production, methods of operation, product mix, etc., 
subject only to broad policy discretion from top management. , The 
areas of the company where this independence cannot exist should 
properly-be considered as service centres, because the volume and 
character of services rendered are to a large extent determined 
by decisions originatinf; 'outside their divisions - e. g. as in 
the case of a public relations departnent. 
(2) Access to Sources and Markets 
The manager of the profit cc-n-tric must hwqc control, over all 
decisions relating to sources and markets. He must genuinely be 
free/ 
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free to buy and sell in alternative markets both inside and 
outside the company. Freedom to trade is essential to the 
concept because it dissolves alibis. Both buyer and seller 
have ample incentive to reach agreement on prices, if neither 
is restricted to a particular source or market. If these 
channels are; redetemined, the greater-part of the incentive 
is removed; nor can the required access to sources and markets 
be created by edict - outside sources or markets must either be 
there or be capable of being created. 
(3) Separable Costs and Revenues 
A profit centre must be able to split off its costs and find an 
I 
economically r6alistic price of the end products - otherwise, 
measurement of its profit performance is impossible. This 
requirement eliminates service type staff activities from 
consideration. 
(4) Management intent 
A distinction between a profit centre and a service centre can 
also be drawn in terms of management's intention. Only if the 
basic goal is profits should the operation be treated as a profit 
centre. 
Competitive Pricing 
Having outlined the characteristics which a profit centre must have, Dean 
goes on to consider competitive pricing. The underlying requisite for 
profit centre controls is competitive prices negotiated in arms' length 
bargaining by divisional managers who are free to go outside the company 
if unhappy with prIces paid by or to brother division managers. 
Intra-company pricing must preserve the profit making autonomy of the 
division manager so that his selfish interests will be identical with 
the interests of the company as a vybole. This can be Accomplished by 
the following three principles: 
I 
(1) I 
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(1) Prices of all transfers in and out of a profit centre should be 
determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers. 
(2) Negotiators should have access to full data on alternative 
sources and markets and to public and private information about 
market prices. 
Buyers and sellers should be completely free to deal outside the. 
company. 
In a big company there is a danger that interest in making profits will 
be diluted as a result of managerial specialisation and the separation 
of operation from ownership. The parochial ambitions of operating 
managers need to be held in check - performance should be judged 
in terms 
of alibi-proof, objectively-measured profits. When transfer prices. are 
economically correct and profit centres are properly established, top 
management can delegate and still have peace of mind, because the 
division manager's targets and incentives will be so set up that his 
interests are identical to those of top management* 
It must be emphasised that much of the harm that can be done by arbitrary 
and authoritarian pricing of intra-company transfers is hidden. such 
prices lead to sins of omission as well as sins of commission. They fail 
to give definitive indication of profitability of added volume. They rob 
management of an economically correct basis for evaluating various profit 
figures and they provide a distorted and incorrect measure of the economic 
desirability of different channels of distribution. Bad transfer prices 
can also misdirect capital investment and cause friction and dissension 
among executives. 
It is Dean's claim 
1 
that negotiated competitive transfer prices can prevent 
such lossess 
'for they can make the division's procurement, processing, 
pricing and distribution sensitive to market requirements and responsive 
to competitive alternatives. They can provide sound guidance in making 
1. Joel Dean - Decentralisation --nd intra-ccmpairl Pricing - Harvard Business 
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purchasing decisions, indicate the extent to which additional procesqiIIS 
will be profitable, and direct the flow of products so as to make the 
greatest net profit for the company. 
one of the main criticisms of negotiated transfer prices is that it 
inevitably takes up a considerable part of executive time and that the 
time-wasting element is, therefore, often sigfiificant. Dean refutes 
this suggestion and claims that the very process of negotiation avoids 
arbitrariness, tends to create agreement, and eliminates the cause of 
much friction and ill-feeling. Whilst his case isstrong, negotiation 
does not meet the demands of every situation, and as a result, consideration 
must be given to the criteria required in the development of transfer prices. 
When the other alternatives have been taken into account, we shall return 
to the question of Negotiated Prices. 
F) 0 d. %J 0 
CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING TRANsrER rRICES 
Willard E. Stone suggests that an intra-company pricing method must 
meet several requirements that reach into the very heart of the decentralised 
operation. These requirements must be satisfied if the organisation is to 
achieve the management efficiency that is its potential. 
First in importance is that the intra-company pricing method must arrive 
at a competitive price. This is basic to the entire structure of 
decentralisation. Profits are the yardstick for the measurement of 
managerial ability. If intra-company prices are not natural, that is to 
say competitivet this important means of evaluating management is lost. 
Top management must use divisional income statements in arriving at policy 
decisions concerning the profitability of divisional ventures. The decision 
to make or to subcontract various component parts of the company's end 
product will certainly be greatly influenced by the apparent profit or loss 
of a division. It is even possible that a decision to continue or to 
terminate operations of a division may depend on results based on intra-- 
company transfer prices. 
Intra-company pricing may well play a major part in showing a profit or a 
loss for a particular division. Unless top management is to ignore intra- 
company statements and go back to rule of thumb decisions in these matters, 
the intra-company. pricing system must therefore be realistic. If the intra- 
company pricing system is to be efficient, prices must be established which: 
(1) Foster a healthy interdepartmental competitive spirit. 
(2) Provide an adequate profit yardstick for the measurement of departmental 
management. 
(3) Provide figures to top management for use in policy decisions to make 
or to subcontract. 
Willard E. Stone "Intra-company Pricing" Accounting Review October 1956 
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Ilaving established the criteria which are required for the development of 
transfer prices, consideration should next be given to the various company 
policies which have been adopted to govern transfers from one division to 
another within the same organisation. 
30. 
8. COITANY POLICIES COVERNING INTER-UNIT TRANSFERS 
The National Association of Accountants' examination of company policies 
governing intra-company transfers 
I 
reached the following conclusions: 
1. Internal procurement is*expected where the company's products and 
services are superior or equal in design, quality, performance and 
price, when acceptable delivery schedules can be met, the-receiving 
unit suffers no loss and the supplier unit! s profit accrues to the company. 
Often the receiving division gains advantages such as better control over 
quality, assurance of continued supply and prompt delivery. 
If a receiving unit finds that internal sources of supply are not 
competitive, policy calls for one of the following actions: 
(a) It may purchase from an outside supplier after it has made a 
reasonable offort to bring the internal supplier unit's quotations 
and tems into line with those available outside. 
(b) It is free to purchase outside but must be prepared to justify its 
decision. Central executives usually review such actions and have 
an opportunity to take action where needed. Normally the right to buy 
outside is seldom used because the advantages of integration make 
inter-unit transfers preferable for both supplying and receiving 
units. Companies interviewed stated that the policy had sometimes 
been instrumental in bringing to light the presence of excessive 
costs due to obsolete or poorly located facilities, inefficient 
management, lack of volume or other causes 
In some cases it is customary to split purchases between internal 
and external suppliers because internal capacity is inadequate or 
because management wishes to have alternative sources available. 
2! 
1. National Association of Accountants - Research Series No. 30 as quoted in 
Accountants Cost Handbook (R. I. Dickey, Editor) 1960 
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2. Transfer prices are expected to be competitive, but internal 
procurement is required or neces3ar'y because no satisfactory outside 
source is available. Miere competitive prices are not profitable 
to the supplier unit, central executive and staff facilities are 
utilised to formulate and put into effect a plan for improvement. 
Internal transfer policies applying to different products often vary 
according to the nature of the product and conditions under which it*is 
marketed and sold. 
32. 
TRANSFER PRICING METBODS 
In practice, the transfer pricing methods used can be classified 
under the heading of either Cost-based prices or Market-based 
prices. Consideration is given first to the various types of Cost-based 
prices and then to Market-based prices. Finally we shall return to 
consider the question of Negotiated Prices already referred to on 
page 25. 
33. 
Cost-based Prices 
(a) Full Cost (Actual) 
Intra-company transfers at cost are satisfactory for accounting 
purposes because the need for determining intra-company profit is 
eliminated. However, trading at cost means that it is impossible 
to measure the contribution to profit of each unit of the company, 
Accordingly, the actual cost price, although relatively simple to 
calculate and, traditionally, the method used in valuing stock, is 
of little worth when evaluating the performance of decentralised 
units or making decisions based on the profitability of these units. 
Its use is restricted, therefore, to situations in which the 
responsibility for profit perfDrmance is centralised. 
Keller 
1 
points-out: ' 
"Where profit responsibility is placed below the .1 level of'the chief 
executive, intra-company prices at other than cost are required for 
preparing performance'. reports for each area of profit responsibility. 
A division manager's profit and loss report will be a true measure 
of his performance only if products*of his division are sold to 
other divisions at prices which result in either profit or loss to 
his division, depending upon his =nagerial abilities. - Transfers 
at cost would provide no measure of the profit performance of 
-he either unit. Production inefficiencies or efficiencies-in t. 
selling division would be passed on to the bpying division. The, 
profits of the latter would be determined in part by the performance 
in plants which are under another division manager. " 
Keller, I. W. Management Accounting f or 
Profit Control McGraw Hill 1957 
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Full Cost (Standard) 
Transfers at standard cost are preferable to actual cost transfers 
because the use of standard costs prevents the selling division 
from passing on its inefficiencies in the transfer price. 
The use of standard cost also eliminates one source of delay in 
processing transfers and permits a division manager to know in 
advance what price he will receive or what price he will pay for 
transferred goods, thus eliminating a source of uncertainty and 
permitting a division manager to predict more accurately the 
effects of his decisions on his reported profit. 
Mien the National Association of Accountants carried out their 
research on l, ntra-Company Transfers in 1956, it was found that 
I 
where transfers were costed at standard, variances from standard 
cost were usually absorbed by the supplying division, as, one would 
have expected., However, it is noteworthy that in a few cases, the 
amount of variance applicable to transferred1roducts was also 
transferred to the receiving unit. 
Nevertheless, some of the criticisms raised against transfers at 
actual manufacturing cost also apply to standard cost transfers. 
Whilst the supplying division may derive the benefit of favourable 
variances from standard, and suffer the unfavourable variances, 
transfers at standard cost do not provide a proper measure of the 
profit performance of either, unit. Anthony, in his "Notes on 
Transfer Prices", 1 suggests that there ought to be a mechanism 
to ensure that the selling division benefits from savings arising- 
from new methods, where practicable, - otherwise the division will 
not be motivated to introduce new methods. Ile proposes the rather 
arbitrary idea that the stai. lard costs should remain unchanged for a 
period of time after a new method is introduced. 
1A -n t-lin "" I'j -1 -, j 17 -, --ý, I- 'b ,II, -'.. ,, ý-1.171, r I- -, rl , 
Ir r 1.7 TIN7 1Pq. 
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The majur defect of both full cost systems as a basis for transfer pricing 
is that they fail to provide a sound guide to decision making. The 
manager of a division which receives intermediate products from another 
division will treat the transfer price as a variable cost of his own 
operation (as shown in the examples given in the Introduction) - therefore, 
he will not buy unless the price that - he can receive from the sale of the 
final product is enough to cover the transfer price plus any additional 
processing and marketing costs which he may incur. The overall effect 
of the transaction might be to increase total company profits but the 
transfer at cost will obscure this fact. 
e. g. If a division manager has to choose between an outside vendor and an 
internal supplying division for all or part of his requirements of a certain 
intermediate product$ he will buy outside if the outside vendor's price is 
less than the internal full cost transfer price. It is assumed that 
reliability and quality are equal, that he has the authority to choone his 
sources of supply and that his financial performance is to be judged on the 
basis of his divisional reported profit. However, if the internal 
supplying divisionis operating at, say 60% of capacity and its incremen-'al 
costs amount to less than the outside vendor's cost, the loss in total 
company profit will be the difference between the price paid to the outside 
S upplier and the supplying division's incremental costs. 
It can be seen that in this case transfers at cost are in sharp conflict 
with the principle of decentralised decision making, which r(quires that the 
buying division manager be granted control over his sources of supply. if 
there is complete rigidity in the transfer price, the only way that top 
management can prevent an action which will reduce company profit is to take 
over the buying division manager's authority and order him to purchase 
internally. When t his has been done, however, the buying division manager 
can no longer be held responsible for his division's reported profit. 
Transfers/ 
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Transfers at full cost may have a further distorting effect on executive 
decisions. As long as a division manager is operating below practical 
capacity - that is, on the relatively flat portion of his average variable 
cost curve - he will be willing to produce to satisfy both internal and 
external demands for his goods. On the other hand, if he is nearing the 
limit of his capacity, he will be likely to favour the outlet for his 
goods which offers him the highest current revenue. Under these 
circumstances, market prices for the intermediate product are most likely 
to be higher than full cost, and unless a higher authority intervenes, 
sales to the outside market are likely to take precedence over internal 
transfers. The usual result is that the full cost transfer price system 
breaks down at this point as top management steps in to ensure the flow of 
goods to other divisions. 
Full cost transfer prices are in fact incompatible with the resource 
allocation objectives of a decentraliscd company. They do not provide 
a sound basis on which top management can delegate decision-making authority 
to division managers - authority over sources of supply and'outlets for' 
each division's products. For this reason, full cost transfer prices 
are generally restricted to situations in which this authority is not 
granted; in fact, to companies or divisions that are not really decentralised. 
In such cases, full cost or full cost plus a specified mark-up, is used to 
divide the total revenue from the sale of the company's products among 
divisions in such a way as to provide each division with an illusion of 
profit. Under these circumstances, the profit reported by a manufacturing 
division, for example, reflects only the effect of volume and the 
effectiveness of costcontrol. A useful purpose may be served by expressing 
these factors in an overall profit figure, but this is by no means a 
comprehensive concept of profit. In this way, full cost. transfer prices 
may serve the profit awareness objective of internal profit measu, ement, 
but they fail to deal with the resource allocation objectives. 
37. 
(C) Full Cost Plus 
A mark-up is often added to full cost. There are a number of variants 
to this method, but in most cases the mark-up is in the nature of C'n 
arbitrary figure set by central management. In this contextq the 
N. A. A. Research Study reported that the purpose of this method of 
pricing was to establish inter-unit trading prices at cost plus an 
allowance for profit, which is determined as a specified rate of 
return on the capital employed. 
The transfer price is made up of the following elements: 
1. Standard direct cost formulated from raw materials purchase priceq 
direct labour rates and variable overhead expense budgets. 
2. Standard period expense, established by the annual period expense 
budgets. The share of period expense applicable to the particular 
product is determined by distribution methods, used in the individual 
works. Standard period expense per unit of product ic based upon a 
forecasted volume supplied by the receiving divisiori. 
General administrative expenses at the rate of X% of capital employedp 
unitised at forecast volume. 
4. Profit at the rate of X% of capital employed, unitised at forecast 
volume. 
The N. A. A. Research Study observed that: 
"For some products, no outside market exists, and there is no way to 
approximate a reliable competitive price. These circumstances are 
most common where all companies in the industry are fully integrated 
and each produces certain materials or components solely for its own 
consumption. In pricing such products, one company explained that 
its. inter-unit transfer prices are designed 'to strike a balance between 
anA a fair return to the supplying plant & encouragement to intcr-plant 
-i, -c pric4--'. '-us" Onscrvat .e b. y c &-ý ý&, C, AnOther r-, a.. n given fcr the us 
of cost-plus pricing is that it reduces the amount of time devoted to 
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inter-unit price negotiation when the items to be prices are comp3ratively 
minor in value. In these cases, methods of cost determination are 
negotiated in order that future pricing may proceed routinely. This 
procedure is viewed as a form of competitive pricing by most companies. 
However, a few companies turned to cost-plus pricing wben attempts to 
negotiate competitive prices resulted in time-consuming disputes among 
divisional managers. " 
Kellerl in "Management Accounting for ProfitýControl", describes a type of 
full-cost plus method called the budgeted cost-plus profit method, which is 
used where the producing unit does not sell to outside customers. The 
budgeted cost includes the factory cost and any administrative expenses 
related directly to the production function. Profit is determined as a 
percentage return on the capital which is budgeted to be employed at the 
budgeted or normal volume used for unitising period expenses. The 
percentage is set by company policy. It may be the average return budgeted 
for the company, for the producing unit or for the buying unit. Or it may be 
a constant rate established by policy to be used for all intra-company 
trading. The following figures show how the intra-company price is 
calculated by this method: 
Unit Standard Cost/ 
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£ 
Unit Standard Cost - Material 1.00 
Labour . 6o 
Direct Expense 
_. 
40 
Unit Direct Cost 2.00 
Factory Period Expense 120000.00 
Administrative Expense 4,000.00 
1_6 v 000.0_0: 
Normal Volume - 10,000 units i. e. per unit 1.60 
Total Unit Cost 3.60 
=: Wmzý 
Capital Employed - Cash 3,000.00 
Stocks 70000.00 
Property 15,000.00 
25,000.00 
Desired Return on Capital Employed 8% - 2,000.00 
Pr ofit per unit to yield desired return 
at notmal volume of 10,000 - 0.20 
Intra-company price - 3.6 +. 0.20 - E3.80 
The objection t6 this method is that the producing unit is guaranteed 
a profit at normal volume if it meets its unit-standard costs and holds 
its period expenses to the budgeted amounts. it will incur gains or 
losses as volume exceeds or falls below normal. if budgeted volume 
were used, the producer could also have gains or losses as volume varied 
from the budgeted level, if policy did not provide for th6se to be passed 
on to the buying unit. However, this method does provide an incentive 
to the producing unit to meet or beat its standards and budgets, so that 
it will equal or exceed the return on. capital employed on the product which 
is established by the. intra-company trading policy. At the same time, 
profits of the buvi. ng unit will 0 not 
be affected by efficiercies or 
inefficiencies of the producing unit. To the extent that achieved 
efficiency is reflected in the standards for the next budget period, it 
Will/ 
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will be passed on to the buying unit in that and future periods. 
Where the budgeted cost-plus profit method is used for setting 
intra-company prices, there is usually a provision for adjustment for 
changes in raw material prices and wage and salary rates. The effect 
of these is passed on to the buying unit, which must then decide if its 
prices to customers should be changed accordingly. 
Although the above method has a number of points in its favour, because 
it is based on full cost, its use must be restricted to situations in 
which the producing unit does not sell to outside customers - if used 
in 
situations where outside sales do take place, the criticisms of full cost 
transfer pricing methods, stated earlier, will apply. 
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(d) Marginal or Variable Cost 
Transfer prices based on narginal cost or average variable cost are 
designed specifically to answer the objections raised to full cost 
transfer prices. Again, for the reasons cited earlier, we shall 
define these costs as standard costs rather than historical costs. 
Marginal and average variable cost, of course, are not the same thing, 
but difficulties of measurement and the likelihood of a close parallelism 
over wide segments of the operating range have led most accountants to 
assume them equal. Because this situation is a special case of the more 
general marginal cost case, our immediate purpose can be served by examining 
marginal cost as a basis for transfer pricing. 
A marginal cost transfer pricing system works in the following manner. 
Each division manager is provided with a schedule representing the ' 
marginal cost of each of his supplying divisions at various volumes of 
operations. This provides him with a basis for calculating the prices 
he must pay for additional quantities of the intermediate products. To 
these he adds his own marginal cost figures to determine a composite 
marginal cost schedule for the final products. He then adjusts his 
volume to the level at which the additional or marginal revenue from the 
sale of an additional unit of the final product is just adequate to cover 
total marginal cost. To use a more common frame of reference, the division 
manager will accept additional orders for the final product as long as the 
price received exceeds combined marginal cost, assuming that additional 
orders do not require price reductions on the business already obtainable 
at higher prices. When there is a market for the intermediate product, 
the respective amounts to be sold in the final and intermediate markets can 
be determined by finding that point at which the marginal cost of 
manufacturing7the intermediate product is just equal to the marginal 
rcvenuc fro-- sale of the intermediate product and is also equal to the 
net. marginal revenue (marginal revenue less marginal processing cost) from 
sales of tbp final. product. 
The/ 
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The difficultics of developing marginal cost And mnrginal revenue 
schedules that change with volu-me in this way are substantial. Few 
companies have cost structures that are delineated clearly enough to 
justify anything but a constant marginal cost assumption, and marginal 
revenue is even more of a mystery. Within sorre volume limits, however, 
marginal cost may indeed be constant, and within these limits marginal 
cost may be a reasonable measure of opportunity cost. 
A second defect is even more fundamental in that in some situations a 
marginal cost tralitsfer pricing system cannot be administered without 
abrogating the decision-making autonomy of the various profit centres. 
For example, if marginal cost increases with volumep production volume 
will depend on the total demands, of the buying division and the supplying 
division's external cu-stomers. Thus neither division can make its Output 
decisions independently. A division is thus essentially a cost. centre 
rather than a profit centre toýthe extent that it obtains or supplies 
products internally. 0 
The third defect of a straight marginal cost transfer pricing system is 
that it ignores the performance measurement aspects of internal profit 
reporting. As long as marginal cost is lower than average full cost, under 
marginal cost transfer pricing all divisions will show a loss except those 
divisions that make sales to the outside market. If these divisions also 
supply intermediate products to other units within the corporation, then their 
profit reports will reflect a mixture of "profits" on outside sales and "losses' 
on internal sales. 
Reported losses need have no ill effects at all on the use of divisional 
ptofit statements in the evaluation of manager. -, *. al performance providcd that 
evaluation is based on achievement of predetermined goals whAch have been I 
established in a critical, crcaLive manner. Unfortunately, no matt crh. ow 
intellectually it is conuAtted to this point 
of -,, -icw, 
b- cf-.. - of-r- fin-3s 
it emotionally difficult to accept a low profit figure as evidence of good or 
satisfactory/ 
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satisfactory performance. Furthermore$ executive promotion often seems to 
come faster, the monetary rewards are greater, and people are easier to 
recruit in divisions with good profit records, and a transfer pricing system 
that a division manager feels is unfairly depriving him of these advantages 
is likely to breed resentment, 
The activity evaluation aspect may be even more importantq particularly 
during periods of idle capacity. Here all the profits on internally 
transfdrred goods will be lodged in the internal buying divisions, and the 
supplying divisions may find it correspondingly more difficult to justify 
capital expenditure proposals. 
If marginal cost or something like it is to be used as a basis for*transfer 
pricing, some means must be found for overcoming these defects. 
Consideratiofi will now be given to the significance of Marginal Cost in the 
theoretical analyses of Transfer pricing and then to its-shortcomings when 
attempting to apply it to practical situations. 
44. 
d. M Theoretica-l Analyses 
The analogy between decentralised divisions within companies and the 
companies themselves as decentralised decision centres within the 
macro-system of the economy as a whole has made transfer pricing problems 
of interest 'to theoretical economists. Theoretical analysis indicates that 
optimal decisiorr-making occurs where the transfer price is set at the 
marginal or incremental cost of the transferor division for that output 
at which this marginal cost equals the transferee division's net marginal 
revenue from using the transferred product. This optimisation rule is 
derived from the economist's profit maximising condition for the firm as 
a whole - i-. e. that marginal cost should equal marginal revenue., Even 
where there is an outside competitive price which can be usedo the marginal 
cost rule still holds good-. The transferor division should produce-ýp to the 
point where its marginal cost equals the competitive pricet so that by 
setting the transfer price equal to the competitive pricet it is also set 
equal to the transferor division's marginal cost for its marginal unit of 
output. In effect, if a company'sý object is to maximise profit, the 
production policy which is best for it as a single profit centre is also 
best for it when it is organised into a number ofdivisional profit centres. 
If the company is organised with a single manager in charge of both the 
production of the intermediate and of its conversion into the final product, 
the most profitable course would be to push production to the point where 
the marginal cost of output equalled the marginal revenue to be obtained from 
it. From the company's point of view, this policy does not cease to be 
right just because the responsibility for production is divided between two 
or more profit centres. 
The argument that the correct procedure is to transfer at marginal cost if 
the market is imperfectly competitive or where no market exists for the 
transferred commodity appears to have been put first by J. Hirshleifer in 
his article "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing" in the Journal of 
Business, July 1956'. In this article he establishes as his go"al that mode of 
Pri cinr, / 
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pricing which lead., the autonomous profit centres to -make decisions yieldivg 
the largest aggregate profit for the firm as a whole. lie assumes, too, at 
the beginning of the article, that both technological independence and 
demand independence apply between the operations of the two divisions. 
lie defines. technological independence as meaning that the operating costs 
of each division are independent of the leyel of operations being carried 
on by the other and demand independence as meaning that an additional external 
sale by either division does not reduce the external demand for the products 
of the other. lie assumes also that the units of the intermediate and the 
final commodities are commensurate, 
The determination of the best joint level of output is shown in a diagram, 
which is reproduced on the next page. In this diagramt quantity. of output 
for the manufacturing division is shown as qm, and the distribution division's 
output as qd. 
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Figure I- Determination of Best Joint Level of OtktPut 
Source - 
J. Hirshleifer "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing" 
in R. V. Carsberg and H. C. Edey eds. 
Modern Financial Management Penguin 1969 
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Prices and costs per unit of output are measured vertically. The curves 
labelled mmc and mdc represent the marginal manufacturing cost and the 
marginal distribution cost, respectively, each as a function of output. 
Assuming that there is a competitive market for the final product, the 
distribution division will face a ruling price P. The best solution for 
the company as a whole is to set the joint level qm, and qd at the output 
such that mmc and mdc -P- that is, where the overall marginal cost equals 
the price, of the final product. If P equalsibe vertical distance OM, the 
optimum output is OL. 
Such an output would be established by central management by adding the mdc and 
mmc curves of the-separate divisions. A transfer price rule can, howevers be 
devised which will lead the divisions autonomously to the same solution. - If 
the distribution division calls for and secur&s from the manufacturing division 
a schedule showing how much the manufacturing division would produce (i. e. sell 
to the distribution division) at any transfer price p* for the intermediate 
commodity, this schedule would in fact be the same as the =c, curve, if the 
manufacturing division rationally determines its output to set Limc - p*. With 
this information, the distribution division can thendetermine a curve showing 
the difference or margin (P - p*) between market price and transfer price for 
any level of output which might be set. The distribution division then finds 
its own output where mdc =P- p* at OL and establishes the transfer price 
LD - ON. Evidently, the manufacturing division will then also produce at OL, 
since that is where mmc - p*. The upper shaded figure in the diagram represents 
the separate profit of the manufacturing division, and the lower shaded area 
that of the distribution division. 
Birshleifer stipulates one condition - the distribution division must not be 
permitted to increase its separate profit by finding a quasi-marginal revenue 
curve marginal to P- p* (the one labelled mr) and establishing an output of 
OR and a transfer price of RS - OU. This would amount to the distribution 
division's exploitirg the manufacturing division b-y acting as a monopolistic 
buyer/ 
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buyer of the latter's product, in which case the gain to the forwer wuuld be 
more than offset by the loss to the latter, and so the firm as a whole would 
lose thereby. The net loss is evident from the fact that the company output 
would be set at OR rather than at the optimal level of OL. 
The dominant role in decision-making has been given to the distribution 
division, but Hirshleifer indicates that the positions could be reversed 
without any essential change. Ile points out thaý bilateral bargaining in 
such a situation couldlead to a rather poor solution. 
In cases where the market for the final product is not perfectly competitive 
the solution remains unchanged In such instances, a sloping demand curve 
could be constructed instead of, the horizontal'demand curve MTQ. The process 
is the same as before, except that what corresponds to the curve labelled 
P- p* would be MR - p*q where MR is the marginal revenue for the final product. 
See Figure 2 on the next page. 
Hirshleifer has stated the case for the use of marginal cost pricing as applied 
to an intermediate product, but indicates that marginal cost pricing in this 
sense is a quite general answer for transfer pricing under conditions of demand 
independence. It is, howiever, marginal costing in a special sense, where the 
rules of procedure are set up so as to correspond-to the solution that a 
centralised management would arrive at with full information - namely, to set 
the sum of the divisional marginal costs equal to price (in the case of perfect 
competition) or*marginal revenue (in the case of imperfect competition) in the 
final market. 
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Figure 2- Determination of Best Joint Level of Output 
Source - 
optimal output and price will be where Marginal Cost (MC) 
equals Marginal Revenue. 
MC is the sum of marginal manufacturine cost (m m c) and 
marginal distribution (m d c). 
If Transfer Price is p*, distribution manager will choose 
output'level of qd, so that MR - p* +mdc- MC*. 
In turn the first division manager would independently choose 
an output level of qm, so that mmc= p*. Transfer price p* 
should therefore be set so that qd = qm., i. e. so that the two 
divisionsoperate at the same level. 
Ple goes on then to drop the'assumption that a single joint lcvel of outPut 
must be established for the two divisions together. Instead, each division 
is assumed to be free to determine its own output, with the manufacturing 
division selling its excess production, if any, on the intermediate market, 
and the distribution division similarly calling on this market to supply any 
excess of the quantity it desires to handle, over that available from the 
manufacturing division. Hirshleifer shows that in general, if the inter'mcdiate 
market is competitive, the transfer price should be the market price irrespective 
of the competitiveness of the market for the final product. in this case, as 
the price equals manufacturing marginal cost, the earlier contention that 
marginal cost pricing is the more general solution is not refuted by this 
result. 
Subsequently, Hirshleifer deals with the transfer price problem in an 
imperfectly competitive intermediate market and the effects of demand 
dependence and technological dependence, and reaches the following conclusions: 
(1) If a simple joint level ofoutput is to be determined (because no market 
for the intermediate commodity exists, or for any other reason) this 
output should be such that the sum of the divisional marginal costs equal 
the marginal revenue in the final market. To achieve this result by 
internal pricing, the transfer price must equal the marginal costs of the 
seller division. This is only a necessary condition, however, and not a 
sufficient one. The full solution involves one of the divisions presenting 
to the other its supply schedule (or demand schedule as the case may be) 
as a function of the transfer price. The second division then establishes 
its output and the transfer price by a rule which leads to the optimum 
solution for the firm as a whole. 
(2) Given technological independence and demand indepepdence, if a perfectly 
competitive market for the intermediate commodity exists, transfer price 
ttcr is should be at the marginal costs of the sellirg division. The l.. 
the more general solution. In the general case of imperfect competiticn, 
the/ 
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the price of the intermediate commodity will exceed the marginal cost 
of the seller division. Transfer pricing at the market will then lead 
to excessive output by the seller division and insuf f icient output by the 
buyer division - in comparison with the optimum solution. 
(3) Where technological dependence exists, the situation is so complex that 
he is unable to indicate even the nature of the general solution. However, 
as he states, the prospects for divisional autonomy in these circumstances 
is probably poor. 
(4) Where demand dependence exists, the analysis is rather complex. Generally 
speaking, the solution falls between market price and marginal cost. 
(5) Even under the assumptions of demand independence and technological 
independence, the optimal rule for transfer price leads to correct output 
adjustments only on the margin. It does TIOt follow thato if an autonomous 
division is apparently'losing money at the established transfer price, the 
company would really increase its profits by abandoning the operation 
concerned. 
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Similarly, David Solom-ons 
1 
pr , esents a eraphical. treatment of the theory of 
Transfer Pricing. He submits that it is impossible to discuss the economic 
theory of pricing in purely verbal terms without some loss of rigour, and 
depicts a variety of situations by means of a number of diagrams. 
In his first diagram (Figure 3 on the next page) he assumes that the 
intermediate product has a competitive market and depicts the position where 
a division (Division B) using an intermediate product is supplied both by 
transfers from another division (Division A) and by purchases in a competitive 
market from outside suppliers. 
1. Solomons David Divisional Performance - Measurement Control Irwin 1965 
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The horizontal line PB represents the demand curve for the 
final product of Division B. It is assumed that the market 
for this product is perfectly competitive, so that the price 
per unit obtainable by Division B is independent of the 
quantity sold since the division's sales do not represent 
more than a small part of the total industry sales of the 
produc t. 
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From the unit revenue PB, Division B has to recoup its own costs of 
processing the intermediate. These processing costs will consist of 
certain fixed costs of operating the process, together with the variable 
costs per unit of processing carried out. The fixed costs will be 
relevant in deciding whether a process will be instituted or not, or 
whether it will be continued or not. They are not, however, relevant 
to short term questions about the level of operations once the equipment 
and other fixed costs have been determined. In pursuing the short term 
policy questions, therefore, the fixed costs can be ignored and the variable 
or incremental cost of operations can be concentrated on. How these 
incremental costs will reacttD changes in the level of operations will vary 
from situation to situation. It is assumed that they increase as the scale 
of operations expands, (because loss efficient labour and equipment has to be 
drawain to feed the expansion) the line PB - MCB (depicting'the price of 
Product B less the marginal cost of processing the intermediate which, goes 
with it) will fall from left to right. (i. e. Because an increasing marginal 
cost of processing is being deducted from a constant selling price per unit 
of the final product. ) 
The line represents the net reVenueearned by Division B for each additional 
unit of the final product which it sells, subject to the recovering of its 
fixed costs and to the further deduction of the cost of the intermediate which 
it uses, whether it is bought outside or obtained by transfer from Division A. 
Division A's variable or incremental or marginal costs are shown by the line 
MCa. It is shown as rising from left to right as production expands, 'for the 
same reason as that given for the rising marginal cost of processing the 
intermediate in Division B. Division A is not the only source of the 
intermediate, which car, be bought competitively on the outside market at a price 
of Pa per unit. The unlimited availability of the intermediate at this price 
is represented by the horizontal line Pa. 
The correct courses for the two divisions are now clear. Division B should 
buy/ 
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buy the intermediate and process it so long as it adds more to its revcnue 
by so doing than it adds to its costs. It can profitably use a total of 
0 Qla units so long as it pays no more than the market price Pa whether its 
supplies come from Division A or the outside market. Any consumption of 
intermediate in excess of this quantity will add more to its costs than 
it adds to its revenue. Any consumption less than this will leave it 
with unsatisfied opportunities for profit. 
Division A will be prepared to supply only OQa units at a price Pa, because 
supplying more than this will add more to its costs (as shown by the line MCa) 
than it will add to its revenue. Thus Division B will get OQa of its supply 
of the intermediate from Division A, and Qa Qla by purchase on the market. 
11o better result than this can be found for the company as a whole. 
If Division B were to obtain more than OQa of its supply of intermediate 
from Division A, the additional cost to the company of supplies in excess 
of this amount would be greater than if they were bought outside at the price Pa. 
If Division B were to obtain less than OQa from Division A and bought more of 
its supply'outside, the company would again be incurring a greater cost for the 
intermediate than it need iticur. Setting the transfer price equal to the 
outside market price is the best way to make the two divisions act in the best 
interest of the corporation while seeking the most favourable result for 
themselves. 
Where Division B's costs of processing theintermediate product are greater 
than they were in Figure 3, the situation will be as shown in Figure 4 on the 
following page. 
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Figure 4- Where Division B's Costs of Processing the 
intermediate are higher than in Figure 3. 
Source - 
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In this case, although the line PB is in the same position as before, 
the line PB - MCB is lower, because less not revenue accrues to 
Division B from the sale of successive units of the final product than 
in the situation depicted by Figure 3. This reduction in not revenue 
results in the line PB - MCB cutting the line Pa to the left of the 
point where it is cut by the line representing the marginal cost of the 
interniediate product (Ma). . 
As a result, whilst Division A is prepare d 
to supply a quantity OQa of the intermediate product at a price Pa, because 
producing up to that quantity adds more to-its revenue than its costs, 
Division B will not be prepared to accept more than quantity OQIa, because 
to accept more than this quantity would increase its costs by a greater 
amount than its net revenue. This is shown in Figure 4 by the fact that 
the line PB - MCB is below the line Pa at all points to the right of 
Q1d. In these circumstances as Division B should only buy the quantity 
OQ'dat the price Pa, and Division A can produce OQa at a profit, the 
difference in volume of Q'a Qa should be sold to outside customers, because 
these outside sales will increase both Division A's profits and the company's 
total profits. 
In Figures 3 and 4, the vertically hatched area represents Division A's 
profit (subject to fixed costs) and the horizontally hatched area represents 
Division B's profit (subject to fixed costs). 
cse .0 
Solomons then goes on to consider the slLuations in which there in 
an imperfectly competitive market for the final product. Where 
Division B commands more than a small part of the total market for 
its product, it then has to take account of the impact of volume 
on price in deciding how much of its product it should make and sell. 
The price line will then be shown as falling from left to right, since 
the division can only achieve an increase in volume by accepting a lower 
price or by increasing the selling costs per unit, so that in either case 
the result is a fall in the net proceeds per unit sold. 
The situation is shown in the diagram on the next page. 
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The sloping line PB shows the relation between selling price and voluine, or 
more realistically, net sales proceeds per unit and volume. From this line 
can be derived the marginal revenue line (MRB) for Division B. Thisshows the 
incremental sales proceeds from each additional unit sold, and it will always 
be below the PB line, although it need not fall consistently. From Division 
B's MRB curve can now be derived the net marginal revenue curve, showing the 
amount available for purchase of the intermediate, by Divisi on B. This is 
obtained by deducting the division's marginal cost of processing the 
intermediate from the marginal revenue obtained from marketing the final 
product. The result is the MRB - MCB curve, which corresponds to the PB - MCB 
curve in the previous figure, except that in that situation the selling price 
per unit was constant (and therefore equal to marginal revenue per unit, which 
was also constant) whereas now we have to start from a falling PB curve. 
In Figure 5, Division B is willing to acquire a quantity OQ'a of the 
intermediate at the'ruling price Pa, for at any quantity less than this, the 
division has an incentive to increase its purchases, since 
ýy doing so it can 
add more to its net revenue than it adds to its costs. Division A, on the 
other hand, will be willing to supply only the quantity OQa at the competitive 
price Pa, for outputs in excess of OQa add more to its costs'than to its 
revenues. Division B therefore acquires OQa of the intermediate from 
Division A and an additional quantity Qa Q'a by purchase from outside. 
Division B's profit, subject to its fixed costs, is shown as the horizontally 
patched area, while Division A's profit, subject'to its fixed costs, is 
represented by the area of vertical hatching. 
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StrcnS re-inforcement for the marginal cost rule is to be found whenever a 
choice has to be made between buying an intermediate product needed by a 
division or having it made by another division and transferred. Within a 
division, "make or buy" decisions, if made rationally, call for a comparison 
of the cost of buying outside with the incremental cost of producing the 
article inside. The nature of the decision, -from the company's point of 
view, is not changed simply because the intermediate would have to cross 
divisional lines, if made internally. The use of incremental cost as the 
basis of transfer pricing will enable the make or buy decision to be made 
just as it would be in a non-divisionalised firm. If there is a competitive 
market outside for the intermediate in which the divisions are really free 
to buy and sell, there is no problem. In the absence of such a market, 
however, it is clear that some common bases of transfer pricing - full 
standard cost, or full standard cost plus a return on investment - could 
cause a division to buy an intermediate outside because the price was below 
the transfer price even though the incremental cost of production internally 
in another division would have beýn below the outside price. obviously, 
in such a situation, outside purchase would add more to the company's outlays 
I 
than production within the company would have done. Such purchases would 
therefore reduce the company's profit (or keep it below what it would have 
been) even though the purchasing division, looked at by itself, might be 
better off as a result of tbeoutside purchase. 
It should be noted that the determination of the separate marginal costs of 
several products made by the same division is not much more difficult than 
finding the marginal cost of a single product, as long as extreme accuracy 
is not important. The reason for this is that fixed costs do not enter into 
marginal costs. Each product's marginal cost is made up only of those cost 
I items for which the product itself is responsible. 
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Practical Objections to the use nf Mirginal Cost 
In the study of transfer pricing policies actually in use carried out 
for the Financial Executives'Research Foundation, Professor Solomons 
states that the most common method of fixing transfer prices was to set 
them equal to the' outside market price of the transferred product, or 
to some variant of this figure adjusted to pass on the saving in selling 
costs (or a part of the saving) to the transferee division. In only one 
case was there an open reference to marginal cost or anything close to it. 
He suggests three reasons why the, narginal cost rule has been neglected 
by divisionalised companies: 
1. Some companies are subject (or believe that they are subject) to legal 
or institutional restrictions on their freedom to choose the transfer 
price basis most. suitable for them. 
2. There are a number of situations, in which it is difficult or 
-impossible to use-marginal cost pricing. 
3. The use of marginal cost pricing by a division for la substantial part 
of its output (where transfers make up a large part of its activity) 
interferes more or less seriously withthe use of divisional profit as 
-a measure of performance. 
We shall now examine these three reasons in detail, for a number of 
authorities both in the U. S. A. and in the United Kingdom have considered 
these aspects from different viewpoints. 
1. Solomons, D. Divis; ional Performance - Measurement and Control 
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1. Legal and Institutional Objections 
It would appear reasonable to assume that there is nothing to prevent a 
division which sells a product, both to other divisions and to outside 
customers, from using a transfer price which differs from the outside 
price. Otherwise, transactions between divisions would be subject to 
restrictions not applying to transactions between departments within a 
division,, or between departments of a non-divisionalised company. 
In the U. S. AýO the position is less clear when a division is separately 
incorporated as a subsidiary company, for-the Supreme Court has held a 
parent company and its subsidiaries to be, capable of conspiring together 
in restraint of trade. The case in question is Kiefer Stewart Company v. 
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons Inc. and'is described as follows by Willard E. 
stone 
"The Seagram Company was accused of'restraining trade by, entering into 
agreements with the Calvert Company, -a'subsidiary corporation, to refuse 
to sell whisky to the Kiefer Stewart company -the Seagram Company 
was said to have violated the Sheman Act. ". 
stone also quotes a section of the Clayton Act as follows: 
I 
"It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to 
discriminate in prices between different purchasers of commodities 
of like grade and quality - where the effect of such discrimination 
may be subs'tantially to lessen*competition or tend to create a monopoly, 
He points out that the issue which arises here is - does a corporation 
which transfers products to its own organisational units at a price lower 
than it sells to outside purchasers, give itself a discriminatory 
competitive advantage in the eyes of the law? The consent decree given 
in the/ 
1. Willard E. Stone "Legal Implications of Intra-Company Pricing" 0 
Accounting Review January, 1964. 
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in the Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company Case in 1954 in New York 
indicates an affirmative answer, for'it was held that: . 
"Defendants in the sale of any food or food products manufactured 
or processed by any of the defendants or their subsidiaries are 
severally and jointly enjoined and restrained from making any 
sale of such food or food products to the outside trade within 
the continental United States except atprices no higher and on 
terms of sale no less favourable than those prices and terms of 
sale upon which such products are sold to the defendants. " 
The inference is that the transfer of produce from subsidiary to parent 
at a price equal to cost, or in any event less than market pricet was an 
important factor in the court's finding the A. & P. Tea Company guilty of an 
infringementlof the U. S. anti-trust laws. 
However, in his article Stone goes on to point out that the use of an 
intra-company transfer price other than full market price would not constitute 
a violation of anti-trust laws in the absence of other practices which 
restrict free trade, and substantiates t4is. viewpoint with a quotation from 
the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, which states: 
"Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation 
engaged in commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary 
, corporations 
for the, actual carrying on of their immediate lawful 
business, or the natural or legitimate branches or extensions thereof, 
I or 
from owning. and holding all or part of the stock of such subsidiary 
corporations when the effect of such formation is not to substantially 
lessen competition. " 
Anti-dumping laws 
In the case of multi-national organisations, it should be noted that goods, 
either in finished or unfinished form, when transferred from a U. S. corporation 
to a foreign subsidiary are subject to the customs laws of the fc-4gn 
country. These customs laws have two purp9ses: 
l. / 
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1. the raising of revenue, and 
2. the protection of their home industries against the dumping of excesc 
production of the companies of Other countries. 
For example, the Canadian customs tariff laws require that a value be placed 
upon all the goods entering the country. The value placed upon the goods 
must appear on the invoice and bill of entry. ror all goods for which there 
is an established competitive price in the U. S. A., the value for duty will be 
the fair market value, at the time when and the place from which the goods 
were shipped to Canada, of like goods when sold in like quantities for home 
consumption in the ordinary course of trade under fully competitive conditions 
and under comparable conditions of sale. For goods for which there is no 
competitive market, such as unfinished products, the law provides: 
"Where'the value for duty cannot be determined under the preceding 
subsections, the value for duty shall be the actual cost of production 
of like or similar-&O'ods at the date of shipment to Canada plus a 
reasonable addition for administration costs, selling cQsts and profit. " 
The value that is used'On the duty declaration must be the same as that which 
appears on the invoice. 
. 
This invoice must be certified as the true and 
only invoice. It would appear, therefore, that the intra-company pricing 
value of goods transferred between a U. S. corporation and its Canadian 
subsidiary must meet the requirements of the customs duty laws. Accordinglys 
the intra-company pricing method that is required is market value for those 
items for, which there is an established market, -and manufacturing cost plus 
something in the region of 207. for products for which there is no, market. 
The teeth in the law are provided by a clause which permits the Minister 
of Tariff to determine a fair market value for assessment purposes for any 
product for which he is not satisfied that the declared value meets the 
above qualifications. The Minister of Tariff does not have the power to 
cxaminc/ 
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examine the books and records of a U. S. corporation, but by his authority 
to establish a value on imported products lie can throw the burden of proof 
of market price or cost on the U. S. corporation. As there is no statute 
of limitations in the Canadian custotas duty act, there can 
ýe little doubt 
that most U. S. companies would find it advisable to open their records to the 
Canadian authorities if the request was made. 
Stone concludes that there can be little doubt that the method of intra-company 
pricing used to place a value on goods transferred between parent and. 
subsidiary corporation has legal implications. In the A. & P. Tea Company 
anti-trust casev the prosecution pointed to the intra-company pricing as 
evidence of violation on several occasions. 
e. g. "The profit from the non-retailing end of the business 
subsidised the retail business, so that the latter could 
operate at, an uneconomical profit rate,, a privilege not 
possible, to A. & P. 's competitors. This,, the Government, 
contends is an inherent abuse of the, vertical integration of 
A. &. P. 1s system. " 
Probably the use of market value, as the transfer price would not have changed 
the outcome of the case, but the judge was certainly impressed with the point 
as is'evidencedby the decree., on thelother hand, the intra-company pricing 
method used, in the absence of a restraint of trade violation obviously 
cannot-lead to any anti-trust prosecution, Customs tariff laws'and anti-dumping 
laws of Canada, 'the United Statess Mexico and many other countries appear to 
place a'definite requirement on the method of intra-company pricing between 
domestic corporations and'foreign subsidiaries. For goods with an established 
marketo the fair market value must be used - for all other goods, full 
manufacturing and distribution cost is required. 
Customers ob_je_ctions 
In-the study carried out by Solomons, it was'noted that a number of divisional 
executives raised the objection that customers would resent paying higher prices 
than other divisions of the company had to pay. lie concludes, however, that this 
argument/ 
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argument is probably no more than a rationalisation of objections really 
based on other grounds', on the basis that customers would not know how much 
the other divisions u\ere charged, and therefore how could they resent what 
they didn't know? 
The'implication is, of course, that, there are outside customers and that 
there is in fact a market. The wider the market, the more likely it will 
be approximate to a freely competitive market and the more likely it 
will be that market price is the appropriate basis for transfer pricing - 
wheremarket price can be used between divisions the interests of outsiders 
will be automatically safeguarded. -Alowever., if-the outside market is a 
limited onev or for other reasons, is too dependent on what the company 
does to qualify as a perfect market, then market price, as it becomes more 
difficulty to determine,. also becomes less appropriate. 
Tax Avoidance- 
In this country it has been noted that transfer prices can be used to 
minimise taxes on a world wide basis. In his article on International 
Aspects of Accounting, Professor R. H. Parker 
1 
quotes from the Report from 
the Co=ittee of Enquiry into the Relationship of, the Pharmaceutical Industry 
with the National Health Servicep as follows: II 
"The second difficulty about foreign-ovmed firms, the, transfcr price 
of'raw materials of intermediate procured from foreign affiliatest 
is likewise an intricate one and we have reason to believe from the 
results. of our financial questionnaire that it is of considerable 
importance. Foreign firms reported a much higher cost of materials 
as a percentage of the total cost of manufacture than did British 
firms and we believe that the propriety of such costs should be 
investigated. We are aware that the United Kingdom tax authorities 
have a right to investigate these transfer prices in order to ensure 
that foreign-owned manufacturing or distributing companies in this 
country (no matter in what industry) are not improperly reducing the 
R. H. Parker "International Aspects of Accounting" Journal of Business Finance 
Vol. 3. No. 
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apparent amount of their profits in the United Kingdom by inflating 
the transfer prices that they pay to their foreign parents. The tax 
authorities of other countries have and operate similar powers. We 
recommend that the attention of the British tax authorities should be 
drawn to the transfer prices of pharmaceutical raw materials or 
intermediate4 and that the Ministry, in assessing the Standard Cost 
Returns of foreign-owned manufacturing companies, should make use of the 
ability of chemical engineers to form reasonable assessments of the. 
production costs of chemical materials. They should be unwilling to 
accept the prices noted on Standard Cost Returns unless the foreign-owned 
firm offers confirmation of the reasonableness of its transfer prices, and 
the Ministry's own professional staff consider them reasonable. " 
Situations in which it is difficulty or imRossible to use marginal 
cost pricing. 
In certain situations it is impossible to ýgnore the fact that the 
cost function is "stepped", -rather than smooth, owing to the fact that 
production facilities are inadequate or that other necessary resources 
constitute a bottleneck which restricts the output of the product 
which is transferred between divisions, below the amount required. 
In these circumstances marginal cost-pricing will not, if the matter 
is to be settled between divisions without interference from above, 
result in a satisfactory transfer of the product. The fact that 
further expansion in output will, from time to time, be held up by 
a need for heavy expenditure on additional space or equipment 
(i. e. situations in which what are usually called "fixed costs" refuse 
to stay fixed) will create conditions in which the marginal analysis 
cannot operate. 
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3. Where interdivisional transfers make up an im2ortant partof a 
division's activity, a MarBinal CostPricing basis will interfere 
with the use of Divisional Profit as a Measure of Performance. 
If a division has no outside business, marginal cost pricing of its 
transfers to other divisions will leave the division with a loss which 
is equal to its fixed costs. Whilst theproducts transferred to other 
divisions will enable those divisions to make a maximum contribution to 
the company's profit, the supplying division's part in the operation 
cannot be judged in terms of its own profit and loss account because it 
will have passed on all of its profit to the divisions making the final 
products. In these circumstances it is clear that either marginal 
cost pricing or profit independence'has to be discarded. 
If profit independence is dropped, the supplying division should dither 
be merged with another division (if it does all, or most of its business 
with that one division) to form a single profit centre; or if it does,, 
business with several other divisions, it should be given a separate 
status as a service centre, rather than as a profit centre. 
On the other hand, the difficulty of combining marginal cost pricing 
with full divisional status for divisions serving other divisions 
has sometimes led to marginal cost pricing being replaced by other bases 
of transfer pricing. These bases usually involve negotiated prices or 
some approximation to markeýt price, even where no really free market 
exists. The argument is made that the loss of the profit incentive 
will diminish efficiency and that the company will lose more from this 
cause than it will gain from the elimination of sub-optimisation. 
In this contexto Paul W. Cook 
1 
has written: 
"A company might well find that the effects of incentives and 
profit evaluations, in terms of innovation, creativity and hard 
work / 
1. Cook, P. W. Decentralisation and the Transfer Price Problem 
Journal of Business Vol. 28 1955 
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work, far out: weigh the disadvantages inherent in a somewhat illogical a 
transfer price system and somewhat misleading financial reports. " 
Similarly, Joel Dean writes: 
"Commercial abilities that are so desirable in a well rounded 
divisional manager are stunted under marginal cost transfcr pricing. 
He is isolated from the pitfalls and opportunities of the market and 
is confined to the role of a service division manager. " 
Whilst there is clearly a danger in the loss of-profit rcsponsibilityl 
it should be noted that the profit spur is not the only way to maintain 
efficiency. Jt does not follow that divisionalised companies are invariably 
more efficient than non-divisionalised businesses, and as long as every 
effort is-made to find and use other means of keeping the efficiency of 
service centres high, resorting to the profit motive for sections of a 
business where it is not appropriate is likely to do more harm. than good. 
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Marginal_Cost and Opportunity Cost. 
A transfer price will only achieve its decision-making objectives 
satisfactorily if it leads the management of both divisions involved 
to reach the same decision as would be made by the management at 
headquarters, if that management had time to study the problem and 
had full access to all of the data available to the managers of both 
divisions. As has already been indicated, if the transfer price 
selected in any particular situation leads to a departure from this 
ideal, suboptimisation will occur. An optimal economic decision 
will only be achieved if consideration is given to both the 
additional costs incurred to'the point of transfer and the opportunity 
costs of the company as a whole. Tbýese additional costs will be 
reflected by the cash flowing out which*is directly associated'with 
the production and transfer of the product in question and which is 
sometimes referred to as incremental cost or direct cost or variable 
co's't. Op - portunity cost is''usually defined as the maximum contribution 
foregone by using limited resources for-a particular purpose . and in 
this case will therefore mean the maximum I contribution to' profits 
foregone by the company as a whole if an internal transfer of the 
product takes place. ý It is important therefore that the definition 
of Marginal Cost'in this context should include the cost cf opportunities 
'foregone by the decision to sell internally. 
Horngren distinguishes specifically between the additional money 
costs (which he calls additional outlay costs) and opportunity costs 
because in most circumstances accounting systems record the additional 
costs incurred in attaining the purpose chosen, but do not record the 
Opp , ortuniýy costs of the best alternative rejected. He agrees that 
some'economis-ts would not make the distinction, but would consider 
the/ 
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the additional outlay costs as part of the total opportunity costs 
because these additional outlay costs measure what could have been 
saved by the company had the outlay on this particular alternative 
not been incurred. He accepts too the point made by David Solomons 
that there is a range of transfer prices rather than an unchanging 
transfer price. Solomons says: 
"Transfer prices should be set equal to the marginal cost of 
supply, not just at any output, but at one particular equilibrium 
output. " 
The additional outlay costs of the supplying division at different 
levels of output have to be related to the quantities demanded at 
each level of additional sales. So that an unchanging transfer price 
can only be appro priate in the case of a perfect market for the 
intermediate product (with a constant market price equal to marginal 
revenue) or in the case of constant marginal costs. In fact the 
transfer price has to be determined in relation to constantly changing 
levels of supply and demand, so that market prices and marginal costs 
vary and there is a schedule of transfer prices for various quantities 
rather than a specific transfer price. 
Horngren suggests that where a perfect market exists for the intermediate 
market, opportunity cost in the restricted sense as applied by him will 
be the market price for the intermediate product less the additional 
outlay cost. For example, if the outlay cost is $1 and the market 
price is $4, the transfer price will be $1 + the opportunity cost) 
which is $3 (Market Price $4 less Outlay Cost $1). In this situation 
the transfer price will be the same as the market price. Where, 
howevert no market exists for the intermediate product or alternative 
products/ 
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products which might make use of the supplying division's facilities, 
the opportunity cost may be nil. In these circumstances the correct 
transfer price may, be the additional outlay costs only. 
It can be seen from the above example that the existence of a perfect 
market for the intermediate product eliminates most of the transfer 
pricing problem. Unfortunately, in practice the market for the 
intermediate product is often imperfect and ill-defined and sometimes 
even non-existent. Against such a background the significance of 
Horngren's "opportunity cost" will be recognised, for whilst it may be 
easy in theory to measure the foregone contribution from rejecting the 
next best alternative, this may prove to be impossible in practice. 
Horngren quotes the case of a supplier division with idle capacity 
which produces an intermediate product against a background of 
imperfect demand. In such a case the opportunity cost, as defined 
by him, may be nil but it could have a positive value if the demand 
for the product is elastic and the supplying division has the 
alternative of increasing demand by reducing its price and increasing 
its overall revenue. 
-Since optimal transfer prices depend on cost and revenue functions, 
they must depend on--the company's ability to know what the relevant 
functions are. The company will never know exactly how the additional 
outside sales will affect, revenue because it does not know the precise 
elasticity of demand for its product, so that it can only forecast the 
opportunity cost of inter-divisional sales. The following example 
illustrates this forecasting problem and just how difficult it is to 
measure the probable effect of such a decision and therefore how 
difficult it is. to measure opportunity cost in such a situation 
e, - 
A company has two divisions, A and B., Division A produces a, 
sub-assembly andDivision B incorporates this sub-assembly into the 
f inal/ 
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final product. There is a market for both the sub-assembly and 
the final product, and profit responsibility has been delegated to 
the divisional management, The transfer price for the sub-assembly 
has been set at long-run average market price. 
The following information is available to both divisions 
Estimated Selling Price for completed product 200 
Long-run average Selling Price for sub-assembly 140 
Additional outlay costs incurred by Division B 
to convert sub-assembly into final product 100 
Additional outlay costs incurred by Division A so 
if the divisional manager of'Division B reviews this data from his 
own standpoint, he will produce the following calculation 
E 
Selling Price - completed, product 200 
-Charge 
for sub-assembly from Division A 
(based on market price) 140 
Additional outlay costs to complete 
product 100 240 
Loss on Product (40) 
However, if a marginal cost approach is made from the viewpoint of 
the company as a whole, a positive contribution will be shown - 
E 
Selling Price - completed product 200 
Less - Additional outlay costs in 
Division A 80 
Additional outlay costs in Division B 100 180 
Contribution 
. 
20 
Sub-optimisation would therefore occur if the manager ofI. Division 
decided against accepting the t, ansfer of the sub-assembly from 
Division A. 
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It must be noted though that the question of excess capaclLy itt 
Division A is important in this context. If there is no excess 
capacity in Division A, any internal transfer of the sub-assembly 
for conversion into the final product must result in the diversion 
of the sub-assembly from its outside market. In othmwords 
Division A gives up its opportunity to sell outside the company. 
In the circumstances outlined, sales in the market for the 
sub-assembly result in a greater contribution to the company as 
a whole - 
E 
Selling Price - sub-assembly 140 
Additional outlay costs in Division A 80 
Contribution 60 
Where there is no excess'capacity in Division A, 'ilie market price 
for the sub-assembly is the transfer price which leads to the correct 
decision because the additional outlay costs of E80 plus the 
is opportunity cost" (E140 - 80) -E60 givcs a total opportunity cost 
of E140 which is equivalent to the market price. The manager of 
Division A should not therefore transfer to Division B unless there 
are extenuating circumstances making it necessary to continue to sell 
the completed product. Accordingly Division B will either have to 
cease the manufacture and sale of the completed product or find some 
way of reducing costts thereby increasing the contribution to fixed 
costs and profits. 
The sLtuation changes, however, when DivisionAhas excess capacity. 
If it is assumed that Division A's maximum capacity for, the 
sub-assembly is 500 units per month and sales to the outside market 
are only 400 units, there will be excess capacity of 100 units for 
which there is no outside market. In this case, the opportunity cost 
in respect of 'these 100 unitS will be ESO pcr unit, because cnly the 
additional outlay costs should be taken into account, there being no 
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excess of market price over outlay cost. The transfer price to 
Division B in respect of these 100 units should therefore be fixed 
at E80, if the viewpoint of the company as a whole is taken. 
Consideration must then be given to the effect of a reduction in 
Division A's selling price of the sub-assembly to the outside market. 
If such a reduction resulted in increased sales which eliminated the 
excess capacity, the opportunity cost of supplying the 100 units to 
Division B at E80 per unit would again become significant. if it is 
assumed, first, that the price reduction is restricted to the 100 units 
only, the selling price for these units could be cut to say E100p and 
there would still be a contribution of E20 per unit for the company as 
a whole. 
It is however more realistic to assume that the price will be cut for 
all sales, for it is unlikely that Division A could maintain two prices 
to different outside customers for. -any 
length of tirrie. If, for example 
it is assumed that a reduction in the external priceof the sub-assembly 
to E135 would result in an-increase in sales to 500 units, the following 
result would be obtained 
E 
Contribution from external sales of sub-assembly 
(E135 -fBO) x 500 27,500 
Contribution if price is maintained at E140 
(E140 - 80) x 400 24,000 
Contribution foregone if 100 units transferred to 
Division B 3,500 
It should be noted that this result has been obtained by assuming 
that demand is highly elastic - i. e. that a small reduction in price 
of E5, (from E140 to E135). will produce an increase in sales of 100 units 
(from 400 to 500 units). In these circumstances reventnincreases 
as price f"alls, but where de-m--nd is inelastic the contributicn will 
decrease after a reduction in price. 
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1n our example the opportunity coz; t per unit incurred by the 
transfer of the 100 units to Division B would be 
E31500 E35. 100 
It is correct therefore to say that in these circumstances the total 
opportunity cost per unit of the transfers to Division B is the 
additional outlay costs in Division A (E60) plus the above E35 
making a total'of E115'and that the transfer price should be fixed 
at this figure. This transfer price of E115 will lead to the correct 
decision, for Division B will not accept the transfer at this pike 
because its total costs of ElOO (additional outlay costs) plus E115 
will exceed its prospective selling price of E200. Division A may 
then sell all of the 500 units to outside customersm E135, and the 
contribution margin for both Division A and the company, as a whole 
will be E27,500. If Division A continued to sell 400 units externally 
and. transferred 100 units to Division B, the company's contribution 
would be E24,000+000 units of completed product x E20) or E26,000. 
It might be thoughtthat the new market price of E135 is the appropriate 
transfer price, butthis assumes a perfect market. In this case there 
are imperfections in'the market for the sub-assembly and as a result 
the market price is not a good approximation of alternative revenue. 
If an increase in a division's sales creates a fall in the market 
price, then marginal revenue will be less than the-market price. 
It is true that either E135 or E115 will lead to the correct decision by 
Division B, in these circumstances. However, if, Division B's additional 
outlay costs were E80 instead of ElOO, then the manager of Division B 
would buy at a transfer price of E115 because the situation would be as 
f ollows: 
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E 
Selling Price - completed product 200 
Transfer Price - Division & 115 
Outlay Costs - Division B 80 195 
Contribution 5 
He would not, however, buy at E135 because B would then earn a 
negative contribution of E15 i. e. 200 - (135 + 80). If B's 
additional outlay costs were E80, transfers from Division A to 
Division B would be desirable because - 
E 
Division A's contribution is - 
400 (E140 - E80) + 100 (E115 - E80) 27,500 
and Division B's contribution is 
loo (200 - 115 + 80) 500 
28,000 
The same facts analysed for the company as a whole would produce the 
following results - 
Sales of sub-as sembly 
400 (140 - 80) 24,000 
Sales of completed product 
100 (200 - (80 + 80) 4pOOO 
280000 
If the transfer price was agreed at E135, Division B would not accept 
the transfer and would'not earn any contribution. Division A and the 
company as a whole would therefore earn a total contribution of E27,500. 
An intermediate situation could arise in which when the selling price 
of the sub-assembly is reduced to E135, sales inc rease to 450 units and 
Division B wishes to acquire 100 units This means that only 50 units 
are competing for the same facilities. The contribution foregone an 
those facilities would be affected by the price cut. The n,: I, "marginal 
revenue" on the increase in sales to oýtside customers from 400 units 
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to 450 units would be - 
potential contribution is 450 x (E135 - E80) 
Present contribution is 400 x (E140 - E80) 
Net marginal revenue 
Alternatively the computation could be - 
Increase in contribution from 50 more units - 
50 x E55 
Loss in contribution on 400 units - 
400 x 4: 60 - E55) 
Net marginal revenue 
E 
24,750 
24 000 zzl== 
750 -* 50 - E15 
2,750 
2 000 
750 4-50 - E15 
In these circumstances the transfer price applicable to the first 
50 Units offered by Division A will be the additional outlay costs of: 
E80 plus (E750 50) E95 per unit, and the transfer price 
applicable to the second 50 units offered by A will be E80 only because 
no "opportunity cost" element is involved. It can be seen from these 
different situations that in imperfect markets there is no single 
"marginal cost" or "opportunity cost" or "transfer price" which can be 
derived and can become a general, unchanging price-, 'Put another, wayt 
the optimal decision will depend on the shapes of the demandý(and cost) 
curves for both the sub-assembly and the completed product. It must 
also depend on how the price structure is, viewed, because if the company 
feels that there is some benefit to be derived from holding the price of 
the sub-assembly at E140g then there is no alternative but to transfer 
the 100 units in excess of outside market demand to Division B. Division A 
should sell all it can on the outside market at E140 and transfer the 
rest to Division B, at any price it can get which cxceeds, its additional 
outlay costs (variable costs). 
It has to be remembered that, tlie transfer price which may appear optimal 
in an economic analysis may be totally unacceptable from both the 
vicwpOint/ 
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viewpoint of preserving the autonomy of the divisional managers 
and the evaluation of the performance of these divisions as economic 
units. For example, if we consider the situation in which the selling 
price of E140 is to be maintained for the sub-assembly and there is 
idle capacity, a suggestion that Division A should sell the excess 
units to Division B at E80, the additional outlay costs, would be 
desirable from the viewpoint of Division L and the company as a whole. 
It would not however be acceptable to the manager of Division A for 
he will earn nothing from the transfer and his autonomy is being 
* 
eroded. He could maintain that he is contributing to the mrning 
of profits on the completed product, and is therefore entitled to a 
share in the total company contribution of E20 per unit. There are 
reasonable grounds for such an argument, but how can we assess how 
.. 
much of the ultimate contribution should be iredited to him. This is 
a major practical difficulty and it may be that its solution will result 
from negotiation between the two divisional managers. An equitable 
split may be achieved if a transfer price within the range of E80 to 
E100 is agreed. 
In these circumstances it may be that a dual pricing scheme, whereby the 
supplier gets credit for the market price of the sub-assembly, and the 
buyer is charged only with the incremental cost, may be introduced. 
In any event, where there is interdependence between the divisions, 
some system of subsidies may be required to ensure that the three 
criteria of goal congruence$ the preservation of autonomy and a 
universally acceptable method of evaluating performance are iraintained. 
It is of course a question of degree, however, for in instances where 
the subsidies required are heavy, some doubt must arise as to whether 
or not the existing degree of decentralisation is optimal. 
The examples of differing circumstances outlined in the foregoing pages, 
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illustrate how important it is to consider all nf the factors involved 
when determining the level of inter-unit trading which should take 
place. It is clear that the purchasing division's management must 
know the supplying division's marginD! costs, if sub-optimisation is 
not to occur. Secondly, the question of excess capacity in the 
supplying division has to be considered. Where that division is 
operatiag below peak capacity, the opportunity cost of internal 
transfers will be restricted to its additional outlay costs because 
there is no excess of market price over outlay cost. on the other 
I 
hand, if there is no excess capacity, any internal trading will reduce 
the supply of the intermediate product to the outside marketq so that 
the market price for that product will be the transfer price which 
leads to the correct decision.. Extenuating circumstances may make 
it necessary however to maintain sales of the product which is completed 
by the purchasing division, so that internal transfers will continue 
to take place despite the existence of a considerable margin between 
the external selling price of the intermediate product and the 
additiorial outlay costs. 
The results of poEsible changes in the outside market price of the 
intermediate product complicate the situation even more, because of 
the effect on the level of excess capacity. if a small decrease in 
the selling price of the sub-assembly to outside buyers eliminates 
excess operating capacity, the opportunity cost of selling internally 
becomes significant, and the profits accruing from existing sales of 
the finished product must be reviewed again. Finally, the degree of 
imperfection in the market for the intermediate product has to be taken 
into account, for market price becomes progres6ively a poorer 
approxiration of alternative revenue. as the degree of imperfection 
increases. If a fall in market price is created by an increase in the 
supplying division's sales to outside purchasers, then marginal revenue 
will/ 
82. 
will be less than the market price. All of these factors will 
influence forecasts of opportunity cost and therefore the optimal 
decision relating to the extent of inter-divisional trading. 
4 
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IL MARKET BASED PRICES 
'r Ln the National Accounting Asbociation Researeh Series No. 
ki the 
market price method is -described as follows: 
"A competitive market implies the existence of buyers and sellers, 
each acting in his own interest to establish prices at which goods 
are exchanged to mutual benefit. Such a market provides an incentive 
to efficient production because excessive costs cannot be passed on to 
buyers. By pricing inter-unit transfers at competitive market 
prices, this incentive can be introduced into internal operations 
I 
which would otherwise be largely insulated from external competitive 
pressures. In addition, competitive market prices provide reliable 
measures of divisional income because these prices are established 
0 
independently rather than by individuals who have an interest in the 
results. " 
A number ol. examples are given in the above research work to illustrate 
the fact that inter-unit pricing methods are influenced by characteristics 
of the commodity and the industry, e. g.: - 
1. A pricing agreement setting out principles and procedures to be 
followed 'is no-gotiated between supplying and receiving divisions. 
Inter-unit transfers are then priced in accordance with the agreement. 
Companies interviewed apply this procedure where fluctuating market 
prices require frequent changes in transfer prices and where numerous 
items of small unit value are transferred. 
2. Where transfers are non-repatitive and the amount involved is substantial, 
prices are negotiated for each transaction just as they would be in 
dealing with outside suppliers. 
3. Where periodic model or styl-e changes are made in end products, prices 
of components are negotiated when new'. model specifications become 
available and rcmain in force for the life of the model or style. 
Plans for a new model often include a series of deadline dates by which 
inter-unit transfer prices must be established. 
40/ 
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4. Standard items arc often transferred at the supplier division's 
list prices. Little negotiation is nccessary because uniform 
prices are usually quoted by all suppliers. When a lower price 
is quote%'A 'by an outside supplier, the buying division negotiates 
to obtain the same price internally, if possible. 
Paul W. Cook Jnr. 
1 
comes out strongly in favour of market-based 
transfer prices. Ile sets out to prove that there is no conflict 
between a company's profit goals and a profit centre's goals, when 
market alternatives are used to determine the transfer prices. Ile 
considers first the case of complete autonomy and stipulates the 
following. conditions: 
1. Trangfers must be made if they increase the profit of the company. 
2. Transfers must not be forced on profit centres if they reduce. the 
profit of the company. 
If both these conditions hold, whatever increases the profit of a profit 
centre will increase the profits of the whole company. 
When a transaction is considered from the standpoint of the buying division, 
if the price to be paid is the same for purchases inside the organisation 
as for outside purchases, it cannot be forced to accept a transfer which 
would result in lower profits, compared to the profit it could earn by 
purchasing outside. The division will accept transfers as long as it can 
use the supplies profitably, so that any transfer will be made which 
increases its profit. 
Conversely, from the standpoint of the selling division, -if it can get the 
same price by selling to another profit centre as it would to the outside 
market, its profit cannot be reduced by making the transfer. It cannot be 
forced into a transfer which will reduce its profit, so that the second 
condition is met. 
Paul W. Cook, Jnr. "Decentralisation and the Transfer Price Pr6blcn, " 
Journal of Business Vol. 28,1955 
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Cook then goes on to zmplify his general statement of the relationship 
between autonomous profit centres as follows: 
1. The net prices that the buyer and seller can get in the market 
might be different, owing to freightabsorption, selling expensesp 
credit terms, bad debt expense, etc. This allows some room for 
negotiation and there is no rule that can say where in this range 
the price should be. This difference is really a reflection of the 
gains of integration - if there was no difference between these net 
iprices, there would be no operating advantages in having the two 
profit centres in the same company. 
2. Either profit centre might sho%; a loss by dealing at the mirket price. 
The only effect or. this is to provide useful and objective information 
to top management. It shows that something is wrong and needs attention. 
Having one profit centre subsidise the other through an artificial 
transfer price merely conceals the fact that there are weak links in 
the chain. 
3. Either profit centre might find that it would reduce its losses by 
shutting down. If the company wants to get the largest possible 
current profits, such a profit centre should shut down. If management 
wants to keep the operation running until its problems are 
Lrrected, 
this couldbe done by aspecial budget which makes it possible to 
operate at the market price. If a rigged transfer price is used to 
keep the operation running, L, anagement would be merely practising 
self-delusion. Using a special budget tells management exactly 
what it costs to keep the profit centre going and permits a much 
-- 
better means of determining whether this is advisable or not. 
4. "The price that the buyer or seller can get in the market" means that 
the market price must be a real alternative. if, for example, the 
selling profit centre is anxious not to break the outside price but 
has excess capacity, the market price is not a real alternative. 
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In this case, he might practise internal price-cuttingo down to the 
limit of his variable costs or to what he could get by cutting the 
market price. 
The situation where a real market altcrnative does not exist is quite 
commc, q with brarded products or with ordinary transfers between a 
production and a sales department. In this case, the market price 
is no longer a reliýLble indicator of whether transfers are in the 
company's interest or not; the transfer price must reflect the 
I revenue which 
could be earned by selling to the market. This may 
well be below the market price, especially if selling more to the 
market would break the price structure. 
Using the market would not disrupt operations. Companies regularly 
grant concessions to customers or to suppliers in return for assurances, 
in one form or another, of orderly operations. There is no reason why 
this would not be done inside the company as well. 
Simply entering transactions into the books at the market price has the 
advantage of giving relatively reliable information on the efficiency of 
profit centres compared to competitors. But it ignores the 'possibility 
that both profit centres might find it advantageous to transfer at A lower 
price. This would be the case if the revenue from an increase in volume 
was greater than the increase in costs. For this reason, such a policy 
may have to be suspended from time to time. This, of course, requires a 
review of the situation by top management and the decentralisation with 
respect to operating decisions is commensurately less complete. 
Much the same situation is faced when the profit centres, through research, 
try to estimate what a market ýrice would be. Vere again it might be 
mutually advantageous to trade below the estimated market price. This 
would especially be the case if the selling profit centre had low(x costs 
than competitors. But it should be noted that there is a mutual advantage 
in/ 
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in these cases. Therefore, good reasons for an adjustmerit in the 
transfer price are more likely to be called to top management's attention 
and the adjustments more readily agreed upon. 
Some of the difficulties involved in the practical application of market 
based transfer prices are outlined by Dean in his article "Decentralisation 
and Intra-Company Pricing". These are: 
Conditions may make published statistics an inaccurate statement 
of the market price for the size, quality, timing and location of the 
intra-company transactions. Ile suggests that if market determined 
price spreads are large, it is likely that they cannot be established 
objectively in a manner that will be satisfactory to buyer and seller 
without negotiations. 
2. The market place may not offer a real alternative for the. intra-company 
buyer or seller, because of differences in volume or quality standards. 
3. It mjy be difficult to distinguish between nominal price quotations 
and real ones. 
It can be seen then that the theoretical decision that market price is 
the most desirable transfer price in situations where the intermediate 
market is competitive, is subject to qualification in many cases in 
practice. When the market price approach is used, the attempt is to 
transfer goods at a price which*is no higher than that prevailing in an 
outside market at the time of the transfer - that is, at the price that the 
receiving division would have to pay to outsiders. 
Put another way, the market price approach is an atterapt to approximate 
to an am's length, bargained, open-market price. The usefulness of a 
market price method is therefore contingent on the availability of dependable 
market-price quotations of other manufacturers, because it is these prices 
that would have to be taken into account by parties dealing at arm's length 
as they establish competitive price levels. 
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However, in =ny instances an internal price which is lowcr than markct 
price may easily be justified, particularly 
(1) when large purchases-are made 
or (2) when selling costs are less 
or (3) when an advantage is obtained through an exclusive 
supplies contract. 
These situations lead to the notion of negotiated market price, whereby 
the cost savings to the company as a whole are split between the selling 
and buying divisions through bargaining. 
In addition, a practical difficulty arises in the use of the market price 
basis becauso either 
(a) few markets are perfectly competitive, or 
(b) no intermediate market exists for the exact product or 
service in question. 
A quoted price for a product is only strictly comparable if the credit 
terms 
quality grade 
and delivery terms etc. 
are precisely the same. 
Similarly, isolated price quotations are sometimes temporary distress 
or dumping prices. These temporary market prices are not applicable 
for repetitive high volume transactions, and they hurt the credibility 
% 
of market transfer prices. 
If distress prices exist, should they be used, or should a long run 
"average" or normal market price be used instedaf The decision must 
depend on subjective judnents xegardinj the costs and benefits of each 
alternative. 
If the distress price is use'd, in the short run the manager of the 
supplying division will meet the price as long as it exceeds his 
additional/ 
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additional cost. In the long run he has to decide whether or not 
to cease producing this item. There is a danger that lie may decide 
to stoplr6ducing this item because it is baving an adverse effect on 
his divisional rate of return, and as a result, the cut in the total 
industry supply may lcad to higher outside future prices which will 
probably be disadvantageous to the company ab a whole, in the long run. 
On the other hand transfers based on the long run "average" or "normal" 
price, impose "- problem on the buying di-. -ision - to tha extent that 
I 
transfers are forced at above current market prices, the short run 
performance of the buying division will be impaired and that manager 
will be influenced by both 
(1) his performance measure 
and (2) his partial loss of autonomy 
Nevertheless, as a-- the selling division's additional costs do not 
exceed the market price, the company as a whole would benefit by the 
transfer. 
Finally, it should be remembered that if an outside supplier submits 
a number of estimates and discovers that the internal supplier division 
has won all of the contracts, he may either cease to subinit a "market price" 
or alternatively will give an artifically ýigh price which is unreliable. 
As a result it may be necessary for the buying division to buy outside from. 
time to time in order to maintain a valid check on market prices as well 
as an alternative source of supply. 
The advice offered by R. N. Anthony in his "Notes on Trariffer Prices 
may not therefore be so widely applicable as he infers. 
He states: 
"If a market price exists, use it. A: transfer price based on a 
market price is preferable to a transfer price based an cost. An 
important ground rule is this - 4-f an inside division is willing 
1. Anthony, Deariden and Vancil "Management Control Systems" IRWIN 1965 
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to meet an outside market price and wants the business, it can have 
the business. " 
It will be appreciated from the illustrations given at the beginning of 
this paper that the existence of a market price arrived at by arm's 
length competitive bargaining between independent buyers and sellers 
does not necessarily guarantee the best price for the optimum benefit 
of the organisation as a whole. Such transfer prices could motivate 
divisional managers to make decisions which are bad for the company and 
t1ferefore lead to a lack of goal congruence. In such instances a 
transfer price based on a market price is irrelevant. As R. N. Anthony 
and his associates have A top class reputation in their field (with good 
reason), _and 
as the book on Management Control Systems is, widely used in 
Business Management schools, it is to be hoped that his Notes on Transfer 
Prices will be revised in future editions. 
0 
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III NEGOTIATED PRICE^ 
Following Dean's objections to market based priceso as outlined 
earlieiý it is not surprising to find that he suggests a refinement 
on market price, consistent with the view that each decentralised 
unit is considered an independent unit which is bascd on negotiations 
or bargaining. Ile describes the necessary condition for profit 
centre control as the freedom of division managers to negotiate 
competitive prices in arm's length bargaining and to go outside the 
, company 
if the prices paid by or to other division managers are not 
agreeable to them. 
Dean points out that a divisijnls profits and executive bonuses 
cart be greatly affected by even small differences in the unit prices 
of transferred products. Ile holds that the identification of the 
selfish interests of the division managers and the interests of the 
company as a whole can be maintained by intra-company pricing under 
the following simple principles: 
1. Prices of all transfers in and out of a profit centre should be 
determined by negotiation between buyers and sellers. 
2. Negotiators should have access to full data on alternative 
sources and markets and to public and private information about 
market priccs. 
3. Buyers and sellers should be completely free to deal outside the 
company. 
Paul W. Cook accepts that, if managers are sophisticated and equipped 
with good accounting data on their operations, a frýe negotiation 
system could satisfy the basic criteria - that is, a transfer price 
that will not lead to transfers which will re. duce the company's profit, 
but will permit and encourage any transfer which increases the company's 
prof it. 
However/ 
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However, he does make the point that the principal disadvantage of such 
an approach is the amount of executive time it is likely to take. it 
is true that executive salaries have to be paid anyway, but, sooner or 
later, increased demands on executive time will lead to more executives. 
lie feels that paying attention to the outside market would probably be 
a more profitable use of time. 
0 A second disadvantage is that negotiated prices may distort the profit 
centre's financial reports, so thnt the information which top management 
has for use in capital budgeting, evaluations, etc. is misleading. 
This is especially true if the ranýe of prices which would be advantageous 
to both profit centres is quite wide. 
Where there is no outside competitive market and transfers take place 
in amounts which are neither important nor potentially important, David 
Solomons suggests that negotiation between the divisions ic the cimplest 0 01 
solution. It would seem that negotiated prices tend to settle down at a 
figure which is based on the standard cost of the transferred product Plus 
a return or the capital deemed to have been used in its production. Since 
standard cost generally includes fixed overheadsq from thd theoretical 
viewpoint, negotiated prices determined in this way are open to the 
objection already levelled against any transfer pricing method which. turns 
one division's fixed costs into another division's variable costs by 
including them in a product price. Ile concludes, however, that not much 
harm can be done when the volumes transferred are not large or potentially 
large. 
It should be noted, however, that the existence of an outside market 
for the intermediate product isý important in negotiations, because it 
provides both parties with an dternative. Dissemination of information 
relating to this outside market should reduce the bargaining range and 
permit ncgotiations to take place in an atmosphere conducive to producing 
transfer prices that are fair approximations to opportunity cost. In the 
PI 
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absence of an outside market, the bargaining range is likely to be 
considerably. wider because the buying and selling divisions are 
in the position known to economists as bilateral monopoly - that is, 
the market for the intermediate product consists of two firms, one 
buying and one selling, and neither has an outside alternative. The 
buyer may buy or not buy or, at theextreme, he may equip his division 
to manufacture the intermediate product. Tho'seller may sell or not 
sell oro at the extreme, hc may equip his division to manufacture the 
final product. Under these conditions the market price is likely to 
be indeterminate within a fairly wide range and the relative profit of 
the two divisions will depend on the bargaining ability of the respective 
divisional managers. 
0 
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10. CONCLUSION 
The fo-&cgo: &. -,, g pages and Sections B and C which follow will 
indicate to the reader that the Transfer Pricing Problem is 
considerably more complex than a casual acquaintanceship with the 
subject might indicate. It seems fitting therefore to conclude 
with a quotation from Joel Dean, whose views although expressed 
almost twenty years ago, and which have been criticised by 
subsequent authors, are just as relevant as ever they were: 
"The practical benefits of sound transfer pricing for profit 
I centre control are not always obvious. Many companies - 
especially if they are decentralised - seem to get along fine 
without it, never-knowing what they are missing. This is 
beceuse decentralisation 'digs gold with a pick-axe'. In 
the flush of gratification for this great improvement ovcr old 
authoritari. an ways, management may neglect the toole to get the 
most out of it. 
in a big company thereisa danger that interest in making profits 
will be diluted as a result of rnnnagerial specialisation. and the 
separation of operation from ownership-. The parochial ambitionz 
of operating managers need to be held in check; performance 
should be judged in terms of alibi-proof, objectively measured 
profits. When transfer prices are economically correct and 
profit centres are properly established, top management can 
delegate and still have peace of mind because the division 
manager's targets and incentives will be so set up that his 
interests are identical to those of top management. " 
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SECTION B 
AMERICAN CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION 
This section of the dissertation is devoted to the consideration of 
two American company case histories in which Interdivisional Transfer 
Pricing Problems have arisen. 
The two cases selected (Birch Paper Company and General Appliance 
Company) are published in the book, Management Control Systems, by 
Anthonyl, Dearden and Vancil and are included-in the Harvard Case Studies 
list. Whilst the Harvard Case Study Unit was prepared to permit 
references and comments on the two cases, permission was not given 
to reproduce them either in whole or in part. Accordinly, a summary 
has been prepared of the relevant aspects of each case and then comments 
have. been made on the problems which have emerged and possible solutions 
to these problems. 
These cases are used to illustrate some of the practical difficulties 
which emerge in trying to apply the theoretical principles explained 
in Section A. They lead on to Section C which contains an assessment 
of transfer pricing in the United Kingdom and three original case studies 
which are the outcome of work carried out by-the writer in three British 
-organisations. 
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CASE I THE BIRCH PAPER COMPANY 
TEE PROBLEM 
The Birch Paper Company was a medium-sized organisation, made up 
of four producing divisions and a timberland division which supplied 
part of the company's pulp requirements. 
. 
The company produced white 
and kraft papers and paper board, and even though a considerable volume 
of inter-divisional trading was carried on, each division had been judged 
independently on the basis of its profit and return on investment for 
some years prior to 1957. 
A policy of decentralisation, in which the responsibility and 
authority for. all decisions except those relating to overall company 
policy, had been devised by central management* It was the opinion of 
these officials that this concept of decentralisation had been successfully 
applibd, and that as a result, the company's profits and standing in the 
industry had definitely improved. 
In the case, three of the producing divisions are mentioned, and they 
are, in process order: 
1. The Southern Division, which produces linerboard and corrugating 
medium for sale to outside customers and internally to the Thompson 
division. 
2. The Thompson Division, which converts paperboard output into corrugated 
boxes and prints and colours the outside surface of these boxes. it 
sells directly to purchasers outside Birch, or alternatively to the 
Northern Division, for subsequent sale by that division. 
3. The Northern Division, which designs special display boxes and sells 
them to outside customers. 
The controversy which forms the basis of the case arose as a result of a 
quotation frcm the Thcmpson division to the Northern Division being 
considerably in excess of two quotations submitted by outside competitcrS 
for the manufacture of a non-standard displaybox. As each divisional 
manager/ 
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manager could normally buy from the supplier, he wished, whether internal 
or external, and as divisions were expected to meet the going market price 
if they wanted the business, the Northern manager was not prepared to 
accept the Thompson quotation. 
The circumstances leading up to the, controversy were as follows: 
(a) Thompson's staff helped the Northern*division in the package design 
and development of the box and charged a fee for the work, based on 
cost only. 
(b) Subsequently, Northern invited tenders from Thompson and two outside 
manufacturers, the TATest Paper Company and Eire Papers Ltd., for the 
manufacture of the box. 
(c) The quotations received were: 
West Paper Company $430 per thousand boxes 
Eire Papers Ltd. $432 per thousand boxes 
Thompson Division $480 per thousand boxes 
(d) James Brunner, the manager of-the Thompson division based his 
quotation of $480 on full cost plus a margin for profit, following 
his decision to "try to improve the quality of the Thompson business", 
and an instruction to his salesmen to "stop shaving their bids. " 
He argued that the acceptance of this work at any price below $480 
would be a reversal of this decision, that such a bid would not cover 
a fair share of overhead costs let alone realise a profit, and that 
as he had done the development work on the box at no profit, he 
considered that he should receive a profit on the production of the box. 
(e) William Kenton, manager of the Northern division decided to discuss the 
situation with Birch's co=ercial vice-president, because he considered 
the circumstances to be abnormal. He pointed out that he could not be 
expected to produce a satisfactory profit and return on investment, if he 
had to buy his supplies at more than 10% above the market price. 
(f) The commercial vice-president knew that the Thompson division had not 
been/ 
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been operating at full capacity and was therefore surprised to 
learn that Brunner had added the full 20 per cent on to the out of 
pocket costs to cover overheads and profit. He heard Brunner's 
arguments and then decided to examine the cost structures of the 
divisions concerned. He knew that in the absence of a specific 
instruction to the contrary from Head Office, Kenton would accept 
the quotation from the West Paper Company. However, although this 
particular job represented less than 5 per cent of the volume of 
either of the division's output, he believed that other transactions 
could raise similar problems later, and that central management should 
therefore order Northernts acceptance of the Thompson quotation, if the 
situation warranted such a decision. 
The analysis'of the costs involved revealed that the Southern 
division had quoted a price to Thompson for the linerboard and 
corrugating medium which was approximately 702 of Thompson's out of 
pocket cost of $400 per thousand boxes. SoutherAs'out of pocket 
costs for these items amounted to approximately 602 of this price, 
for although it had been operating below full-capacity and had excess 
-stocks, it had quoted the market price to Thompson. Thompsonts Costs 
of ccnverting these materials into boxes was therefore $120 per thousand 
boxes. * At this time (1957), converters such as the Thompson division 
were operating on narrow profit margins, whereas paper board manufacturers 
such as Southern were not suffering from reduced market prices, even 
although total production exceeded market demand. 
The situation was further complicated by the fact that if the 
Worthern division accepted the quotation from Eire Papers Ltd., the 
outside supplier would be prepared to buy the coloured and printed 
outside linerboard from Thompson for $120 per thousand boxes. if 
Z4-ven this order from Eire Papers Ltd., Thompson would obtain the 
necessary unprocessed outside linerboard from the Southern division 
at -a price of $90 per thousand boxes. Thompson's charge for 
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colouring and printing would therefore be $30 and of this sum it was 
estimated that $25 would be its out of pocket cost. 
The problem which has to be resolved is therefore whether or not 
Kenton should be permitted to accept the quotation from the West Paper 
Company. If not, whether all of the work should be kept within the 
Birch organisation by the acceptance of the Thompson quotation or 
alternatively that the order should go to Eire Papers Ltd., meaning that, 
only part of the job will be done by the Southern and Thompson diviiions. 
if it is decided that the work should remain within the Birch organisation 
the transfer prices which will be charged by Southern to Thompson and 
Thompson to Northern have to be determined. 
100. 
CUMENTS AND APPRAISAL 
In so far as Eire Papers Ltd. haveoffered to buy the outside 
linerboard with the special printing from Birch (thereby entailin. - 
profitable work for both the Southern and Thompson divisions), the 
quotation from the West Paper Company and its small saving of $2 per 
thousand boxes can be ignored. As far as the overall position of Birch 
Paper is concerned, consideration must be centred on the effect of 
giving work to the Thompson division, compared with the work being 
done outside by Eire Papers Ltd. The relevant marginal costs are as 
follows: 
TABLE 1 
1. If jobis done inside Birch Paper Company by the ThOm2son Division 
Per 1,000 boxes 
Total out of pocket cost quoted - $400 
made up Of 7 
(a) Cost of linerboard and corrugating medium 
bought from the Southern Division 
70% of $400 280- 
and 
(b) Thompson's processing costs - 120 
400 
Marginal Cost is therefore - Per 1,000 boxes 
(a) Southern's costs - 602 of $280 $168 
(b)-Thompson's costs 120 
288 
2.1 
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2. If job is done externally by Eire Papers Ltd. 
Eire's quotation to Northern Division 
Less - (a) Southern's contribution to Fixed costs 
and profit - 
Charge to Thompson for unprocessed 
linerboard $90 
Less - Cost - 
Per 1,000 boxes 
$432 
60% of $90 54 36 
(b) Thompson's contribution to 'Fixed costs 
and profit - 
Charge to Eire for coloured and 
printed linerboard $120 
Less - Costs - 
from Southern 90 
Process costs 25 115 5 41 
39-1 
Birch Paper will therefore be $103 per thousand boxes better off, 
($391 - $288) if the work is completed by the Thompson division, rather 
than given to Eire Papers Ltd. . As far as the company's interests as 
a whole are concerned, the decision should therefore be that the 
Thompson division should do the job. 
Consideration should now be given as to how this difference of 
$103 per thousand will be distributed between the manufacturing divisions 
concerned. The relevant figures are as shown in Table 2 on the next 
page. 
TABLE 2 
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TABLE 2 
1. 
-If 
Thompson Division does the job 
Per 1,000 boxes 
(a) Southern's contribution - 
Selling Price to Thompson $280 
Less - Cost 60% _168 
112 
W Thompson's contribution 
Selling Price to Northern 
(say at Eire Paper's quoted 
price) 432 
Less - Cost 400 32 
Total Contribution to Fixed Costs and Profit 144 
mum= 
If Eire Papers Ltd. does the job 
Per 1,000 boxes 
Selling Price to Thompson 90 90 
Less - Cost 54 36 
Selling Price to Eire Papers Ltd. 120 
Less - Costs 115 5 
To tal Contribution to Fixed Costs and rrofit 41 
Mý 
The difference of $103 is therefore made up as follows: 
Southern division 76 
Thompson division 27 
103 
if the work is completed externally, the effect on the company as a 
whole, and on each division is adverse, so that the transfer pricing system 
cannot be described as being dysf unctional, f or its ef f ect is not to motivate 
the divisional managers and central management differently. If the order 
goes to Eire Papers Ltd., the effect on Birch Paper as a whole, is detrimentals 
as/ 
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as it is on the Thompson division too, for Thompson will lose business 
on which it can earn some marginal income. Convereely, if Thompson 
makes the boxes, Birch profits will increase in total and so will the 
profits of the Thompson division. 
It has already been suggested that 
1. if the division managers have full information 
2. if they are free to negotiate with one another, and 
3ý if they are competent, 
they should reach decisions, which if in the best interests their own 
divisions are also in. the best interests of the company as a whole. 
The foregoing figures imply that Brunner, the manager of the 
Thompson division, either - 
(a) does not have a good arg=ent, possibly because he does not appreciate 
the contribution margin concept, or 
(b) that he is competent, and is prepared to sacrifice the contribution 
of $32 per thousand boxes to his fixed costs, in the hope that by 
waiting, he can obtain sufficient outside work at $480 per thousand 
boxes, thereby more than doubling the contribution margin. It can be 
seen that, if as Brunner says he has been trying to improve the quality 
of this business and that if his judgment of the market is correctp it 
may well be that his decision to reject the "market price" of $432 and 
refuse to accept the job, could prove correct. For example, it may be 
that at a price of $480, he could look for say 45%of the volume of work 
which he can get at $432. The relevant figures would therefore be - 
Price 
Cost Contribution Boxes Total 
per 1,000 boxes Margin Volume Contribution 
OOOTS 
(a) $480 $400 80 45 $3,600 
(b) $432 $400 32 100 $3,200 
in/ 
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In these circumstances* a policy of holding out for a price to cover 
full costs plus profit would be correct. The above figures could be 
reasonable, for Brunner's uncompromising attitude regarding his quotation 
to Northern may be explained by the fact that his "no shaving bids'"' 
policy in the period prior to the Northern job had already resulted in 
Thompson receiving orders at the full price. Bad no work been 
forthcoming he would probably have been prepared to come down to the 
outside competitors' price. 
However, the marketing strategy adoptedby Brunner may be suitable 
for his division but at the same time may not be in the best interests 
of the company as a whole, because he is not considering the contribution 
which the Southern division obtains from each sale made by Thompson. 
Using the same figures as above, the situation would be as follows: 
Price Contribution to Birch Company* Boxes Total 
Volume Contribution 
-CO-O-T-s 
(a) $480 $192 45 $8,640 
(b) $432' $144 100 $14,400 
i. e. difference between costs of $288 (Table 1) and prices given. 
Brunner could correct this situation by advising the Southern division of 
the strategy which he is using, in order that they might be aware of the 
implications that it has on their pricing policy. If Southern were 
totally dependent on the Thompson division, their manager should make 
calculations which are similar to Thompson's. 
Price 
(a) $280 
(b) $232 
Contribution to Southern 
$112* 
64* 
Volume Total 
Corýt-ributicns 
45 5,040 
100 6,400 
*Prices less cost of $168 as shown in Table 1. 
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if these figures were relevant to'tha situation, the Southern division 
manager would realise that he is better off lowering his price to 
Thompson in order to get higher volume, and Thompson accepting the 
new prices from Southern, would then be able to make the following 
calculation: 
Price Contribution to Thompson* Volume TotAl 
Contribution 
(a) $480 $128 45 5,760 
(b) $432 $ 80 100 8,000 
*i. e. (a) $480 - $352 (Southern's charge 232 + Thompson's cost 120) 
(b) $432 - $352 (Southern's charge 232 + Thompson's cost 120) 
Mr. Brunner would see from the above figures that he would be better off, 
if he lowered his price to $432, because both his own volume of output 
and that of the Southern division would be increased. 
However, these figures assume that both divisions should follow the 
same marketing-strategy and this is not necessarily correct. The case 
indicates that the market in which Southern is operating has not weakened 
to the sa=e extent as the market in which the Thompson division is 
operating -the fact that Southern has not lowered its prices is an 
indication of this fact, and from the Southern viewpoint, it may be that 
the relevant figures are therefore along the following lines - 
Southern's Price 
(to Thompson and 
externally 
$280 
Contribution 
to Southern Volume 
$112 60 
0 Anticipated 
Cc7n-tribution to 
Fixed Assets and Profit 
60720 
$232 64 100 6,400 
If the manager of the Southern division believes that his-demand curve 
is following the lines indicated above, then he is correct in holding his 
price at the $280 level. In point of fact he may be supplyin; scme of 
Thompson's competitors who are operating a different pricing strategy 
from Thompson. 
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A further point for consideration in this case is that Thompson 
has the opportunity to re-bid because the customer (Northern division) 
is another part of the Birch Company. Mr, Brunner can lower his original 
bid, an opportunity which would be denied him if he was dealing with an 
outside customer. It is possible that Brunner could observe the policy 
outlined at the beginning of the case, with outside customers, and adopt 
a different pricing policy for internal business. This would mean 
however that outside suppliers would cease to bid for work from Northern 
Division, if Thompson was always' given the opportunity to match the lowest 
bid, assuming that Northern always accepts the lowest price. It does not 
follow that this assumption is always valid, because Thompson appears to 
have succeeded in obtaining orders at "full cost" plus prices, which 
indicates that some of their customers are prepared to pay a premium, for 
their services. If Thompsons always offer package design and development 
advice it may be that customers accept the increased charge because, they 
-value thiS-service. Indeed, it may be that'Northern recognise the value 
of this Aervice and will accept the Thompson quotation of $480 per thousand, 
but are merely trying to take advantage of the fact that Thompson is a 
captive supplier by appealing to the commercial vice-president to force 
Thompson to quote a lower price. 
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SUMMARY 
It can be seen from the foregoing that this case is more than 
an exercise in marginal costing. In so far as consideration has to 
be given to the pricing strategies of both the Thompson and Southern 
divisions, both of which are complicated, the conclusion reached must 
depend on the reader's interpretation of the validity of Brunner's 
attitude in the circumstances, Although he is not thinking of the 
best interests of the company as a whole, it seems reasonable that the 
commercial vice-president should let Brunner take the decision whether 
or not to accept the business at $432, having ensured that he fully 
understands all the factors involved. It may be that he will accept 
the work at $432, which might indicate that he welcomed the intervention 
of the vice-president in the hope of getting a higher rate from Northern. 
In any case, it would be wrong for the commercial vice-president to wake 
the decision, for the detrimental effect on the overall decentralisation 
policy would be considerable. Intervention by top management in instances 
like this would soon make the whole divisional profit measurement system 
meaningless. 
An important cost accounting lesson can be learned from this case - 
whilst Southern's out of pocket costs and therefore variable costs are 
only 60% of the price imposed on Thompson, the total charge of $280 becomes 
a variable cost from Brunner's point of view. Similarly, Brunner's charge 
of $480 is wholly variable as far as the Northern management is concerned. 
It may be concluded therefore-that the fixed costelement passed on in a 
transfer price becomes variable from the viewpoint of the purchasing 
division and may lead to sub-optimisation as far as the organisation as 
avliole is concerned, if full information relating to the costs of the 
product transferred are not c=un:! Pated to the purchaser. 
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CASE 2 GENERAL APPLIANCE COMRATION 
The Ceneral Appliance Corporation manufactures consumer durables and 
is a decentralised, divisional organisation made up of 
Four Product Divisions - Electric Stove Division, 
Laundry Equipment Division, 
Refrigeration Division, 
Miscellaneous Appliance Division, 
Four Manufacturing Divisions - Chrome Products Division, 
Electric Motor Divisiont 
Gear and Transmission Division, 
Stamping Division, 
and six staff offices. 
The product divisions are responsible for the design, engineering, 
assembly and sale of a variety of home appliances. They manufacture 
very few component parts and as a result look to either the manufacturing 
divisions or outside suppliers for stocks of these parts. The parts made 
by the manufacturing divisions, about 75% of which are sold to the product 
divisions, are produced to specifications provided by the product divisions, 
who are responsible for the designs. 
Company policy states that the divisions are expected to deal with one 
another, as though they were independent companies. Bowever, in many 
instances, this policy could not be observed because the product division 
involved did not have the power to de cide whether to buy from the 
manufacturing division within the company or from an outside supplier. 
In practice, onc ea manufacturing division has accepted the responsiblity 
for the production of a part., the product division buying this part may 
only change to an outside supplier by permission of the manufacturing 
division, or if the manufacturing division refuses to give permission for 
the change, by appeal to the purchasing staff. Where disputes betwecn 
product and manufacturing divisions occur on such issues, the purchasing 
staff/ 
109. 
staff is authorised to decide the issue. In most instances the result 
of these decisions has been the continued production of the part by the 
manufacturing division. It is fair to add though that the manufacturing 
division was required to hold the price of the part to the level of the 
outside supplier's price to the product division. 
Transfer prices for the parts are arrived at by negotiation between 
the divisions, and are usually based on the prices paid to outside 
suppliers for comparable parts. These transfer prices are subject to 
adjustment for changes in the generalprice level since the date of the 
previously agreed price, and are also adjusted to reflect differences 
in the design of the outside part compared with that being produced within 
the organisation. Where the divisions cannot agree a price, they can" 
submit the dispute to the finance staff for arbitration. 
The authority to decide the source of supply of now parts is vested 
in the product divisions. However, the manufacturing divisions are 
permitted to appeal to the purchasing staff, if a decision has bc'en made 
to buy a new part from an outside supplier. 
Three disputes are listed for consideration in the case, i. e. 
(1) The Stovetop Problem - involving the Chrome Products Division and 
-the Electric Stove division. 
(2) The Thermostatic Control Problem - Involving the Electric Motor 
Division, the Laundry equipment division and the Refrigeration 
divisicn, and 
(3) The Transmission Problem - involving the Gear and Transmission 
division and the Laundry equipment division. 
110. 
The Stovetop Problem 
owing to complaints from customers and dealers relating to the 
quality of the company's products, the head of the production staff 
office was instructed by the president of the corporation to ensure 
that the quality of all products was brought up to a satisfactory level. 
In the course of his investigation he decided that the appearance of a 
chrome-plated stovetop, made by the chrome products division for the 
electric stove division but formerly manufactured by an outside supplier 
was not satisfactory. He therefore increased the minimum acceptable 
quality level for thesestovetops by making the best of a particular batch 
the standard, and as a result, rejects increased to more than 80% of the 
quantity being produced. In turn, this high rejection level led to a 
study of the manufacturing process by the chrome products division and 
the production staff, following which additional processes (copper plating 
and'buffing) at the beginning ind end of the manufacturing cycle were 
included. Whilst these additional processes had the effect of cutting 
the rejection rate to less than one per cent, they increased the chrome 
products division costs by 40 cents per unit and considerably reduced the 
-margin-between that divisionts total costs and its transfer price of $5.00 
per unit to the electric stove division. 
During the month following the changes in the manufacturing cycle, the 
chrome products division therefore proposed that the transfer price to the 
Electric Stove division be increased from $5.00 a unit to $5.45, i. e. 
40 cents to cover the cost of the additional operations and 5 cents 
additional profit. This price increase was opposed by the Electric 
stove division, on the grounds that there had been no change in engineering 
specifications; appearance, which they contended was a subjective matter, 
being the only change. They felt that any change in quality standards 
which is not accompanied bya change in engineering specification should 
not give the supplying division the right to increase the price. Further, 
they/ 
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they contended that they had not requested the improvement in quality, 
nor had they been consulted, and in any case they were doubtful if their 
customers would notice the difference in quality standards before and 
after the change in the manufacturing cycle. It was argued that the 
improvement in quality only brought the part up to the level previously 
attained by the outside manufacturer, so that the cost was included in the 
$5.00 transfer price. Finally, the Electr. ic Stove division stated that 
if 45 cents was to be added to the cost of the stove, they could add 
features which would have a much more significant effect on its 
marketability than this quality improvement. 
The argument of the manager of the Chrome Products division for the 
increase in price was based on the fact that the production staff had 
reqf1ired him to add'operations to his manufacturing process, that these 
operations had resulted in improved quality that could benefit only the 
electric stove division and that had the outside supplier been required 
to meet the new quality standard, the price would hav6 been increased by 
45 cents. 
The dispute. was submitted to the finance staff for arbitration. During 
the review by the finance staff, the engineering department of the 
production staff stated that the costs proposed by the Chrome Products 
division' were reasonable and represented efficient processing. SIMIlarly, 
the quality control department of the manufacturing staff when approached 
by the finance staff stated that the quality was improved and that the new 
parts were of superior quality to the parts previously supplied by the 
outside manufacturer. 
112. 
Comments on the Stoveto2 Problen 
An important point to emerge from this problem is that it demonstrates 
one of the advantages of decentralised profit control. If profit control 
had been operated on a centralised basis, none of the participants in the 
dispute would have been greatly concerned about the extra cost of the 
improvement in quality. The head of týe production staff would have 
achieved his aim of improving quality, the works manager would have 
obtained budget authorisation to offset the increased costst plus 
improved quality which no doubt would have improved his relationship 
with quality control, and the sales force would be marketing a product 
whose appearance ha d improved. Even if any of the above personnel was 
fully aware of the fact that the company was wasting money, in a 
centralised profit control situation there would be little incentive 
for any of them to take steps to cut cost, 
One of the questions which this problem poses is - 
Under what conditions is a manufacturing division entitled to an increase 
in an interdivisional price, when the conditions of acceptance (e. g. 
quality standards) are changed, even though specifications and blue prints 
are unaltered? 
If the outside price used as the basis for establishing the internal 
transfer price is considered, an answer may be found to this question. 
If the quality of the outside part was the same as the quality of the 
part produced by the chrome products division, before the improvement 
was introduced, it can be assumed that the outside price would have risen 
if quality standards had been raised. Conversely, if the quality of 
the outside product was equal to the new improved standards, then the 
selling division would not be entitled to a price increase, for the 
original price would be assumed to include the higher quality standards. 
Although the staff members"consulted on this point are not really impartial, 
it would seem that the improvement in quality did make the stove top made 
by/ 
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by the chrome products division better than its counter part produced 
by the outside supplier. It seems reasonable therefore that the 
transfer price should be increased in this instance. However, whether 
the chrome products division's proposal that the price of the stove top 
should be increased by 45 cents is another matter - in so far as the cost 
of the improvement in quality is limited to 40 cents per unit, that would 
seem an adequate increase, The request for a further 5 cents to cover 
the profit mark-up on the added costs raises all of the cost plus problems 
already discussed in Section A, and should therefore not be approved. The 
buying division will probably have sufficient difficulty in absorbing the 
additional 40 cents without having to contend with the plus element of 
5 cents in respect of profit mark-up. 
Another question which has to be considered is 
Should the buying division pay for the better quality even though it did 
not request the change? 
This question arises because an informal change in the lines of authority 
within the organisatio'n took place when the president asked the head of 
the. production staff-office to assume temporary 'responsibility for quality. 
Normally, this would be the function of the Product Division, -so that the 
head of the production staff office is, in these circumstances, acting 
for the general manager of the Electric Stove division. Therefore, the 
divisional manager of the Electric Stove division must pay for the increased 
quality, even although he was not consulted. If the improved qualityýof 
the stove top means that the product obtains a market advantage, this 
advantage will accrue to the Electric Stove division; on the other hand, 
if there is no market advantage, and the improvement in quality is not 
worth the extra cost, the head of the Electric Stove division must take 
action to correct the situation. He must take steps to reduce the 
quality requirements, and there would be little inducement for him to 
do 
so, if he had not beenýrequired to pay for the increase in quality. 
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The Thermostatic Control Problem 
Thermostatic Control units were manufactured by the Electric Motor 
Division, which supplied both the Laundry Equipment Division and the 
Refrigeration Division. The Laundry Equipment Division purchased all 
of its units (about 100,000 a year) internally, whereas the Refrigeration 
Division which used about 20,000 units per annum were in 1958 buying about 
5,000 units outside from the Monson Controls Corporation. Until 1956, 
the Monson Controls Corporation had supplied the Refrigeration Divisioný 
with all of its requirements, but in response to a request from the 
Electric Motor Division, 252 was purchased internally in 1956,502 in 
1957, and 75%in 1958. 
In July 1958 the Monson Controls Corporation were informed by the 
Refrigeration Division that from lst January, 1959, all thermostatic 
control units would be supplied by the Electric Motor Division. The 
transfer price paid to the Electric Motor Division by the Laundry Equipment 
Division wcsthe same as the price paid to Monson Controls Corporation, and 
the quality of the unit made internally was comparable to that made 
externally. 
In mid-1958 the Electric Motors Division was not operating profitably. 
Since 1955 its profitability had declined from a before-tax profit of 
15% on investment, to almost nil in 1958. Trade Research statistics 
indicated that the production capacity of all of the manufacturers of 
this type of unit, which had been low in relation to demand in 1955, had 
steadily increased until by 1958 surplus capacity existed. A consequence 
of this steady increase in production capacity relative to demand was a 
declining price level, which is evidenced by the Monson prices during 
this period: 
1955 3.00 
1956 2.70 
1957 2.50 
1958 (Jan 2.40 
June) 
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The Electric Motor Division had met each of these price reductions 
and had consequently suffered a decline in profitability. 
The reaction of the Monson Corporation to the information that they 
would not be required to supply units in 1959 was to cut the price to the 
Refrigeration Division by 25 cents from lst July, 1958. The intracompany 
price was not reduced because the three divisions had agreed that the price 
of $2.40 would operate for the whole cE1958. Howeverg later in the year 
when the 1959 price was being negotiated, the Refrigeration Division proposed 
the price of $2.15, i. e. the same price as that paid to the Monson Controls 
Corporation. Since the Electric Motors Division would not agree to a 
reduction of the price from $2.40 to either the Refrigeration Division or 
the Laundry Equipment Division, the matter was submitted to the finance 
staff for arbitration. 
The argument put up by the Electric Motor Division against the price 
of $2.15 was based on the fact that they interpreted it as a distress price, 
made by Monson Controls Corporation in a desperate effort to keep the 
Refrigeration Division as a customer for this part. The general manager 
of the Electric Motor Division claimed that his division was as efficient 
as Monson, and that since he would lose money on a price of $2.159 so also 
must Monson. Even at a price of $2.40, a profit was by no means certain, 
so that $2.15 could hardly be a valid basis for a transfer price. If the 
result of the arbitration was that he was compelled to accept a price of 
$2.15 per unit, he would have to close his plant, with the result that 
future supplies of this thermostatic control unit would have to come from 
suppliers outside the General Appliance Corporation. 
The proposal from the Refrigeration Division for a price of $2.15 was 
based on the fact that a reliable outside manufacturer was already supplying 
this part at that price. It felt that it was unfair that a higher price 
should be imposed on it when consideration was given to how it had permitted 
the Electric Motor Division to take over. the supply of this part, in the 
interests/ 
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interests of the company as a whole. 
The general manager of the Refrigeration Division supported his 
argument by reproducing part of the agreement made with the Electric 
Motor Division at the time when it was arranged that all of his 
requirements for thermostatic, control units would be met by that 
division. The relevant sentence was: 
"In the event of a major pricing disparity, it is agreed that 
further model requirements will be competitively sourced - i. e. 
sourced to the lowest bidder. " 
The Laundry Equipment Division supported the $2.15 price on the 
grounds that company policy required products to be transferred between 
divisions at competi. tive prices. It was pointed out that with an annual 
volume of 100,000 units per annum compared with only 20,000 for the 
Refrigeration Division, it was possible that a price lower than $2.15 
per unit could be obtained, if quotations from suppliers outside the 
corporation were sought. 
In the course of the process of arbitration$ the purchasing staff 
advised the finance staff that prices were very soft because of the excess 
capacity in this market. They felt that there would be a rise in prices 
when demand increased, or alternatively, when some of the suppliers wcre 
forced out of business. If the Refrigeration Division placed its orders 
outside. ' a price of $2.15 could be obtained for a year or two, but they 
believed that if all of the corporation's r equirements were put in the 
hands of outside manufacturers, excesscapacity would soon be absorbed 
and the-price would soon rise to at least $2.40. 
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Comments on the Thermostatic Control Unit Problem 
If one of the most important points of the Stovetop, problem. was to 
illustrate the advantages of decentralised profit control, then the 
major difficulty demonstrated in this second problem is that of 
assessing the validity of, the low price of $2.15 in a make or buy 
decision. As the Electric Motor Division contributes to the total 
capacity of Thermostatic Control units, the existence of this capacity 
within the corporation is one of the factors which has created the 
excess capacity in the industry, with the resulting low prices. Bow 
far the price per unit will be affected by a decision to cease production 
in the Electric Motor Division which results in all of the General 
Appliance Corporation's requirements being placed with outside suppliers 
must depend on the ratio of the Electric Motor division's producti6n to 
the total production of the industry. It would seem that some increase 
in price must be expected and accordingly that the $2.15 price does not 
appear to be a valid price in the circumstances, 
Indications are that the demand from the Laundry Equipment Division 
is significant, and that therefore the price will rise if it places itd 
orders outside the corporation. It is conceivable that its requirements 
will be sufficient to absorb the excess capacity outside the General 
Appliance Corporation and that the price will move up again to around 
$2.40. In the case of the Laundry Equipment division it would seem 
therefore that the $2.40 price is reasonable, and that, that division 
has not a valid argument against this higher price. The $2.40 price 
seems to be a valid figure on which to base make or buy decisions. 
The problem relating to the Refrigeration division is not so clear 
cut. In addition to having the agreement with the Electric Motor divi i r, sion 
which states that the latter will either match the prices of outside 
competitors or permit it to buy outside, the Refrigeration division cang 
at this moment in time, buy the unit at a lov,, er price. The point made 
relating/ 
lis. 
relating to the fact that it has increased its purchases inside the 
organisation in order to benefit the corporation as a whole is also 
significant, for if the divisional general manager sees that this 
action has operated to his detriment he will probably be reluctant 
to take acpion of a similar nature in future. Against this, however, 
it can be argued that if the Refrigeration division had refused the 
Electric Motors division's request for an increasing volume of business, 
the Electric Motor division would have sought the intervention of the 
Purchasing staff. It is more than possible thatsuch an appeal would 
have been successful and that the general manager of the Refrigeration 
division had the likelihood of such a result clearly in mind when he 
agreed to place an increasing volume of his requirements with the 
Electric Motors division. Further, if the arbitrators decide that 
the, lower price of $2.15 would be allowed to the Refrigeration division, 
an obvious inconsistency between the two buying divisions will arise, 
especially when it is remembered that it is the Laundry Equipment 
division, with five times as great a consumption of units (100,000 units 
against. the 20,000 per annum of the Refrigeration division) which is being 
asked to accept . the-higher price. 
It would seem therefore, that the most equitable solution would be to 
. apply the $2.40 per unit price in both instances. It is unlikely that the 
Refrigeration division could enjoy the lower price for any length of time 
in the future, and if the thermostatic control unit factory is closed by 
the corporation, it is probable that the price would rise immediately. 
It canýbe argued, therefore, that this lower price is-only a temporaryt 
fortuitous event, which could not continue in any event. Such a decision 
would, however, ignore the agreement, made between the Refrigeration division 
and the Electric Motors division, the factor which is probably the most 
important objection to the higher price. Such agreements should not be 
dishonouFed*lightly, for adherence to such agreement:; is norr=11Y 
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essential element in the working relationships between divivions. 
In this situationt whilst the complexity and abnormality of the factors 
involved can be given as the justification for this decision, a strong 
re-affirmation of the desirability of divisions living up to such 
agreements must also be made. 
One of the most important aspects of this problem is the future 
of the Thermostatic Control Unit works. A decision to maintain the 
transfer price at $2.40 per unit will ensure the continued operation 
of this section of the organisation, but even at this price levell it 
might be logical to lower its profit objective whilst the general 
depressed condition of the industry continues. The general manager 
of the Electric Motors division considers this a marginal case$ yet 
the effects of his decision whether or not to continue producing these 
units are very far reaching. As we have seen, a decision to close will 
probably take care of the industry's excess capacity problem, meaning a 
rise in price, which will cancel any temporary benefit which the 
Refrigeration division is enjoying at the moment, but, more than that, 
once the General Appliance Corporation has ceased to manufacture this 
unit, there may be pressure from outside suppliers to push the price 
above $2.40. The knowledge that the costs of re-entering this field 
-may be prohibitive to the corporation will strengthen the hands of 
outside suppliers in future price negotiations with the Refrigeration 
division and the Laundry Equipment division. It is essential, therefore, 
that full consideration is given to this factor, and it is believed that 
its importance is sufficient to warrant a $2.40 transfer price and the 
continued manufacture of the thermostatic control unit by the Electric 
Motors division. 
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The Transinission Problem 
The third problem in the series is similar in some respects to the 
Thermostatic Control Unit problem. In this instance the Laundry 
Equipment division is buying transmissions for use in the production 
of automatic washing machines from two sources - internally, from the 
Gear and Transmission division and externally, from the Thorndike 
Machining Corporation. This outside supplier had in fact developed 
and engineered the transmission and had given the General Appliance 
Corporation a licence to make it, subject to an agreement that the 
General Appliance Corporation would buy half of its transmissiousfrom 
Thorndike during a ten year period ending in 1959. At the end of this 
period, General Appliance could use the design without restriction. 
General Appliance Corporation decided in 1957 that it would increase 
the size of its Gear and Transmission division, and advised Thorndike that 
it would not be renewing the agreement in 10,59. In so far as the Laundry 
Equipment division was Thorndike's major customer, the detrimental effects 
of this decision on Thorndike's profit level were considerable. Accordingly 
in April 1957 Thorndike asked General Appliance to reconsider their decision 
and offered price reductions on the basis of anticipated productivity 
increases and because they considered that lower prices were preferable 
to having to scrap the special purpose machinery, Vhich was used in the 
manufacture of the transmissions. The schedule of price reductions which 
Thorndike offered was as follows: 
Present price (April, 1957) $14.00 
From lst July, 1957 $13.50 
do. lst January, 1958 $13.00 
do. lst July, 1958 $12.50 
do. lst January, 1959 $12.00 
A further incentive was offered to Ceneral Appliance in the shape 
of i cheaper transmission which Thorndike stated was intended for use in 
economy washing machines and would be available from lst January, 1959 
at a cost 0! $10.00. 
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The information from Thorndikc was sufficiently important to make 
the, general manager of the Laundry Equipment division reconsider the 
decision to cease buying from the Thorndike Machining Corporation. lie 
was particularly keen to add a cheaper automatic washing machine to his 
range of products, so that the lower cost transmission was particularly 
relevant at this time. However, as already stated the Gear and Transmission 
division had a programme of expansion in view, and the general manager of 
that division therefore offered to develop a transmission unit for the 
Laundry Equipment division, which would match the Thorndike Unit in price 
and quality. This offer was made in writing to the general manager of 
the Laundry Equipment division on 22.4.1957 and was accepted by him, so 
that the request by Thorndike for reconsideration of the original decision 
was not accepted. 
Two months later, after the performance features of the economy 
transmission had been considered by the engineering departments of both 
divisions, the general manager of the Gear and Transmission division wrote 
to hisopposite number in the Laundry Equipment division listing the 
engineering features which had been agreed and making the following price 
proposal: 
Probable cost of Thorndike model (assuming 
10% profit on selling price) 9.00 
Add Cost of additional design features of 
internally made model . 85 
Increased cost of labour and materials 
since date of Thorndike quotation . 75 
Total cost 10.60 
Profit (10%) 1.06 
Adjusted Price of unit to be made by Gear 
and Transmission Unit 11.66 
The/ 
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The letter closed by suggesting that as a price of $11.66 would not 
produce the Gear and Transmission division's profit objective, he 
proposed to round the price up to $12.00, which he felt was fair and 
equitable in the circumstances, 
Strangely enough the general manager of the Laundry Equipment 
division did not reply nor acknowledge this proposal, which was 
subsequently (in October, 1957) used by the Gear and Transmission 
division in their application to the top management of the corporation 
for the funds required to implement the new economy transmission project. 
The profit projection relating to the newproject was based on a transfer 
price of $12, and it was stated that this price had been approved by the 
Laundry Equipment division. Again as the Laundry Equipment division made 
no objection, the project was approved and the Gear and Transmission 
division purchased and installed the equipment required to produce the 
new transmission. 
A year later the Gear and Transmission division proposed a price of 
$12 plus a minor increase to take account of changes in price levels since 
October, 1957. At last, the general manager of the Laundry Equipment 
division objected, and countered this proposal with a price of $11.21, made 
up as follows: 
Proposed selling price of Thorndike 
Model 10.00 
Adjustments 
Cost of added design features . 85 Cost of eliminated design features (. 50) 
Increased cost of material and labour 
since date of quotation . 75 
1.10 
Profit on added cost (10%) . 11 1.21 
Proposed Price 11.21 
As neither of the divisions would move from their proposed prices, the 
matter was refarred to the finance staff for arbitration. 
The manager of the Gear and Transmission, division justified his 
proposal/ 
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proposal of $12 + to the finance staff on the grounds that there 
was no objection from the Laundry Equipment division until after the 
installation of the plant and machinery required to make the transmission 
units. If the Laundry Equipment division was unhappy with the proposal 
it ought to have objectcd when the project was submitted to top management 
for approval, for this approval had been obtained on the basis of 
profitability figures using the $12.00 price for the transmission unit. 
In addition, he submitted that the price of'$10 quoted by Thorndike 
was a "distress price" in that it was a final desperate effort by that 
business to stay in the transmission industry. As such it was not a valid 
basis for a long term intra-company prica agreementg for if the Thorndike 
Machining Corporation bad been successful in gaining the business, the 
price would have been increased eventually. 
The Laundry Equipment division's case was based on the argument that 
a transmission, which was comparable in performance, could be bought from 
Thorndike for $11.21. In addition, it was pointed out that company policy 
relating to divisional transfer prices was based on the understanding that 
supplying divisions should sell at competitive prices and that the Gear and 
Transmission division had observed this rule when they agreed to match 
Thorndike on price and quality, but had subsequently changed their attitude. 
If the $12 + price was accepted by the arbitrators, it would release the 
general manager of the Gear and Transmission division from his promise, and 
would penalise the Laundry Equipment division for safeguarding the interests 
of the corporation as a whole, by keeping the transmission business within 
the organisation. It was claimed by the general manager of the Laundry 
Equipment division that he had not protested in mid-1957, because he felt 
it was too early at that time to negotiate a 1959 price. He claimed that 
his cost analysts. had not evaluated the proposal, but assumed that the 
$11.66 was approximately correct, and he had interpreted the rounding up 
of the price to $12.00 as a negotiating gimmick by his opposite number, 
which would have been discarded, when the terms of the agreement between 
the/ 
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the two divisions were considcrcd in detaiL 
During the review by the finance staff, it was disclosed that the 
cost effect of changes in performance characteristics and the increase 
in cost levels since the original quotation would have the effect of 
adding $1.25 to Thorndike's price of $10.00, i. e. a total price of 
$11.25, which was nearly the same as thAt proposed by the Laundry 
Equipment division. It was also discovered that the cost of eliminated 
, design features amounting to 50 cents was valid, so that the proposal by 
the Gear and Transmission division was wrong in that it had failed to 
take account of this siving. A study of the figures indicated that at a 
price of $12.00 the Gear and Transmission division could look for an 
after-tax profit on investment of 15%, and at a price of $11.25, the 
division would earn approximately 6% after tax. At this time the 
after-tax profit objective of the Gear and Transmission division was 15%. 
Finally, it was stated by the Purchasing staff that the price levels quoted 
by the Thorndike Machining Corporation should be a valid basis for the 
foreseeable future. 
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Comments on the Transmission Problem 
In this dispute, it would appear that errors can be attributed to 
both of the divisions involved. The level of communication between the 
divisions seems inadequate and the negative reaction of the general manager 
of the Laundry Equipment division to the proposals put up by the Gear and 
Transmission division can hardly be commended. It is certainly not in the 
corporation's interest for a capital investment1roject to be submitted for 
consideration by top management on the basis of a transfer price which will 
be challenged only after approval has been given. Similarly, in so far as 
the general manager of the Gear and Transmission division agreed to match 
the $10.00 price of the outside supplier, in a bid to extend the operations 
carried on within his division, it is not acceptable for him to ignore flis 
undertaking at a later date. However, as has been indicated in the first 
part of this dissertation, it is a general principle in decentralised 
divisional transactions that a division should only be required to pay for 
its errors in intracompany transactions when these errors result in a loss 
of profits io the organisation as a whole. If a loss of profits to the 
, company 
lias-not occurred, then the divisions should be placed in the 
financial positions which they would have enjoyed had no mistake taken place. 
Fith this principle in mind, we should therefore try to. determine what the 
current price for a make or buy decision should be, and what would have been 
the outcome of the capital investment appraisal had the correct price been. 
employed. 
A decision relating to the make or buy price must consider the validity 
of the $10.00 quotation made by the Thorndike Machining Corporation. 
According to the general manager of the Gear and Transmission division it 
is a last desperate attempt to remain in this section of the industry, an 
argument which is refuted by the Laundry Equipment division. The view of 
the Laundry Equipment division is supported by the Purchasing staff who 
believe that tInc price can be maintained by Thorndike in the fornseeable 
future/ 
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future and as a return on investment of 6% after tax can be achieved on 
the price based on this quotation, (very low by present standards but 
probably acceptable in the late 501s) it does seem that the quotation 
is valid and that this price ought to have been used in the appraisal 
of the capital investment project. 
Turning to the second part of the question, consideration should 
now be given to the effect on the decision to approve the investment 
project if the proposal had been based on the lower price. It can be 
seen that a price of $11.25 per unit would produce an after tax profit 
of 6% on investment, which, if acceptable to top management, means that 
no harm has been done by the failure of the Laundry Equipment division 
to challenge the $12.00 price when it was used in the project. In these 
circumstances, the intra-company price ought to be $11.25. On the other 
hand, if an incorrect make or buy decision has been made, and the 
profitability level of the whole company has been jeopardised by the 
failure of the Laundry Equipmentcivision to question the basis of the 
projects profitability, then the reduction in profit should be reflected 
in that division's financial statement. A point of minor interest in this 
problem, is the anomaly created in the Gear and Transmission division's 
proposal, which starts by assuming a profit of 10% of Selling Price and 
then used a 10% on cost, for profit in the calculation of the transfer price. 
Bad they continued on their original assumption, the difference between their 
calculations and their final price of $12.00 would have been reduced. 
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Conclusions - Ccneral Appliance Corporation 
When a comparison is made of the circunstances-existing in the 
Birch Paper Company Case and the General Appliance Corporation case, 
it can be seen that there is at least one significant difference. 
The major difference lies in the fact that in the former case the 
dispute between the divisions could probably have been settled by free 
negotiation between the divisions, whereas in the latter case this was 
not possible. In the General Appliance case, negotiation did not 
produce an agreement, so that resort to arbitration was necessary* 
The essential reason for the failure of the negotiation procedure 
results from the fact that the divisions were not free to go outside 
the corporation if they were dissatisfied with the transfer pricing 
arrangement, and hence did not have the bargaining strength which they 
would have had if they could have threatened to go outside. 
In the ideal situation, as outlined by R. N. Anthony in his "Notes 
on Transfer Prices" he states that the buying manager must be free to 
buy outside, but adds that in practice this ideal cannot be met completely. 
Top management must retain the right to intervene when a divisional 
manager's judgment requires to be corrected. 
The negotiation of prices between divisions can of course result in 
long term quarreling among the personnel concerned. In some instances 
the relationship between the parties has been such that their treatment of 
each other has compared unfavourably with their attitude towards employees 
of other organisations. In his article "Interdivisional Pricing", John 
Dearden quotes an instance in which the engineers of a buying division 
were refused admittance to a factory within the same company, which was 
freely accessible to engineers from a competing organisatione Clearly 
such instances are highly unsatisfactory, and it emphasises the need for 
a careful choice to be made when selecting both the personnel engaged in 
negotiations and in arbitrations. It must be realised that prolonged 
bickering over transfer prices is dysfunctional, so that disputes should 
go/ 
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go to arbitration very quickly. In addition to ensuring that the 
arbitrator has a neutral point of view, it is imperative that the 
arbitrator does not follow a purely arbitrary line such as "splitting 
the difference, ' for example. Arbitrary pricing methods can defeat 
one of the most important reasons for decentralising profit responsibility 
that of making divisional personnel profit conscious. If a transfer price 
is imposed upon a division and is considered unsatisfactory from the 
viewpoint of the personnel of that division, their acceptance'of the 
responsibility for the profitability of that division must be adversely 
affected. 
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SECTION C 
I 
A. _I*J " 
SECTION C 
0 TMIE SITUATION IN T Mir UNITED KINGDa-l - SORE r"N"Al-MLES 
This section considers the findings of two surveys carried out on 
Transfer Pricing and then the mechanism employed in three British 
organisations which the writer bas had the opportunity to study. 
The first survey, "Transfer Pricing A Measure of Management Performance 
in multi-divisional Companies" was completed by the British Institute of 
Management in 1971. The companies taking pprt in this survey were 
required to complete a questionnaire (reproduced as Appendix A)on their 
transfer pricing methods and practices in general and to explain the 
principal method of internal trading between their units in detail* 
The second survey, carried out in 1967 by Mr. F. Livesey was restricted 
to companies in the Manchester area and was particularly interested in 
the extent to which aivisions were permitted to trade outside their 
company and how prices. of products traded internally were determined. ' 
The three case studies consider the transfer pricing mechanism employed 
, the circumstances 
in one division, of a I&rge engineering organisation 
which resulted in the liquidation of a subsidiary company of a well known 
paper manufacturer and the arrangement by which two associated companies 
in the furniture manufacturing industry have agreed to transfer the 
semi-finished output of one company to the other, for subsequent completion 
and sale to the public. As some of the terms used in the first case 
require detailed explanationg the determination of Cost Behaviour by 
Least Squares Regression has been included as Appendix B after thatcase. 
131. 
INTRODUCTION 
Twenty years ago the writer was employed as works accountant ilL 
a factorywhich produced torche3, small electric appliances and sundry 
items such as gaslighters etr. This factory (called FactoryA frora now 
onwardsfbr the sake of clarity) was one of six factories which made up 
the production division of a company which is still well known in the 
light engineering industry. Each year the Production Division director 
and the factory managers-were required to negotiate a transfer pricefor their 
products with the management of the Sales Division, which operated from Head 
Office. In the main this arrangement worked reasonably well for the 
Production Divisional management supported their claims with pre-determined 
Standard Cost schedules and the Sales Division with their assessments of 
what prices would be acceptable by wholesalers for a given volume of 
products. The area of negotiation was. therefore clearly defined. The 
usual outcome was that the Sales division agreed to accept a given mix of 
products which, would be delivered over the following, twelve months at 
prices based on the expected market price less a percentage to cover the 
sales division's. handling costs plus a margin of profit. 
In the factoryin question costs were accumulated monthly and set against the 
value of products transferred to the Sales'Division at the-agreed prices', 
in order to determine the profit or*loss for the month. 'These Msults and 
the factory's ability to meet the periodic demands from theýSales Division 
(referred to within the organisation as "call-offs") were used by the Works' 
director to assess his factory managements' performance, so that considerable 
interest was taken in-both the value of output despatched and the variances 
from the pre-determined standard costs. In mid 1953 however, the demand 
for two of the products declined which meant that the Sales Division were 
unableýto call off-the'quantities already agreed, and'the activity level 
in the works fell drastically. As a result-the works'director arranged for 
factory A'to produce certain parts required in the production of dr. v-call 
batteries by another works, Factory B within'the same group, which was 
located about thirty miles away. 
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Despite the other factory's inability to =ke all of the parts 
required without extensive overtime arrangements and the fact that 
the inter-divisional negotiating machinery haloperated reasonably 
successfully, this intra-divisional arrangement proved difficult from 
the outset. Both factory managers saw that the tran, sfer prices would 
influence their monthly performance assessments and set out to obtain' 
the most favourable prices possible. At a. series of meetings, full 
of acrimonious debate, production costs, handling costs, and transit 
costs were bandied abouts without any long term policy being agreed. 
The situation was what has come to be known as the classical captive 
buyer and seller situation - we could only make for them, for the question 
of selling these parts to an outside competitor never arose, and they had 
to take our output for there were no outside suppliers available to them. 
Yet the monthly performance assessments clouded the issue sufficiently 
, to prevent the agreement of two managers who had hitherto been comparatively 
friendly towards each other. As a result the works director intervened 
and laid down fairly arbitrary transfer prices which would be maintained 
until he reviewed the situation six months later'. 
The negotiation of transfer prices would appear to result in trouble 
in many organisations. For example, A. N. Warburton of the Kaiser 
Aluminium and Chemical Corporation found it necessary to say in the 
Harvard Business Review of May/June 1964: 
"At Kaiser we now use a cost system rather than a negotiated, 
system for transfer prices, since we believe that inter-divisional 
transfer price staff work and arguments can represent one of the 
follow that as purest form of overhead. Moreover it does not 
7_ a result of all the work and arguments justice will necessarily 
be done. We have also found that these discussions and 
arguments under a negotiated system are not always a "meeting 
of equals" on the battleground of the free enterprise system, 
but/' 
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butrather are affected by personalities and by corporate positions. " 
It is interesting to note that even in a situation where factory managers 
had considerable information in the shape of time-study reports and material 
specifications, from which standard costs had been calculated, agreement 
could not be reached.. In fact the intervention of the works director 
did not solve the problem for his middle of th. e road solution satisfied 
neither party, and the arrangement was never successful. Ultimately, 
FactoiyA was closed and it cannot be disputed that this lack of success 
in' achieving co-operation between the two locations was an important 
factor in the decision to close down. The battery factory manager 
(Factory B) was given the premises extension whicl, he had always wanted 
and in so fRr as the works is still operating, althounh under different 
management, it can be concluded that the ultimate decision was probably 
correct. However, a case can still be made for some arrangdment which 
would have merged control of the factories, thereby eliminating the 
transfer price controversy and preventing the many social problems which 
the close down brought with it. 
Now, twenty years on, it is important to assess how much has been learned 
from situations such as has been described above. It has to be concluded 
that the present situation is far from satisfactory. For example, in the 
Beta Company case discussed from Page 190onwards, many of the factors 
which created difficulties in the situation described above, were present 
and predictably contributed again to the decision to close down what had 
beelL a thriving enterprise. Even more disquieting was the lack of 
relevant information available to the managements of both Alpha Engineering 
Ltd. (from page 162to page 178) and the Beta company in attempting to reach 
decisions. It has never been more important for managements to be fully 0 
acquainted with all of the costs of their operations, yet indications are that 
the Management Information Systems have been deficient in situations where it 
would/ 
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would have been reascnable to expect a more than satisfactory standard 
from the Accountancy departments. The answers to the Survey questions 
(pages 135and 155 ) indicate that many organisations have given the 
problem little or no thought and that some of those who have are muddled 
in their thinking. For example, in his survey of organisations in the 
Manchester area,, Mr. F. Livesey states that twenty follow-up interviews 
I 
were conducted because reliance could not be placed on written answers to 
questions relating to freedom to trade. 
Whilst most of what follows is critical of present r-ractices, there are 
some indications that organisations are beginning'to appreciate that 
decisions relating to intra-company transfer prices can have considerable 
influence on the ov-rall profitability of their businesses. Whilstthe 
Kaiser experience must not be under-estimated it is to be hoped. that 
transfer pricing will become more and more a logical process aimed at 
achieving corporate goals rather than merely a clash of personalities 
with victory to the strongest and most influential character. The 
transfer pricing problem can certainly not be studied in isolation for 
in every situation there are other factors which are both influenced by 
and influence the transfer pricing system, and therefore require careful 
consideration. 
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TRANSFER PRICING - THE DRITIS11 INSTITUTE OF MANAGUIENT SURVEY 1971 
INTRODUCTION 
In his foreword to the above survey, Dr. J. Batty states that although 
the application of transfer pricing is not new, very little attention has 
been paid to the methods employed and the reasons for their adoption. 
This comment is borne out in full by the results of the survey, which 
indicate that there are a variety of transfer pricing methods in use'in the 
United Kingdom, and that some of these methods are difficult*to justify, when 
considered in relation to the circumstances in which they are being operated. 
Ilowever, the author of the survey has 'Confined the report almost completely to 
the results of the questionnaire (see Appendix)l and whilst emphasising that 
the choice of methods is very importanto has not assessed the validity of the 
methods employed in particular instances to any great extent. 
In his foreword, Dr. Batty has suggested that more extensive study will be 
encouraged by the findings of the survey, so that comments on these findings 
would appear relevant for inclusion in a thesis on this subject. The 
following comments will show that some of the companies which professed in the 
questionnaire to be satisfied with their systems ought not to have been, and 
it is to be hoped that the B. I. M. will produce an appraisal of these methods 
in an effort to reduce the level of complacency indicated in some of the 
replies to the questionnaire. 
THE SURVEY 
293 companies replied to a postal questionnaire (see Appendix) sent out by 
Miss A. Rook, Research Officer, British Institute of Management. The 
findings of the survey are based on the 193 of these companies which stated 
that they operated a system of inter-unit trading. The results obtained 
from the information supplied by these 193 companies have been analysed into 
three groups, according to the n umb er of employees in each organisation - 
i. e. under 1,000 employees sniall companies 
1,000 - 5,000 employees medium companies 
ovdr 5,000 employees large companies 
Ouestion/ 
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Question 9 of Part I of the survey set out to determine the scale of 
inter-unit trading within these companies. From the table below it will be 
seen that in more than half of the companies inter-unit sales accounted for 
less than 10% of the total annual sales in more than half of the companies, 
and that it ranged from 10% to 25% in the majority of the remaining companies - 
Comparison of inter-unit sales with total 
annual sales 
Percentage of 
total sales 
Total number of employees 
formed by Under 19000- Over Total 
inter-unit sales 1,000 59000 5,000 
Percentage of companies 
Under 10% 61 51 45 54 
10% - 25% 27 42 38 34 
25% - 50% 7 
50% - 75% 10 
Over 75% 2 10 5 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL POLICIES 
The survey found that the degree of control exercised by central 
management over company units varied widely. As might have been expected, 
the degree of decentralisation depended to a large extent on the company's 
size and structure. The table below shows that decentralisation to a 
high degree is practised by only 26% of "small"-companies whereas it is 
practised by 00% of "large! 'companies 
Companies/ 
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Companies' general control policies 
Total number of employees 
Under 19000 - over 
General policy 10000 50000 51000 
Percentage of companies 
To decentralise control 
to a high degree- 26 40 60 
To decentralise control 
to a limited degree 50 49 33 
To maintain close central 
control 24 11 7 
Question 7 asked whether it was the organisati6n's policy to decentralise 
control to a high degree, to a limited degree or to maintain close central 
control. As will be shown later, it would seem that the interpretations of 
this question have varied widely , as might have been expected from a question 
of such a subjective nature. It may be argued that the omission of the'te'rm 
"decentralisation" from the list of definitions included-in the questionnaire 
did notlelp the participants in the survey or the objectivity of their replies. 
In this context it is worth noting that David Solumons in "Divisional 
Performance' - Measurement and Control", points out that the varying degrees of 
decentralisation are not easily covered by statistical tabulations. -Decisions 
are often the result of compromise or of consultation so tbatthe answer to the 
question "who makes this or. that kind of decision? " is seldom easily answered. 
Similarly, the level at which authority is given often varies with the. amount 
of money involved, so that what may be a divisional decision at one level of 
cost, may be a centralised management decision at a higher level of, cost. 
If a question, which attempted to-ascertain, the trend of-thL- organisation's 
policy,. cither towards greater decentralisation or back towards closcr central 
control had been substituted for Que. -ýIion 7 in the questionnaire, it might have 
proved more informative. 
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MANALCEMENT CONTROL AND THE DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF TNTER-IJNTT TRADING 
In Part II of the survey, where the Methods of Inter-Unit trading 
was examinedl consideration was given to company policies relating to the 
Buying, Selling and Pricing of Goods. Question 11 asked if the buying unit 
is ever permitted to buy goods from external sources, which could be obtained 
internally, and if Yes, does the decisions to buy externally ever have to be 
approved by head office/central managemente 
It was interesting to note that the proportion of companies which could 
buy from external sources (75%) did not vary appreciably when related to the 
size of company, overall control policy or relative volume of inter-unit 
sales. However, Table 3 below shows that of the companies which decentralise 
control to a high degree, the decision to buy externally has to be approved 
in certain circumstances. inmore than half the cases - 
Table 3 
Central Management Control 
over the external buying of goods 
% of_Conpanies % of Companies % of Companies 
that decentralise that decentralise maintaining close 
control tohigh degree control to limited central control 
de&ree 
Decision has to be 
approved in certain 
circumstances 57 74 89 
'Decision never has to- 
be approved 43 26 
The report indicates that there are a few organisations where"the 
decision to buy externally has-always to be approved by central Týanagementq 
yet profe'ss to'decentralise control to a high degree. Clearly in these 
instances, their interpretation of the term "decentralised to aýhigh-degree" 
must be questioned. As already indicated differences and difficulties in 
interpretation do arise and may in some cases account for this apparent 
contradiction. 
In the instances where head office approval was necessary under certain 
circumstances, it was interesting to note that one company stated that the 
divisional/ 
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divisional buyer had to comply with three conditions: 
1. that he could buy from external sources on a regular basis at 
significantly lower prices than those offered by an internal selling 
uni t. 
2. that if he purchased internally he could not maintain the profit margins 
which he had been achieving to date 
and 3. that his acceptance of an inflated inter-unit price would seriously 
jeopardise his unit's operations. 
The first two of these constraints would not imposelimitations on 
the degree of decentralisation, if it is accepted that decentralisation means 
complete freedom to make decisions in the best interests of the sub-unitt as 
if the unit was independent. However, in so far as the third constraint is 
qualified (seriously jeopardise) it would seem that conflict must inevitably 
arise as a result of differences of interpretation. If head office management 
want to preserve a decentralised structure, the need for complete autonomy at 
sub-unit level has to be respected. 
The sme co=ents can be made in relation to the information emerging 
from the questions on company control policies relating to the pricing of 
goods. Again, as can be seen from the table on the following page, there is 
a contradiction in that nearly half, of'the companies who decentralise control 
to a high degree state that central management alone formulated the policy for 
establishing inter-unit prices. Even if the point is fully accepted that any 
transfer price must be a constraint on decentralisation because it is designed 
to link at least two sub-units, whereas by definition all sub-units in a 
decentralised system should act as though they were independent, a fully 
centralised pricing policy must go a very long way towards reducing the degree 
of decentralisation in any organiiat-ione 
Forrmiation/ 
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METHODS OF ESTABLISHING INTER-UITIT PRICES 
A. Inter-Unit priccs_based on Costs of Production 
Although there are several objections to the establishment of inter-unit 
prices based on costs, of production plus the addition of a profit element 
(see page 37 for a discussion on this point) it was found in the 
survey that out of 89 companies which based their inter-unit prices on 
costs of production, 40-adjusted the cost by a fixed amount or percentage. 
In so far as the survey is based on information received from a total of 
193 companies, the number of companies using what is generally accepted 
as an unsatisfactory basis is significant. The author of the survey 
notes the anomaly which arises when the profit margin is included in the 
inter-unit price as a fixed percentage of the costs incurred, i. e. that 
as Selling unit costs rise, so does the profit margin. The effect is to 
lessen the selling unit's incentive to keep costs to a minimum for its 
profit margin is assured, whatever costs are incurred. 
Some of theconclusions reached in the survey relating'to this basis 
are readily acceptable. The fact that such a system is simple for 
accounting purposes-and that is easy at any one'time to establish the 
product costs, as the profit amount or percentage is known and can be 
deducted from the price, cannot be refuted. However, the conclusions 
that as each selling unit is guaranteedýa profit, this may help to 
encourage inter-unit co-operation seems optimistic to say the least 
Whilst such an arrangement may be very acceptable to the selling unit, 
where the buying unit is faced with the problem of selling the ultimate 
product to outside customers in a reasonably competitive market, its 
co-operation in such a system may understandably be very difficult-to 
obtain, particularly where aiternative outside sources of supply are 
available to it. In such circumstances, if the buying division elects 
to purchase outside, and the selling unit is unable to obtain an 
alternative buyer, the dangers to the profitability of the organisation 
as a whole as a result of this polky of sub-optimisation will be - 
142. 
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significant. Thic aspect of the problem is not considered in the 
findings of the survey. - 
Similarly, little is made of the point that the great defect of full 
cost as a basis for transfer pricing lies in the fact that it does not 
provide a satisfactory guide to decision making. As has been stated 
earlier, as far as the manager of a division buying intermediate products 
is concerned, the transfer price is a variable cost. He will only buy 
the intermediate produci when his mlling price of the final produc6 is 
, sufficient to cover this transfer price plus his adiditional processing 
and marketing costs. Accordingly, although the overall effect of the 
transaction may be to increase Ohe total company profito the full cost 
transfer price will. obscure this situation. 
The survey records that there were no companies which based their 
inter-unit prices on marginal costs of production. Despite the fact 
that many companies use marginal costing to some extent, few used it 
exclusively. Whilst some of the usual objections to systems of marginal 
costing are given as the justification for the lack of enthusiasm fcr'the 
use of this basis for transfer pricing, it would seem that the. practiqal 
difficulties outlined on page 62 are equally relevant. It is true that 
reference to direct costs only may be misleading, but it is also true that 
few companies have cost structures which are delineated clearly enough to 
justify anything but a constant marginal cott assumption. However, from 
the practical viewpoint it is much more important to recognise that a 
marginal cost transfer pricing system ignorcs the divisional performance 
measurement aspect and consequently it cannot be employed without the 
removal of the decision-making autonomy from individual profit centres. 
When it is remembered that as long as marginal cost transfer pricing is 
being operated, the supplying division will show a loss which will aaversely 
affect its overall performance figure, it is not surprising to find that it 
is not being used in situations where the decision to trade internally is 
left at divisional level. Again, in situations where marginal cost is 
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increasing with volume, marginal cost will vary according to the 
total demand of the buying division plus the demands of the supplying 
division's outside customers. Given these circumstances neither 
division can make its decisions relating to output independently, so 
that the complete autonomy of the individual division is no longer 
possible. 
It should be noted of course that if the product to be transferred can 
be bought and sold in a competitive market, marginal cost and market 
price will not conflict. If a competitive market exists, the buying 
division can meet its needs for the intermediate product by buying them 
outside at the market price. It is in the company's interest that it 
should do so if it prevents the supplying division from incurring marginal 
costs of a greater amount in supplying the intermediate. As Soiomons 
I 
says, ''If the transfer price of the intermediate is set at its market 
price, the transferor division can supply as much as it wishes (which 
will be as much as it can produce without incurring incremental costs 
in excess of the price it will get) leaving the transferee division to 
acquire any additional supplies it may need by outside purchase. 
Alternatively, the transferor division may be able and willing to 
supply more of the intermediate at the market price than the consuming 
division can uýe. In that case, the correct course is for the 
supplying division to go on producing so long as its incremen6al cost 
is below the market price. It can sell on the market any output not 
taken up by the other division. " 
In these-rather special circumstances, it is fair to say that an 
organisation/ I 
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organisation is basing its inter-unit prices on marginal costs of 
production - possibly, may it be added, without being aware of it. 
B. Inter-unit Prices based on Ma , rket Prices 
The remaining 104 companies participating in the survey based their 
inter-unit prices on Market Prices, and 60% of these companies modified 
these prices in one way or another. * It was found that a higher percentage 
of companies modified market prices where inter-unit sales formed a large 
proportion of total sales, which appears reasonable having regard to the 
fact that the basis of the system transfcr pricing is more significant, 
the more important the degree of inter-unit trading. These methods of 
modifying the market price were either 
t 
(a) adjustment by negotiation, or 
(b) adjustment by a fixed amount or percentage$ 
the method by negotiation being slightly the more popular. Negotiation 
was, however, much more popular, in the larger companies (70% of companies 
with over 5,000 employees as opposed to 36% of companies with under 
11000 employees)* and-it was felt that this could be attributed to the 
fact that "the scale and diversity of inter-unit operations in large 
companies requires greater flexibility in establishing inter-unit prices". 
The majority of the 40 or so companies using the true market price as the 
basis for their system of transfer pricing considered their method 
satisfactory. Some of the arguments made for this basis are as follows 
"Prices are kept in. line with those for other outside customers" 
"Buyer and seller are treated as though they were unrelated 
companies which are required to make profits in the existing 
market conditions" 
"Normal marketing decisions-are-not interfered-withr-nor are normal 
uses of resources distorted" 
"Unless there is a specific benefit to be gained by way of specialised 
plant utilisation or the use of any other special resources wi. thin 
the/. 
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the group, members are encouraged to deal at arm's length 
and to. quote to group members as if they were dealing in the 
open market, in order to eliminate the risk of inbreeding or 
trading at prices that are too marginal in relation to the 
market demand for the available capacity. " 
It would appear that these organisations are disregarding the 
fact that selling expenses are incurred in making outside sales which 
do not arise in interdivisional transfers. In addition, the question 
of collection expenses and the problem of bad debts do not arise when 
goods are transferred internally. On the other hand, the purchasing 
division will probably not incur any additional cost if the supplier 
is an outside company rather than another division within the same 
organisation. Accordingly, if the selling division charges the full 
market price, the purchasing division is not motivated towards taking 
the intermediate product from the internal source; and if, it does not, 
the organitation as a whole will suffer to the extent of the value of the 
selling expenses incurred by the selling division in selling its output 
to outside customers. 
The survey points out. the disadvantages-of the true market price in 
situations where market prices are subject to wide fluctuations, either 
because of the nature of the goods, or through unstable market conditions. 
Consideration should also be given to the size of the company's share of 
the total market for the product in question, for it may be that the 
market price is dependent on the volume handled by the company's divisions, 
in either a buying or selling capacity. The use of an unrealistic 
market price - one at which unlimited quantities cannot be bought or sold - 
must make the whole market price basis of transfei-Pricing highly 
questionable. Similarly, where the transferred produce has special 
characteristics which make it slightly'different Afrom other iyp6s of what 
might loosely be called the same product, the price - on the market for 
these/ 
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these other types may be inappropriate. 
It would seem therefore that some modification to the market price 
is required in most instances, and that companies which do not consider 
this factor may not be achieving the optimum level of profitability. In 
such a situation Joel. Dean's comments relating to the practic al benefits 
to be derived from sound transfer pricing which are quoted on page 94 seem 
particularly relevant. 
As the survey found, systems in which the market price is adjusted by 
negotiation can prove to be time-consuming, because difficulties in 
agreeing a satisfactory price do give rise to drawn out negotiations. 
Dean, as the advocatL of bargained or negotiated pricess overcomes this 
objection by maintaining that the identification oi the selfish interears 
of the division manager and the interests of the company as a whole can be 
reconciled by a system of inter-unit pricing which observes three rules: 
1. Prices of all transfers in and out of a profit centre should be 
determined by nesotiation between buyers and sellers. 
2. Negotiatimirs should have access to full data on alternative sources 
and markets and to public and private information about market prices. 
3. Buyers and sellers should be completely free to deal outside the comrany. 
This third rule is particularly important, because as the survey says: 
"Difficulties can arise however when the buying unit is not permitted 
to buy externally. This obviously puts the selling unit in a very 
strong position, and may very well mean that prices cannot be negotiated 
satisfactorily. Similarly, a buying unit may take advantabe of its 
strong bargaining position if the selling unit is forced to sell 
internally. " 
it will be Llear from Dean's fules that transfer prices could never be 
negotiated satisfactorily under these ccndit ions. Indeed, in these 
circumstances the whole concept of different profit centres must be 
a 
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questioned, for bow can the management of a unit be held responsible 
for profit where the unit is either-in the position of a captive buyer 
or a captive seller? The central management of organisations which have 
indicated in the survey that excessive time is spent in negotiation would 
do well to ascertain how significant the requirement to buy or sell 
internally, is, 'in specific situations. It may be that they will have to 
balance the replacement of bargained prices by centrally imposed prices 
against the loss'of autonomy at divisional level. Indeed, in some cases, 
where the greater part of a unit's output has to be transferred to another 
internal unit, the whole edifice of different profit centres will be seen to 
be unrealistic so that'a reversion to a system of cost cenýres should be 
imposed. 
CONCLUSION 
The British Institute of Management survey has broken new ground in so far 
as it has required the managements bf many of the most important 
organisation'S in the'United Kingdom to outline their methods of inter-unit 
trading. it has largely confined its findings to the"answers to tile 
questionnaire and has not set out to comment or criticise these answers 
to any great extent. As some of the answers indicate that a greater 
- understanding of the problems involved could improve the profitability 
of these organisations, it is to be hoped that the B. I. M. will follow up 
the survey with an appraisal of the methods used by their members, and 
suggest improvements where necessary. 
It seems particularly important to emphasise. that in a decentralised 
situation, pricing is a function which qualified divisional managers 
should be competent to perform successfully. For thisreason, it should 
be normal fof inter-unit pricing problems to be settled at divisional 
level, and for only exceptional cases to be brought before central 
management. These exceptional cases will in the main relate to interests 
of the company as o whole, such as: 
i. / 
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1. Ensuring that the available facilities are used to greatest advantage. 
For example, it may be in the company's overall best interest to operate 
one division at a loss when a close down would result in a loss of 
profits or failure to recover fixed overheads in a second division, 
which processes the output of the first division. Similarly, central 
control is required to handle divisional requests to set up facilities 
to make components and other items which can be obtained elsewhere 
within the company. 
2. --Preventing a division from pricing its products too high, when overall 
company policy indicates that itwould be preferable to pass cost 
reductions on to outside customers in the form of lower prices or 
better quality. 
Providing further information, if not already available at divisional 
lev'el, e. g. markets and price trends for the company's raw materials, 
estimated suppliers' costs etc. 
Apart from such exceptions. intervention by central management should be 
restricted to the minimum, if divisional autonomy is to be preserved. 
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COWIDENTIAL 
Door Sir. 
With the increasing numb"" Of mergers end takeovers. and the rapid rise In the tire$ 0! ComWift the manligilme"t 
of Internal business matters is becoming more complel, Drill of tl, o major internal plotolerris icistif m4ndwrivent lodov is 0. &1 
of Intre-company pricing. Apart from the task of physically transporting goods from one oopirtniont cc division to anothr. a 
method of assming IS realistic traftsfer Price mirst be established. 
In view of the increasing interest in this subject. we hove &c1ded to carry out a survey to establish and compare the 
current methods which are i, * use. We feet that the telvits will I, Q both interesting and u%eful 10 many of our membor 
organisations, and we voulJ flwref- a be grateful of vo,,, o.,. d con, plate this qucstiormaire and MUM It to US r- 11103 86 
possibic. 
Nabiraliv. tho valli,, of all raw orneovi, d-li, In 0 far- extent on It. @, momhot of comcwtins willino to provide us with 
information. This Is particularly true of this subject, whole cnmpany practice varies widuly, and your cor. ts ibut. on to our 
raiscanth would luarefora be Involumb1c. 
The Informi-tion you send will be treated in the strictest conmence fino you will twelve a COPY of Still fill lei lepOl's as *am, 
is it is published. if you are unable to complete the qoastronnairo. it would M holliful if you Lould notify us of this. 
If you have any queries relating to the questionnaire, pleasit do not hesitate to contact in*. 
I hank ing you for your co-operation. 
Youn; Sincerely. 
Angela Rook. 
Reseavch Officer. 
TIIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS DIVIDED INTO FIVE PARTS 
PART I General information on your or; jnisation. 
PART 11 
in 
Infaimution on one of your main methcds of inter-unit trading. 
PART III information on inter-unit forking Wad an maket prices. 
PART IV infornution on inter-unit pricing b&W on costs of production. 
PART V your opinions and conri-onts. 
NOTES FOR COMPLETING THE OUESTIONNAIRE 
II 
A The answers on the qawtionndire err, to be analysed by mech: nical =8114- 
Mo-t "V*M hove been numbered and you are requested to ring the number 
Of letter opposite the answers which must accurately dawribe your con-PanY 
Practice. In some cases More than one of the given Altefriw-trwes may apply. In 
other cases you are rt-4uested to write in the appropriate answer. 
8 The closing dat: for the return of the quesiHnnaire Is I Oth January. 197 1. 
Further copies of the questionnaire are ovirilable on fOQ%. *: L 
C Please return the questionnaire to: - Miss A. Rook. Flo. -Aarch Officer. 
8IM Publecavons and Surveys Dept.. Management House. Parker Street. 
London. W-. 28 SPT. 
150. 
VErwitioNs 
THROUGHOUT THE OUESTIONNAIRE CERTAIN TEnMSHAVE a[musrDwHict. - Firm FURTHER DEFINITION. 714t 
UNDFRSTANDING OF THESE TERMS IS FSSrNTIAL FOR YOU TO Of ABLE TO COMPLETE ToM OUESTIONNAIRE. AND 
THEY ARE IHEREropf DEFINED BELOW: 
UNITS . PROFIT CtN7RFS (WHETHER THEY ARE SEPARATE COMPANIES V. 111HIN A CROUP, DIVISIONS OR 
DEPARTMFNTS WITHIN A COMPANY. OR OTHER SECTtONSI VYHOSE MikNAGEMENT IS JUMET) ON 
THE PROFITS EARNED. 
INTEA-UNIT - TRANSFERS OF SALEAnLE GOODS. FOR A PRICE. BETWEEN UNITS AS DEFINED ABOVE. EXCLUDE 
TRADING TRANSFERS OF HAW MATERIALS OR SERVICES AND TRANSFERS WITHIN A UNIT. 
I 
0 
a 
3 
F'APIT I GEINERAL 
OUESTIONNAIRE NO. 1-3- 
COMPANY NAME 
1please print) 
COMPANY ADDRESS 
(please print) 
TELEPHONE NO. 
I 
In order to recewl I COPY Of 
ft completed surAy Plea" 
9; ve yow narrw and job title, 
(PIC&W Print) 
-4 
Mass ring number oppcsite tlie claicification wMah mud closely dirsalt" 
Vour organisation. 
4-5 
of L' or* than one of thou I4UJ below. 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSirICATICN 
02 Amiculturs. Forestry. Frshing. 
03 Mining and Ouvrtying. 
04 Food. Drink. Tobacco. 
05 Coal and Petroleum ProductL 
06 Chem" and Albed Industrim. 
07 Metal Manufactwe. 
08 Mechanical Inginvering. 
09 Instrument Engmeering. 
10 1 lectrical Engineering. 
11 Shipbuilding and hirrine Encineering. 
12 Vehicles. 
13 Metal Goods not elsewhere witied. 
14 Teytiles. 
15 Leather. Leather Goods and Firm 
16 Clothing anj fooh%-e&r. 
17 Brwk% PottvV. Gl3w, Coment. 
18 Timber. Furnikure. tic. 
19 Paper. Printing and Publishing. 
-20 Other Maniulacturing Industries. 
21 Constfuct'Un. 
22 Gas. I leýtrvtv and Water. 
23 Irantpoft arid Communication. 
24 D-str-butnie Trades. 
25 Insurance. Banking. Finji: vis. 
26 I'votev-,, rnol anis Soemitti: Services. 
27 ApnCe: 14nerivs Services. 
28 Public Administration and Defence. 
17 
151. 
%Ijit is Vie total tivenber of employen In yvir wOods oqvnivitim? 
unjer 1.000 
1.000-5.000 
Ov" 5.000 
Is it a policy VA thin your organism tion to: 
6) Decentralism, control to a high degree 
b) Decentrabse control to a limited degree 
cl Maintain close central control 
$F 'Yfg» PLFA%f COKIP( ftt (Mg PEST OF THF. (XASTIONNAsnr, 
v611at iß ule arprogemalt pr#CLAtast of total salks forr. trj bl Intuf-Unit Wlebt 
Und« M 
0m75x ' 4 
7 
2 
3 
is Owns any inw-unot trading' within your organisation. 
Yet 
No 
'See definidon On P&; * 1 
is thct, nw@ IhmA cm rnettiod of Inl#r-unil trailing carried out within your 10 
brWiWtion Ii.,, involving major variations in the method Of Costing Of Pricing 
for various products or between d. flerent uniu)? 
I. 
If "YES" how many methods are there? 
V 
221 
3 
4 
Over 4 
PART 11. METHOD OF INTEn-UNIT TRADING 
ficaic 9 rAWS11 Wowing qimti-I in few-, of WJC &-JkVb#Im-' two Units (, V* buyiM " em wiling) wiihin row *WisadM 
is the buying unit evef Permitted to buy from OXWMAI sources. goods which 
could normally be obtaintd internsily? 
Yes 
No 
Not applicable 3 
(No wernal source of suppty) 
0 
if -YES. does ilia dC6s; oa to buy extoma: ly EVER have to be sq)ffoveýj by 
? wW officelcentral management? 
yes 4 
No 5 
it so. ujx! er what circumstances? 
a, Always 6 
bi vjhen buyir. 9 certain specified goods 7. 
c) In the ev, im. 1 of a dispute with on internal Wing unit which could 
provide the 9ooJs in question 3 
di Other V: cas'(4111 (please state). 2 
is the selling unit eve, ; e(mitted to sell to external markets goods for which 12 
there is a demand %ithsn your own organisatioril 
Yes 
No 2 
Not applicable 3 
lNo external market) 
If "YES" does the decision to %*It externally EVER have to be approved by 12 
head officelcentrA manage"want? 
Yes 
No 
It so. undar what circumstances? 
5 
4 
5 
a) Always 6 
b) ". 74n fWlýýg cwz.;. v spý; Gvd 9nods 
c) In the event of a dispute with an inturnal buying unit which CmAld 
buy the goods In qufttion. 
u) U. " U"W. Kmb Ipleaw "step 
Who formulates the policies for determining inter-unit pric" and WkS Changes? 
13 14 
Inter-Unit Inter-Unit 
prk" Prict Changes 
a) N%d officefcentrat management staff 
alone 
b) Committee of head office/centrall 
manarment staff and staff from the 
buying and selling units 2 2 
cl Committee from buying iind Wiling 
units only 3 3 
d) Other lpleinat state) 4 4 
0 
18 
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. 1t, to-cont, ol monawment staff are 
involved, which staff are they? 
15 is 
Intef-Wit Int" Unit 
2rices Price Cho, 9" 
- 
el Bood level StOff 
LI Sqm, or r, &Wrnent 2 2 
C) ol-W vOff 
I 
Dc, el ts, fixing of individual Inter-un; t pr; ces aver 
have to be specifically 17 
@[Vo, od by hirad office/centrall management? 
Yes 
No 
if "YE V* unde what CircuMSWCOS? 
I 
2 
a) Alwavs 1 3 
I'l V. 1ten pricing certain sPecified goods 4 
Cl When a market price has to be estimated (i e. when there is no 
oxt"nal ji, arket and therefore no &sWbfiO*d markot price) 
d) in the event of a d, sput* 
e) Other occasions 
ook's " mot-lighlotl of lolof unit evve have to to mWeMcAlly 
&Pgwuvpd by heed cifficelcyntfal m vwwn*tsl 
Yes 
'40 
II "YES" under what circumstances? 
*I Always 3 
bI In the cvent of a clittme 
CI When the promoed p-ito Change It Substmhal to 1. MCWS than 5% 
d4ferento from the oropnol rwool 
d) Other occomons (pleau state) 
OM what blikii am Intef-unit pfices fixed? 19 
Are *. ey Used on: 
a, P86m plicet 
bl Cost of production 2 
If "YESm to "a"spleaw complete Psiu III and V of the questionnaire. 
If 'YES" to "b". pitew complete Pairts IV and V of the 
PART Ill. lNTER-UNIT PRICES BASED ON MARKET PRICES 
Is the Ong nwket r4ice modified to Orrin at the inter-unit price? 20 
y Ties 
Z 
if "YES" how? Does the inter-unit price wrh-cd at reprewnt: 
8) The market price adjusteu, ov s fixed amount/percentage -3 
kil An Sivragid nwk*t Pf; cf 4 
cl The market price altefed by negotiation between the units concerned 
d) Otfwr (please state) 
If ft "urket price is at-ered by negotiation. is this done: 21 
di 
*I For each individual tr3nwelion 
b) To covw Vansact-ons ever a period of time 2 
Whole. " r"Com you use. is the purpow. 01 It. 22 
a) To allow the selling unit a specified return on Its kw*arnent 
b) So that the total prort on We to the ultimate cons~ is 
C) Other Ipleam state) 
iI 
When we Intef-unit prices rtvk%*d? 23 
8) At regular intervals 
bl On request fbv buying or selling unit) 
cl When market prices clordp w9nificantly 3 
sil Other (ple, se, state) 4 
If prim re reviewed at regular intervals. how often is this done? 24- 
-11) 
Ouartedy 
b) Malf yearly 
C) Yearly 3 
di Other 4 
19 
153. 
? ART IV. INTEn U. NIT Pnicc" . CASED ON COSTS OF PRODUCTION 
Ape inhprýunjt prices b4rAd on: 25 
a) Actual costs of production 
b) Stand3rd costs 
What elements of cost are included in the inter-unit price? 26 
a) Administrative overheads I 
b) Sailing overheads 2 
c) Dstnbulicin overhead% 2 
d) Research and dweloPment overhead% 4 
2) Otrect tabour ard materials S 
if Variable factory overheaft 6 
0) Total factory overhead% 7 
-11 glements of overheads are included how are they arrived at? Arm they baud on: 
OVERHEADS 
Machine hour late 
Labour hour tat@ 
cl Percentage on direct 
d) Percentage on dire" 
Isbour 
4) Percentage on Prinif 
cost 
f) Othw 
27 28 1 29 * 30 31 32 
Admin. sai; ing Distr. 
- 
A&0 
VOr-shla 
Factory 
Total 
Factory 
I I I I 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 j 3 3 31 3 
4 4 4. 4 4 
s 5 s 5 
ý 
s 
ý5 
:6 : 6- - 6 
II fliff"Onts 00 the I-st*d Omttads wo Wuded in the intw-in; t pike. is 23 
OW SOW overhead: 
81 Under obwtW I 
b) Absorbed 2 
C) Ovff obwrbed 3 
I 
Is the cost of production modified In order to arrive at the inter-unit price? . 
34 
(e. g. * profit eirment ailded to basic tftts). 
yes 
N* 
.I 
2 
If "YES". how Is this done? Do" the Inw unit vict bffh'W 1111 1`90"IlInt' 
a) The cost &djusted by a fixed ampum/patcon". 3 
b) The cost shered by ntgritiallon between the units concwn*d 4 
cl Other (weela state) .S 
1 91 
if the cost is altered by negotiation. is thIs %!. )no: 35 
a) Por vch individual transaction I 
b) T* co%ar tranw. tions over a period of time 
Whatever method you use, is the purpose of it: 34 
a) To allow the selling unit A specified return on its inve*; tmant I 
b) So that the total profit on Ve to the I 1imate consumer is 
dliAributed among participating units 2 
C) Other lplea" slate) 3 
Wien are inter-unit prices reviewed 37 
a) At regulw intervals I 
b) On request (by the buying or wiling unit) 2 
C) VPwn the cost Of ptoduution chaNes significantly 3 
d) Other (Otaw ststtj 64 
Of prices are reviewed at regular Inteivals, how often Is this done? 38 
M Cuanerly I 
b) Half-yearty 2 
cl Yearly 3 
d) Oil.. -r 4 
154. 
rAnTV. OPINIONS AND COMMENTS 
W v. comder your method of inter unit trading totalIV satisfactory? 39 
Yes I 
No 2 
remns. 
cOstlY 3 
V, fl, cult to understand 4 
#CI Time wasting for trit managers invohmed 6 
"I d-soutes 6 
011'er lplease state) 
P1 tA$E ENCLOSE ANY FORMS WHICH ARE USED IN YOUR ORGANISATION IN 
CONNECTION WITH INTER-UNIT TRADsNG. 
or YOU MVE ANY COMMENIS ON THE SUBJECT OF INTER UNIT TAADINC. PLEASE Give VILM BELOW, 
Pf'"ted m Loýftn by OKT Coy P, jpj I od. 
0 "*nt*t of the 6ýa Ký. qhj 
.14, 
I 
1) 
m"m 
155. 
The Manchester Survev'1967 
Four years prior to the LIM survey, a questionnaire relating 
to company policy on inter-divisional pricing was sent to 400 companies 
in the Manchester area by Mr. F. Livesey of the Manchester Business School. 
The enquiry was interested in the extent to which divisions within an 
organisation were given freedom to trade, either in buying or selling, 
outside the company and secondly, how the prices of products which were 
traded internally were determined. 
400 companies were approached and of the 232 useable replies received 
100 companies operated some form of inter-divisional pricing. 
The sizes of the 100 companies practising Internal Pricing were as 
follows: 
'Diatribtitibri'of'Uriitg*'PraFtising-internal Pricina 
'by*Size 
'No. of No. of 
'Erftployees 
0- 99 '6 
100 _'199 11 
200 - 499 26 
500 - 999 21 
1000 -'4999 19 
5000*+ 2 
Wo. information given 15 
100 
Information was asked for by "accounting unit". This is not 
an unambiguous concept, but it seems that in most cases the 
information given was sufficient to enable a size of unit to be 
reliabily determined. Thus in a group internal pricing might 
occur within a firm or between the firms of that group. In the 
first instance the size of thFUIrm, in ihe seddind tFe--size of the 
group, would be the appropriate measure. 
Among/ 
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Among the questions asked in the enquiry were the following: 
1. If products (including raw materials and semi. -finished products) 
are transferred internally at a "certain" price to another 
department, is the transfer effected between - 
(a) 'Functional' departments Yes 
(e. g. buying, production, sales) No 
(b) 'Process' departments 
(e. g. foundry to rolling mill, Yes 
mixing shop to calandering 
department) No 
(c) 'Product' departments 
(e. g. yarn departmenttD weaving Yes 
(cloth) department) 
No 
2. If 'priced' transfers do take place wl-atbasis is adopted in the 
setting of such prices? 
Full cost 
Full cost plus 
Direct or Variable 
Cost 
Negotiations between 
buying and selling dept. 
Any other-(please specify) 
3. If the basis is full cost, how is this cost arrived at? 
(Please specify in particular what use is made of standard costs 
and how overheads are allocated) I 
4. ' 
157. 
4. If an addition is made to the full costq what is the nature of the 
addition? 
A percentage of the assets employed in the 
department 
A percentage of the full cost 
An absolute amount 
Any other (please specify) 
Mr. Livesey does not explain why he asked for the departmental 
analysis requested by Question 1, but as might have been expected 
the distribution over the three categories quoted ms fairly even. 
The figures were: 
''TADLE 
'ItitftriAl *Pricitg'by 'Type'of 
-Department 
*of 'Department Turabcr, bf 'Units 
Functional 31 
Process 29 
Product 44 
As in the BIM survey there was a considerable diversity of 
practice regarding the basis adopted in the setting of prices of 
internally traded goods. Table III below shows the distribution 
over the categories quoted in Question 2. 
a 
TABLE III/ 
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''TABLE'III 
'Ba. qea 'Ugo-d lil 'intparriAlly 'traded 'troducts 
Basis % of Companies 
Wegotiation 1 16 15 
Market or Outside Price 17 15 
Full Cost plus 30 27 
Full Cost 37 34 
Variable Cost 9 
.. I1o 1.00 
(The total number of answers exceeds 100, since some companies adopt 
more than one method) 
Theýmethods used, to arrive at the full cost basis employed by 
37 companies-is not discussed in Mr. Livesey's article, which is 
regrettable, for it would have been interesting to'learn how many 
organisations still-employ actual costs as opposed to the much 
preferable predetermined standard costs, and how they handle the 
practicaIdifficulties encountered in the'allocation of overhead 
costs. '' 
According"Co the replies received in response I to qI uestionAg 
the nature of the addition where fullýcost plus is employed is in 
28 cases a-fixed-percentage of the full cost, in one case a figure 
representing a return on the capital employed'in'the facilities used 
for making the particular product and in the. case of the 30th company, 
a fixed absolute amount. Having regard to the shortcomings of this 
method, as outlined in Section I, ýit is disquieting to-noteth'ow many 
companies add-anýarbitrary fixed percentage to full cost. Mr. Livcsey 
had hoped to find more companife-9--addinc, a-figure-which-tcýok into account 
the, value of. capital employed, for one reason given for adopting the 
full Cost plus, method is that it ensures that each division (and hence 
the company as a ýqhole) earns the company target rate of return. However, 
he/ 
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he concludes that in practice it is often difficult and time-consuming 
to try to allocate capital among the various processes, hence the fact 
that in almost all of the cases investigated, the percentage of full 
cost which is added does not vary between products despite the difference 
which may exist in the amounts of capital employed in the production of 
these various products. 
It will be noted that in this survey no attempt was made at the 
questionnaire stage to obtain answers to questions relating to freedom 
to trade. Mr. Livesey felt that reliance could not be placed on written 
answers on this subject and in fact conducted follow up interviews with 
20 companies to obtain this information. As has been indicated in the 
review of the B. I. M. survqy, the interpretation of the term "freedom to 
trade"'varies from company to company, and as a result there are instances 
where central management intervene in situations where they claim that 
divisional management has the maximum freedom totrade. " Sometimes it 
would appear that their thinking is not as clear as it might be for the 
obvious contradiction-appears to escape them. However, it must be 
apparent to most that a situation of complete freedom to trade at 
divisional level must mcan full autonomy for the divisional manaoement 0 
and correspondingly a reduction in t. he degree of control exercised-by- 
central management. This relaxation of centralised control is, -inevitable 
if the policy of the organisation is to foster what Mr. Livesey calls a 
"commercial attitude" in the minds of the divisional managers. Centralised 
control need not be removed completely however - it will still be possible p 
for Head Office to retain some measure of control by means of a budgetary 
control system. 
An important point brought, out T: )Y ihis survey is- ihat --tlie-- relationship 
between the various methods of setting prices and the limits on freedom 
to trade on the one hand and the objectives intended to be achieved by 
systems of internal pricing on the other, have been considered-far more 
in/ 
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in some companies than in others. As pointed out in the preceding 
paragraph, cpntralised control contradicts the objective of making 
each division autonomous, yet evidence of circumstances in which 
both these factors exist side by side was found in this survey and 
in the B. I. M. survey. Similarly, if the organisation's primary objective 
is to maximise profits over a relatively short period of time, it is 
essential that the existing assets are used to'their optimum - this 
means that any internal priCing policy which induces divisional 
management to reduce the volume of output and the volume or- products 
transferred could be operating to the detriment of the company's overall 
objective because its fixed cost per unit of output increases as the 
volume of output decreases. Where transfer pricing systems based on full 
cost or full cost plus are in operation, this situation is likely to be 
happening. 
It will be noted that the Manchester survey found ten companies where 
transfer prices were based on Variable cost, whereas the B. I. M. survey 
did not find any. In the third of the threecases reviewed later on 
Yage 215 the Delta Furniture Co. Ltd., it will be seen that products 
are transferred at predetermined Standard Variable Costs, with a subsequent 
payment to Delta based on the Contribution Margin earned by its internal 
purchaser. It would have been interesting to learn the details of the 
transactions in the ten Manchester companies, but regrettably Mr. Livesey 
does not pursue this matter. 
'Whilst the Manchester survey has not gone into the transfer pricing problem 
as deeply as-the later survey, it is significant-to note'that many of the 
replies correspond quite closely. Mr. Livesey is prepared to conclude 
that as long as the transfer pricing method employed is related to the 
organisation's objectives, then the tran&fer piicing system is doing all 
that is required of it. *Again, some evaluation of how many of the companies 
questioned are meeting this requirement would have been valuable. 
it/ 
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It must be concluded. that a number of the companies which participated 
in this survey ware operating transfer pricing systems which were 
obviously at variance with the objectives of the overall organisation. 
Whilst it was not part, of Mr. Livesey's uniertaking to advise them 
of this unsatisfactory state of affairs it is to be hoped that a close 
study of the results of the survey will have induced them to look into 
their particular circumstances more deeply and seek the remedy which would 
improve their overall situations. 
1621 o 
ALPBA ENGINEERING LIMITED BRITISH CASE I 
INTRODUCTION- 
Alpha Engineering Ltd. is a large,, old established company which is 
subdivided into four, groups, each of which is made up of three or more 
divisions. After, operating successfully for many years, largely due 
to the negotiation of, large and profitable government, contractso, the 
company, has declined in the, recent past. A number of attempts have 
beenýmade to diversify into ranges of products which are, new, to the 
company and some ofIthese ventures have proved successful. This case 
relates to the activities of the Foundry Division, one of the divisions 
which operates within the control of the central management. of what 
is known as the Engineering, Group. Decentralisation has been carried 
out to, a considerable degree within the Engincering. Group and the divisions 
which-make up this part of the organisation show a higher degree of autonomy 
than that exhibited anywhere else within thecompany. 
After several unprofitable years, two members of the staff holding key 
positions, in the central management of the Engineering Croup were replaced 
in mid 1970. A programme-of rationalisation had,. in fact already, been 
started,, but in addition, the new management, instigatcd a number of studies 
in several areas within the company's operating, structure in the, hopethat. 
the results of these studies would provide a basis for the development of 
the rationalisation process. 
A'review of the intra-company pricing structure was included'because'a, '" 
preliminary investigation had revealed a low volume of activity, 'within two 
of the-decentralised divisions combinedýwith a considerable expenditure 
on partly-finished products and sub-assemblies from outside'suppliers. 
This-low, volume of activity hd_'ýe_sulted'in large - financial losses'in 
these divisions, 'arising mainly-from an underabsorption of overhead costs. 
In thelcase of the'division which will be reviewed in detail, overhead:. 
costs of'a non-variable nature had been estimated in advance and an amountý 
allocated/ 
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allocated to each job undertaken in relation to the number of direct 
labour hours charged to that job. For example, if in a given period 
of time, (say 1 year) the divisioml management estimated that the 
expenditure on non-variable overhead costs would be E240,000, ýand that 
the output estimated for that period would require 100,000 direct labour 
hours, E2.40 would be allocated in respect of overhead cost to each job 
for every direct labour hour charged to that job. , As some of the partly 
finished products purchased. from outside were similar to the output 
produced by these divisions, management decided that they must know what 
fraction, if any, of the work being placed with outside manufacturers could 
have been produced internally, why it was being given to these outside 
suppliers and what the overall effect on the profitability of the company 
as a, whole would have been if this work had been undertaken by these two 
divisions. 
The study showed conclusively that some products which hkA44d-been supplied 
by outside organisationsq could have been produced within. the company at 
costs which were less than the prices paid to these outside suppliers. 
Consequentlyl the company's operating, results for these, periods would have 
been improved, -if the production of these products had remained within the- 
company. This situation results, from. the, policy of decentralisation 
operated, by the company, by which the different divisions areýoperated 
as profit centres, so-, that the divisional. managements are permitted to 
conduct their dealings with the-other divisions within the organisation 
in the same way as. they deal with suppliers and customers who are outside 
the control, of the, organisation's central management. In effect divisional 
managers are permitted to. seek quotations from internal,. and, external 
suppliers. in the same way, and-iiaý accepE a lo-, ief quo-EiFtion from an outside 
supplier witIDutgiving the internal producer the opportunity, to. negotiate 
a further, quotation which is lower than the. external competitor ?3 price. 
Unfortunately, this decentralisation of. profit responsibility had-not been 
accompanied/ 
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accompanied by a careful monitoring of divisional managements' 
financial performance, with the result that divisional managers heve 
lost work to outside suppliers because theirquotations to the purchasing 
divisions he" exceeded those submitted by the external competition, and 
yet they 
4a 
not been required to mcount for the resulting losses to any 
great extent. At the present moment the new head office management do 
not envisage a return to greater centralisation, but have already indicated 
to divisional managers that the existing policy of deccntralisation demands 
a greater profit awareness from them than has hitherto been displayed. ' 
It'would seem reasonable to suppose that continuing losses will not be 
tolerated to the extent that they have been in the past, and it is 
therefore in everyone's interest for an examination to be made of the 
circumstances leading'up to the present situation. 
There have in fact been a number of instances where the accounting' 
information hiatbebn totally inadequate for the divisional managerd 
purposes. ' As a re'sule of either misleading or non-exiitent accounting 
information, particularly in relation to overhead costs, quotations to buying 
divisions within the company 
"4 
included a considerable mark-up for fixed 
costs and profit, notwiihstanding that the level of output had fallen so far 
as to warrant the acceptance of this work at any price in excess of marginal 
cost. As these quotations often exceeded the prices quoted by outside 
competitors, the work hastpassed outside the organisation and the level of 
activity within these divisions haaLsuffered accordingly. In both divisions, 
divisional management had, been unable to determine the total variable costs 
of any of the products produced within their works, and as a result the 
quotations submitted by them to prospective customers I" been built 
on an estimate of the direct 1ýbiou-r cost -and the- -material cost, plus an 
arbitrarily allocated fraction of the estimated total overhead costs 
and a percenrape of the resulting total to cover profit. 
The lack of the relevant information haý made it impossible for the 
divisional/ 
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divisional managers to trim their original quotations with any 
certainty that the revised price would produce a contribution towards 
their norr-variable overhead costs, so that a take it or leave it attitude 
towards the first price quoted hastgrown up over time. This attitude 
combined with seeming indifference on the part of central mana'gement 
has 'contributed to the present situation in which both divisions and the 
company as-a whole face'the prospect of continuing losses unless radical 
changes*are made''in the management accounting systems, the interpretation 
of the information derived'and the resulting action'taken by managements, 
both at divisional level and at head office. 
In the following section of the case, attention has been focussed on 
the circumstances existing in the Foundry Division, one of the two 
divisions in which a loss situation, accompanied by a low level of activity, 
exists at present. After a description of the problem, consideration has 
been given to the means by which profits may be improved and recommendations 
are iiade as'to-how the transfer pricing mechanism may be altered to'ensure 
aIs far'as possible that the divisional management's goal-isnot in conflict 
with that of the company as a whole. 
166. 
THE FOUNDRY DIVISION 
The Foundry Division was of particular interest, because the iron 
foundry, which constitutes the major part of this division had been 
operating at a very low volume of activity for a number of years. As a 
significant-proportion of the foundry's overhead costs were fixedltotal 
overhead costs had been underabsorbed for some time. A five month 
analysis of the purchases of iron castings from outside suppliers 
indicated that the company was spending approximately E500,000 per annum 
on products of a similar nature to those produced by the Foundry division. 
Each of these outside purchases was considered by the buying divisions 
and the foundry division, and it was agreed that approximately 60% of these 
castings could have been produced in the Foundry division at the time when 
they had been purchased from outside the company. In effect, bad this 
work not been given to outside contractors, the level of operations within 
the foundry division would have been almost doubled. 
The relevant quotations submitted by the Foundry division were reviewed 
and compared with the'successful quotations from outside the company. In 
all of the cases checked, the buying division was. able to show that the 
price accepted from the outside supplier was significantly lower than'the 
quotation submitted by the Foundry division. As'tbe activity level in 
this division was only just over half of what it had been in 11066, and its 
losses were running at over E150,000 per annum, a detailed investigation 
of the mechanism employed in quoting for work from other divisions was 
clearly warranted. 
Where the marginal cost of producing iron castings in the Foundry division 
was less than the invoice price paid to an external supplier, it was clearly 
against the company's overall interest for the work to go outside the 
organisation. If the work had been done by the Foundry division, any 
amount in excess of the warginal cost recouped by that division in its 
charges to the buying divisions would be a positive contribution-towards its 
fixed/ 
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fixed overhead costs. Similarly, any transfer price set below 
the outside supplier's price would increase the profitability of 
the buying division. 
The extent of the loss incurred by the Foundry division which can bL 
attributed to orders from other divisions which have gone to outside 
contractors, can be determined. A reasonably accurate calculation is 
dependent on the analysis of the cost. -A incurred in each class-of work 
into fixed and variable costs. In this way it is possible to ascertain 
the contribution to fixed costs and profits, earned by each class of 
I 
work, and to produce a break-even analysis for any given mix of products. 
The manager of the foundry division agreed that all direct labour and 
materials should be regarded as variable costs. The analysis of overhead 
costs into fixed and variable cost categories was based on findings 
included in a consultant's report which had been submitted. to the 
divisional managing director in 1970. The Least Squares method (see 
Appendix B) had been used. to make the split between fixed and variable 
costs, and the divisicnal managing director confirmed that the assumptions 
on which this analysis had been based were still relevant. Accordingly, 
it was agreed that the writer should use the Least Squares Method in the 
analysis of Manufacturing Overhead Costs for the first five months of 
1971 (see Table II on Page 172 ). 
The inadequacy of the cost accounting recoras however proved to be a 
major difficulty. In this division overhead costs were absorbed as 
a fixed percentage of direct labour hours, but unfortunately these 
figures were based on overall foundry rates (-ie. ovei the division as 
a whole) rather than on specific cost centre rate5, because the 
accounting system did not provide sufficient relevant information 
relating to the cost centres. Overhcud rates based on cost centre 
figures are preferable-to rates based on total foundry costs because 
they are more accurate estimates of product unit costs. This greater 
accuracy/ 
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. 
I 
accuracy arises because individual production operations vary widely 
in the volume of mechanisation used and therefore, in the amount of 
overhead cost per unit of activity. A highly mechanised cost centre 
will have a high overhead cost in relation to direct labour cost whereas 
the converse will be true-of a cost centre in which the, degree of 
mechanisation is low. Even in a foundry the degree of mechanisation, 
varies considerably from cost centre to cost centrej so that in so far, 
as a foundry-wide overhead rate averages out thecifferences between the 
cost centre4 a degree of inaccuracy is inevitable if the foundry-wide 
rate is employed. 
if costs are analysed by the sections within a division, management can 
examine the activities of each of these sections, thereby providing 
a. better basis for cost-control. Under the system at-present employed, 
an increase in costs. in one section may be concealed by a corresponding 
reduction in costs in another section. Management are therefore unable 
to see where costs are increasing and the places wheýe they are decreasing, 
and are thercfore unable to take corrective action in the former case and 
command the responsible members of their staff'in the latter case. 
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THE EFFECT OF A CILAINGE IN THE BASIS OF QUOTATTONS TO OTHER DIVISIONS 
The financial results of the Iron Foundry for the first five months of 
1971 were examined, and consideration given to what the profitability 
situation might have been, had quotations to the other divisions been on a 
different basis., As already stated, when submitting quotations the 
divisional manager had always endcavoured to recover all of the costs 
incurred, including a charge in respect of overhead costs based on the 
estimated direct labour hours which would be expended by foundrý 
employees. A percentage in respect of profit was added to the total 
cost and the resulting figure was quoted as the foundry division's 
price for the job. 
The financial results of the Iron Foundry for the first five months of 
1971, during which this, method of preparing quotation; was employed were 
as follows: 
TABLE I/ 
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TABLE I 
E 
Net Sales Value of Deliveries 1830920 
E 
Less - Wages 27,990 
Materials 47,680 
Expenses 
_2,130 
Direct Costs 77,800 
Overhead Costs 1700550 
Total Costs 248,350 
operating loss E 64,430 
An analysis of the jobs included in the figure shown as the net Salles 
value of deliveries indicated that 1,040 tons of castings were involved, 
which means, in broad terms, that the foundry was producing at the rate 
of 2,500 tons per annum. Average price per ton sold was E176.24, but 
it should be noted that this average covers a broad range of selling 
prices to both internal and external purchasers. 
WI-lilst there was. also a considerable variation in the charges for foundry 
work. ordered by the other divisions from outside suppliers during the five 
months, an analysis of these jobs made it clear that if all of the work 
which could have been done internally had been handled by the foundry 
division the total weight of castings produced would have been almost 
2,000 tons, an annual level of activity approaching 5,000 tons - i. e. 
almost double the actual output' for the period. 
Work done by-outside suppliers which could have been produced by the 
foundry divisionwas evaluated at the prices invoiced to the buying 
divisions by the outside suppliers and a total value-of E151,320 was 
obtained, i. e. almost 927 tons at an average price of E163.24. It was 
claimed by the divisional management that-almost ýall af-this work could 
have been produced internally within the time constraints specified by the 
purchasing divisions. As an analysis of the jobs involved prod"ced a 
schedule of delivery dates which was faii; ýy evenly spread over the five 
month/ 
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month period, it seemed reasonable to assume that the foundry 
management's claim was not over-optimistic and that for the purposes 
of comparison 90% of the above work could safely be considered to be 
work which might have been produced internally during the five month 
period. The relevant figures would therefore be 834 tons and E136,140. 
Consideration was then given to the costs which would have been incurred, 
had this work been undertaken by the Foundry division. Whilst the 
assumption had been made that Foundry wages were a variable cost, it was 
felt necessary to impose some form of check on the assumption that if a direct 
wages bill of E27,990 could produce 1,040 tons of castings, a further 
834 tons could be produced at a cost of E22,450. A summary of the 
estimated labour costs included in the relevant quotations was therefore 
made and 90% of this total produced a figure of E17,110. Although this 
figure is somewhat less than the figure assumed on the variable cost basis, 
it was felt that rateincreases and adverse efficiency variances could 
account for a considerable part of the difference. It-wAs decided 
therefore to include the figure of E22,450 for direct labour cost. 
A similar examination-was then undertaken of the figures making up 
the totals, quoted in respect of materials and expenses and a comparison, 
made with the total costs actually incurred in respect of these items 
during the five month period. Again, the totals extracted from. the 
quotations fell short of the costs which might have been expected on a 
strictly variable basis by approximately, E8,200, and it was decided to 
assume that if Materials and Expenses costing E49,810 were incurred in the 
production of 1,040 tons, a further 834 tons would have been produced for 
E39,940. 
Finally, the overhead figures were analysed by the Least Squares Method 
(see Appendix B) and the results as shown in the following table were 
obtained: 
TABLE II/ 
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TABLE II 
Analysis of Manufacturing Overhead Costs 
Fixed Variable Total 
E E E 
Repairs and Maintenance 5,566 3,000 8,566 
Special Maintenance 1,467 - 1,467 
Supervisory Wages 7,237 70237 
Checkers' Wages 19193 - 1,193 
General Wages 7,500 13,450 20,950 
Productive Overtime Allowances - 613 613 
Non-Productive Overtime 
Allowances - 2,684 2,684 
Idle Time - 1,871 1,871 
Consumables (including SAnd) - 26,978 26,978 
Rates 3,890 - 3,890 
Depreciation 10,026 - 100026 
Fuel and Power 3,600 5,481 90081 
Insurances and Pensions 5p192 - 5j192 
Holiday Allowances 1,000 3,253 4,253 
Sundries (including Output Bonus) 89919 lOo5OO 19,419 
Stores 1,820 - 1,820 
Accounts 2,131* - 20131 
Maintenance 4,082 - 4,032 
Computer 2,498 - 2,498 
Divisional General Overhead 11,138 6,000 17,138 
Central Services 15,080 - 15,080 
92,339 73,830 166,169 
Adjustments 
other Costs - 4v346 4,346 
Melting Variance 10,453 10,453 
Melt Wages Adjustment (17,769) (17,769) 
Work in Progress Adjustment 7v351 -7 351 
99,690 70,860 170,550 
Following the_ass=ptions made earlier, it was agreed tbat. an, additional 
output of 834 tons would have increased the-variable overhead costs by 
E56,280 and that the Fixed Overhead Costs would remain constant at E99,690. 
On the basis of the above calculations, if the work done oUtside had 
been done by the Foundry division, the results shown in Table I would have 
been amended as shown in Table 
TABLE -III/ 
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TABLE III 
Iron toundry 
Likely Financial Results for first 5 months of 
1971, if work passed to outside suppliers had 
been made in the Foundry 
Additional Work which 
could have been done by 
Actual Foundry_ 
EEEEE 
Net Sales Values 
of Deliveries 
Less: 
Variable Costs 
Wages 279990 
Materials 47,680 
Expenses 2,130 
Variable 
Overheads 70,860 
Contribution to Fixed 
Overheads 
Fixed Overheads 
operating Profit/Loss 
183,920 
22,450 
39,940 
56,280 
148t660 
35,260 
99,690 
(64,430) - 
Total 
136,140 320,000 
50,440 
)89,750 
127,140 
118,670 267,330 
17,470 72,730 
99,690 
17,470 
m 
(46 960) 
, 
Whilst the final result is still far from satisfactory it, can nevertheless 
be concluded that a change in the pricing mechanism employed in quoting 
to other divisions could have reduced the loss by E17,, 470 for the five 
month period, which in overall company terms would have meant an increase 
in profitability of approximately E40,000 per annum. In addition, whilst 
the lack of cost information prevents a firm conclusion, it would seem that 
if this additional work could have been produced at the labour and material 
costs included, in the quotations, a further E12,000 or E28,000 per annum 
might have been deducted from the loss incurred in this division. 
it might possibly be concluded from the above figures that consideration 
should be given to the close-down of thiý; division, Lf__ýatisfactory profits 
cannot be a6hieved in the foreseeable future. However, as this division 
is an important supplier to other sections of the company, and as its very 
existence ensures quotations from out-side suppliers which do not include 
excessive profits, its continued existence is considered by the group 
management/ 
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management to be vital to the future development of the company. 
Nevertheless, its importance as a supplier to internal customers means 
that it is and will continue to be dependent on their custom to a great 
extent. The appropriate action for central management appears to be 
that less emphasis should be placed on profit control in this division, 
and more emphasis on cost control, in order to ensure that all variances 
from the pre-determined standard costs for jobs completed are investigated 
thoroughly. Although the divisional management has obviously not been 
influenced by the profit incentive in the past, if it is felt that the 
division should continue to operate as a profit centre, some form-of 
subsidy for work done for other divisions at non-profitable prices could 
be devised and allocated to the division from central funds. 
In 1971, when the writer was studying this case, it was envisaged that 
several changes in the plant and machinery employed, and its location, 
would be made in early 1972, and it was decided therefore that an annual 
output level of 3,750 tons should be projected for 1972. Adjustments 
were made in the estimated costs which were likely to be incurred at that 
level of o'utput to cover increases in labour rates and in material costs. 
Similarly, the estimated value of overhead costs had to be increased to take 
account of factors such as inflation in fixed'asset replacement costsl 
expected changes in direct labour rates, anticipated increases in the 
purchase prices of indirect materials and increased maintenance costs 
arising out of the increase in activity. As a result the relevant 
costs for 1972 were estimated as follows: 
output Level - 3,750 tons 
Wages (including Melt) 
Materials 
Expenses 
Variable Overheads 
Total Variable Costs 
Fixed Overheads 
Total Annual Cost 
Total, Cost per ton 
Variable Cost per ton 
000's 
106 
121 
9 
183 
419 
186 
605 
E 
161 
112 
Given/ 
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Given this yardstick it is then necessary for the divisional management 
to arrange for the continual monitoring of each of the elements of cost 
in relation to the value of output achieved throughout 1972. The cost 
information system needs to be improved to enable management to determine 
where and why variances from the above estimates are arising. If the 
variances can be controlled, and costs hold to this level, it will be seen 
that any price quoted above E161 per ton should on average earn a profit. 
for the division, if output is maintained at or above 3,750 tons, ahd any 
price in excess of E112 per ton should ensure a contribution towards fixed 
overhead costs. The other divisions need to be instructed to inform the 
foundry division when the original internal estimate exceeds the lowest 
quoted by an external supplier, and by how much in order that the foundry 
management will be in a position to decide whether or not a lower second 
quotation can earn a profit or contribute to fixed overheads. The decision 
whether or not to accept the work will depend on the level of activity in the 
foundry at that time, and in the immediate future. 
At present this division is, however, largely a jobbing concern doing a 
variety of work which required different facilities. Because information 
relating to competitors quotations and their comparison with internal 
quotations is incomplete, and because overhead costs are absorbed on a 
foundry wide basis, it is very difficult to decide which type of work can 
be produced competitively and which cannot. In these circumstances the 
company requires the implementation of a cost information system which will 
enable management to determine where the divisions strengths and weaknesses 
lie in the range of work produced so that future operating results should 
show an appreciable improvement. In the present situation, where the 
costs is significant, it is inevitable underabsorption of fixed overhea 
that the operating loss will be considerable. Any change in the 
inter-divisional pricing policy which reduces this underabsorption of cost 
must result in a favourable change in the company's overall financial 
position. 
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REC ODID IE ND AT 10 NS 
A number of recommendations have been made to central managemento on 
the assumption that they consider it necessary for the Foundry Division 
to retain its present status as a profit centre. As a considerable 
volume of the Foundry Division's output is for other divisions within the 
same organisation, a case can be made for a change to a cost centre 
control system in this instance, but central management have made it 
clear that they wish the profit incentive to continue to be made available 
to the foundry divisional management. Nevertheless they do agree that 
the implementation of a more sophisticated cost control system will mean a 
"management by exception" system, which should enable management to 
concentrate their attention on those sections of the division in which 
actual costs have varied considerably from the pre-determined standard 
or estimated costs: The following recommendations were made to central 
management at group headquarters: 
1. The opportunity to submit a quotation mustalways be made available 
to the Foundry division, when the divisional management believesýthat 
they can produce the product required. The onus should be on the 
buying division to provide facilities which will enable-the Foundry 
division to submit a competitive quotation. 
2. The opportunity to re-quote must be made available to the Foundry 
division, when its original quotation exceeds the outside I competitor's 
quotation which the buying division is proposing to accept. 
3. Transfer prices for any work should always be agreed in advance of 
the work being performed. 
Where a market price, or a market equivalent- price exists, this 
price should be the basis of the intra-company'prices It has been 
drawn to central management's attention that this'recommendation has 
been included to meet their requirements relating to the autonomy 
of/ 
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of the Foundry division. It is conceivable that a purchasing 
division negotiating with the Foundry division on the above basis 
could be put at a disadvantage, if operating in opposition to an 
outside competitor which is controlled on a centralised basis. In 
the latter case, castings from a foundry division within the same 
organisation would be transferred at cost without any profit element 
and this figure could be considerably lower than the market price. 
This difference might be used by the competitor to reduce the final 
price, and gain work from customers who would otherwise have placed 
their orders with the division which is supplied by our "profit centre" 
foundry. Clearly the decentralised division might therefore be 
operating against the interests of the company as a wholet but it is 
felt that in the. circumstances prevailing, the profit incentive 
outweighs the disadvantages of an incorrect transfer pricing policy. 
5. Where market equivalent prices are not available, negotiations between 
the buying and selling. divisions should be entered into, followed by 
arbitration by a representative of central management where price 
differences cannot be reconciled. Central mAnagement do not 
envisage that this control machinery will be required to any great 
extent, but have indicated that a subsidy may be payable from central 
funds where the price determined in the interest of the organisation 
as a whole is clearly operating against either of the parties concerned. 
6. Prices based on total cost incurred should never be used except in those 
remote instances when the final contract with the outside customer is 
on a cost-plus basis. 
7. Consideration should be given to the improvement of the basis of 
cost control - i. e. the analysis of costs by the sections within the 
foundry division, rather than the foundry-wide basis at present employed. 
The divisional management need to amend their systeni of cc)st cojjtj: Ol, 
if the important benefits to be derived from accurate costs are to be 
raad e/ 
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made available to them. Similarly, in the area of product 
pricing, advantages will be derived from a change in the system of 
cost accounting. Whilst. it is not argued that prices are determined 
by costs, a more accurate cost picture will ensure that sales effort 
is more realistically directed towards those products which are 
actually the most profitable. At the same time it has to be 
remembered that overhead costs are not controlled by a change in 
the method by which they are allocated to products - only by the 
examination of the behaviour of items of cost for which each supervisor 
is responsible can the overall total cost be controlled. 
8. In the proposed management control system should, be included a reporL 
at regular intervals giving information relating to the availability 
of productive capacity in each d, ivision and the requirements of these 
divisions. This report should be circulated at intervals of not more 
than one month to all purchasing, sub-contract and production managers 
throughout the group in order to ensure the fullest use of the company's 
facilities. 
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APPENDIX B 
Determination of Cost Behaviour by Least Squares Regression 
In Cost Accountancy, probably the most common dichotomy within groups 
of costs is whether an element of a cost is variable or fixed in relation 
to changes in volume. For purposes of analysist accountants assume that 
the overall cost structure of a particular costing unit can be categorised 
as either, variable or fixed. Variable costs are those items of cost-which 
vary directly and proportionately with volume - that is, as volume of output 
increases by say 10%, the amount of cost also increases by 10%. Direct 
labour, direct material, supplies etc. are examples of variable cost. 
Fixed costs, on the other hand, do not vary at all with volume. These 
costs are. incurred as the result of the passage of time rather than because 
of the volume of output within a specified period of time and include items 
such as supervisory salaries, rentdepreciation of buildings etc. It may 
seem that the term fixed cost implies that the amount of cost is fixed and 
therefore cannot be changed, but this implication is wrong., The term 
refers only to items of cost that, do not change with changes in volume, 
so that the term "non-variable" is probably more appropriate than the 
tem "fixed". 
There-are of course many costs which do not fit the accountant's simple 
fixed cost/variable cost model. These costs are said to be semi-variable 
because they possess an element -of eachý type of cost. These costs vary 
in the same direction as, but less thanproportiOnately with, changes in 
volume- that is, if the volume of output increases by 10%, the amount of 
cost will-increase, but, by less than 10%. A typical exampleýof a 
semi-variable cost is the manufacturing overhead cost of, providing repair 
and maintenance services. Par-t--of- the cost represents-stand-by costs, 
which are fixed whether or not any work is done. Total cost does vary 
with volume however, because more repairs and maintenance are necpssary 
. as more work is done and volume increases. Similarly, there are other 
types/ 
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types of manufacturing overhead costs which are cami-variable as a 
result of what is called the step function. Rather than being defined 
by a continuous curve rising from zero, the 
4*1"6 function increases 
stepwise whenever another group of services is needed. The costs for 
inspecting the quality of output is a common example of this type of cost. 
Each inspector can examine no more'than some maximum number, say 500 units 
per day. If there are more than 500 units to be examined in one day, 
another inspector must be added and paid a day's wages. Shown graphically, 
inspection costs will consist of a series of steps, each 500 units long and 
the cost of one day's pay higher at the end of each step. 
Where there is no clear indication that an item of cost is either wholly 
variable or wholly fixed or that it varies with volume in some predictable 
way, a statistical analysis of historical cost data is necessaýy. The 
purpose of this statistical analysis is to estimate the straightline 
relationship between cost and volume that seems to'provide the most 
reasonable explanation of cost behaviour in the past. - Once this 
relationship has been established it can be expressed as 
bX 
where Y is the total cost 
a is the fixed cost component 
b is the variable cost rate 
and X is the activity measure (say the number of direct labour hours). 
To take the example of General Wages, if monthly fixed overhead costs in 
respect of this item are expected to amount to E20,000 and the estimated 
variable overhead cost rate is El per direct labour hour, if the division 
operates at a level of 10,000 direct labour hours per month, the budgetcd 
total overhead cost will be E-20-, 000 + El-x 10,000 -t0,000. 
Diagrammatically, the situation can be shown as on the next page. 
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It should be noted that an expression in this form will probably not 
be valid over the entire vol=e*range from nil to full capacity. it 
has to be acknowledged that volumes above or below the limits of the 
normal range of activities will be accompanied by changes in "fixed" costs 
and also in some instances by changes in variable costs. 11owever, as 
long as the expression provides meaningful cost estimates within the 
range of normal operating volumes, then its use is valid in most dases. 
Similarly, it has al so been assumed that the line of regression will 
tend to be straight i. e. that the two sets of data (x and y) will vary 
linearly. Whilst this may be so, it need not always be true. For, 
example, when considering supervisory costs, it can usually be assumed 
that one foreman can supervise a group of operators up to a certain number. 
At that level his powers of supervision will be overtaxed, and the group of 
workers will require to be split and the cost of a further foreman incurred. 
In these circumstances9 supervisory costs are fixed over a range of volumes, 
but then jump at various stages of production - in effect the "step" cost 
pattern as already described. Finally, before the relationship between 
cost and volume can be ascertained, the effect on cost of changes in 
other non-random variables has to be eliminated from the data relating 
to overhead costs incurred in the past. For example, . changes in 
supervisory wage rates, changes in operating methods and working'conditions, 
or changes in managerial policy relating to fixed costs can all influence 
the relationship between cost and volume. Wbere the change can be 
isolated in timing' and amount, as in a change in supervisory wage rates, 
it may be possible to increase the comparability of historical 
observations merely by adjusting the data for the effect of the change. 
Similarly, if a strike'leads to a works being'closed down durin, g a 
particular-period, then the'cost data' recorded for that period will be 
abnormal, and should therefore be excluded from the statistical analysis. 
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Method of Least Squares 
Probably the first method to be used regularly in practice to 
determine the fixed and variable parts of a total cost was the so called 
high-low method. This method simply attempted to reflect the change 
in cost that results from changes in output by relying on the two extreme 
outputs, the highest and the lowest. For example, if it is assumed that 
total costs (TC) are E69400 at 1,000 units. and E8,200 at 2,000 units of 
output, the difference in total cost will be E1,800 and the difference 
in units 1,000. The difference in cost based on units produced 
is El'800 or E1.80 per unit. As, by definitiono all the cost variation 10000 
is associated with the variable rather than the fixed cost, it can be 
argued that El. 80 is the variable cost per unit within the range of 
1,000 to 2,000 units. The formula for the variable cost per unit is 
therefore - 
b TCh - TC1 Qh - Q1 
where h and 3. stand for the highest and lowest volumes, and the formula 
for fixed cost is 
a- TC - bQ 
It will be noted that the high-low technique ignores any, information 
contained in any of the instances other than the two points representing 
the greatest variation in the costs. There must however be some question 
of the appropriateness of using these extTeme values for reference points 
in calculating the slope and the intercept (the point at which it cutt the 
Y axis) of the. cost function. Since the two extreme volumes reflect only 
the entire variation, the resulting cost equation does not take into 
account the presence of step costs or any other abnormal situation. The 
function calculated could pý`ss_ibly reflect an- abnormal (ia the extreme 
points are not typical) rather than normal cost relationship. Whilst it 
may be conceded that this method provides a quick estimate of the cost 
function, an examination of all of the data has to be carried out to 
determine how well the line represents the actyal cost relation. 
184. 
Intuitively there is no reason why a cost estimate should be based 
on two arbitrary observations, and a technique Lhat uses all of the 
observations should therefore lead to a more accurate cost estimate 
over all ranges of output. 
The Method of Least Squares is designed to quantify relationships 
between sets of data. The purpose of this method is to find that line 
which minimises the sum of the squares of the deviations from it 
(normally in the vertical direction). The best fitting line is the 
one which gives the smallest total when the differences between the 
4 plotted points and the line are totalled. The deviations will be 
both positive and negative - if the actual values of the deviations 
are used and added algebraically, the total could be a small figure 
even if the fit of the line was poor. The so7ution is therefore to 
use the squares of the deviations, because all of the actual deviations 
become positive when squared. It is for this reason that the most 
common method for fitting a line results in establishing such an equation 
for a line that the squares of the deviations of the actual data from the 
line are minimised, hence týe name, the method of Least Squares. 
The method is illustrated in the diagram below, in which the sum. of the 
squares of the vertical deviations d, *e**d6 is at a minimum. 
1 
The line is the regression line of Y on X. 
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The techniques of Correlation and Regression Analysis are described 
in detail by Colin Robinson - Business Forecasting Nelson 
Chapter 7. 
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It should be noted that it is also possible to calculate the regression 
line of X on Y, but in this case it would be the sum of the squares of 
the horizontal deviations of the observations from the regression line 
which would be minimised. 
Where, for example, we wish to estimate the fixed element in an overhead 
cost item such as General Wages, one of the items included in the analysis 
of Manufacturing Overhead Costs in Table II on page 172 , the steps will 
be as shown in the table on the next page where General Wages (Y) are 
taken as a function cf Direct Labour hours (X) - 
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Using the data in the table, the variable cost pcrcentage or the slope 
of the regression line is derived from the formula - 
that is, 
Col 6 217pOOO 
. 31 Col 5 7009000 
The fixed cost element can then be determined from the regression 
equation formula as follows: 
a bR 
4200 - 0.31 (8800) 
1472 
'41hus, the fixed element of General Wages (a) is E1472 and the variable 
element is given by 0.31 times direct labour hours. 
Applying the formula to the total General wages cost incurred for the 
first five months of 1971, isthen quite straightforward. As shown in 
Table II on Page 172, if Y is E20,950, the variable element will be 
EO. 31 x 43,390 Direct Labour hours eqtwl to E13,450 and the fixed element 
will be E7,500. These figures indicate that within this range of 
activity there is a minimum cost. (the fixed element) which can be 
expected to be incurred in rýspect of General Wages. 
The Corr6lation Co-eificient 
As explained, the Least Squares method yields an equation which minimises 
the sum of the squared deviations between the estimate of the cost function 
and the actual cost function observed. The degree to which the least 
squares estimate of the cost function fits the original data is measured 
by the correlation co-efficient. Correlation therefore tests whether a 
given dependent variable appears to be related to the independent variable. 
Robinson 
1 
states "The co-efficient of correlation, r, always lies 
within the range +I (perfect positive correlation, where all observations 
f all/ 
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fall on a straight line sloping southwest/northeast and -1 (perfect 
negative correlationg where all observations'are on a straight line 
sloping northwest/southeast. 
Thus +1>, - -r>,, -, -1 
A zero correlation co-efficient indicates no measured relationship 
between the variables. " 
In our example the linear cost function has a correlation co-efficientt 
of + 0.977. This figure has been calculated from the following 
information - 
(XY) 
-2 )ýE(Y2) 
217000 
700000 x 70400, 
0.978, 
This number squared, r20 indicates the percentage of the totai variance 
of the total cost around its mean or average that the regression lines 
explains* In this example it is around 95%, and means that 95% of the 
variance of total cost around its mean can be explained by changes in 
Direct Lzbour'hours. The remainder may bi due 'to' rI and I om I variation 
and the effect of other variables. 
It can be seen from the foregoing that the separation of the two elements 
is by no means perfect, since heavy reliance has been placed on historical 
cost in*the analysis of the total cost into fixed and variable categories. 
Regression analysis does assume that there is an ongoing stable relationship 
between the item of overhead cost and the independent variable direct labour 
hours in this case) used to estima. te the costi-and this-stability should not 
be taken for granted. In so far as decision making is concerned with the 
fu*, -jre, it should be remembered that historical costs can be no more than a 
guide to what should happen in the future. Nevertheless, it is fair to say 
that/ 
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that indu6trial constiltants have claimed that the use of the Least 
Squares method has produced satisfactory results when applied for 
budgeting purposes to the analysis of total cost into fixed and variable 
cost categories. Its great advantage lies in the fact that it does not 
rely on visual judgment when determining the location of the cost 
function. In additiong to the extent that deviations from the line of 
"best fit" result pureiy from random causes influencing costf the least 
squares formula provides the best available estimate of the true relationship. - 
However, it is influenced by extreme items and the accuracy of reliability 
of the line must be dependent on the number of observations. It also 
implies a greater penalty for a single large deviation than the same 
size deviation divided among two or more observations. It must be 
remembered that mere satisfaction of the formula will not guarantee that 
the analysis into the two categories will be reasonable budget allowances 
should be based on the best estimates of future relationships, and these 
may or may not coincide with the relationships indicated by mathematical 
equations which have been derived from historical data, no matter how 
recent the period of time to which that data relates. 
Finally, we must also be careful how we interpret the cost estimates. 
Our cost *equation for General Wages of E7,500 + EO. 31 x might seem to 
imply a level of fixed costs of E7,500 when x-0 or zero output. 
However, as such an output is well outside the 
Irange, of observations 
used (8t300 direct labour hours to 9,200 direct labour hours)t the 
equation cannot help us regarding lower outputs, and any attempt to 
extrapolate beyond that range must be a matter of judgment. Statistical 
estimates should always be checked in order to identify and eliminate 
some of the obvious inconsistencies in the data and the relationships 
assumed, before being used by management for planning or controlling 
operations. 
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THE BETA PAPER COATING CO. LTD. BRITISH CASE Il 
INTRODUCTION 
On 26th May, 1972, the management of Portway raper Ltd. announced that 
it had been decided to close their subsidiary company, The Beta Paper 
Coating Co. Ltd. on lst September, 1972, as a result of heavy losses 
having been incurred by that organisation. Discussions had already 
taken place with representatives of the two trade unions operating within 
Beta, and satisfacto'ry'redu . ndancy terms were negotiated for the majority 
of the company's employees. As Beta employed approximately 500 people 
in a paper coating and'tipping mill in a small Scottish town with a 
working population of less than 2,000, the company felt it expedient to 
inform the local Member of Parliament in advance of'their announcement. 
Indeed, as'the'company had declared just under 200 of their employees 
redundant in the summer of 1971, ' he had asked the company to keep him 
informed of any developments which'made further redundancies'necessary. 
In the light'of the information which emerged later, it is significantý 
that as late as January, 1972, when the Member of Parliament visited the 
mill'ý he was informed that both the financial and production prospect's 
of the company'were satisfactory. Reassurances to the creditors frc'M the 
parent body that the balances due to them from Beta were not in jeopardy 
ensured that the financial aspects of the wind-up proceeded smoothly. 
I'llowever, the formal announcement of the close-down caused considerable 
alarm in the town and as a result the Town Council published a memorandum 
stating the grounds for their concern. These were: 
1. The Beta Company had operated in the toi-m for almost fifty years, and 
as a result of its size, the growth and prosperity of the area had been 
closely linked to the companyis-development in-that-period. 
2. The opportunity of re-employment in the area for the majority of those 
made redundant was poor owing to the lack of suitable alternaLives 
and/ 
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and the age structure of the company's employees. 
3.107. of the town's total rating income was derived from the factories 
operated by the company. The elimination of this source of income 
would have an immediate effect on the town's Burgh and Domestic 
Water Rates, so that the closing down would raise the cost of 
living of every ratepayer in the town. 
After a meeting of all"the, interested parties, -the Town Council with the 
co-operation of Portway Paper Ltd. invited two members of the staff of the 
University of Stirling'to examine and comment upon the circumstances leading 
to the company's decision to close down the Beta operation. The writer 
of this thesis undertook to examine the financial factors responsible for 
this decision and'the. other member of the University staff agreed to review 
the social implications. In the course of this investigation, the writer 
had access to-d considerable volume of financial data which led him to 
conclude that whilst the problem of intra-company transfer pricing had never 
been offered as a reason for the liquidation of the Beta Company, its 
influence during the life of the company had, been considerable and its 
importance as 'a factor in the ultimate demise of the company could notýbe 
over-estimated. 
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THE BETA PRODUCTS 
The products which were made by Beta fall into two broad categories - 
coated papers and cigarette tipping paper. 
The production of coated papers was important from the company's 
early days, but whilst coloured papers continued in importance, the 
range of art and chromo, papers declined aver the years. Nevertheless, 
up to the close down, this part of the output of the mill was converted 
into a wide variety of finished products including recorder charts,. stamp 
paper, direct image offset litho plates, playing cards, record labels and 
single, colour and duplex papers for labelling and advertising. 
The production of. cigarette tipping paper became important when the 
Spanish Civil War cut, off the supply of sliced cork, bark to the cigarette 
manufacturers and a substitute had to be found. The result was Dusted 
Tipping, using cork dust, adhesive paste and yellow paper. The cork dust 
originates in Portugal, in the factories where bottle corkslare cut or 
stamped, from slabs of bark and the Beta product has been used in the 
manufacture of such well known cigarettes as Cadets,. Embassy, Stuyvesantj, 
Consulate, Piccadilly, Benson and Hedges, Sobrannie etc. Dusted tipping 
was successful almost immediately and accounted for a large part of Beta's 
profits for a number of years. However, it in turn was challenged by a 
substitute - Printed Tipping, which is simply paper printed to rosemble 
cork. The elimination of, the need for cork dust and the fact that 
printed tipping can be integrated with the paper making process has meant 
a considerable reduction in cost compared with Dusted Tipping, with the 
result that the level of competition for Beta's customers grew steadily 
during recent years. This competition and the acquisition of tipping 
production units by some of the international cigarette manufacturing 
groups induced Beta to enter the Printed Tipping field whilst continuing 
with Dusted Tipping on a reduced scale. 
Coated papers were either gummed or ungu=ed and from 1966 onwards* 
when/ 
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when Beta's parent company Kennington Peckham Ltd. was acquired by 
Portway Paper Ltd., the volume of s' emi-finished output which was produced 
by Beta for subsequent conversion by other units within the Gateway 
organisation increased. Some coated paper was produced by Beta for 
stock and subsequent sale to either the Adhesive Products Division of 
Kennington Peckham Ltd. or the U. K. Branches division of Portway Paper 
Ltd. In addition, special items were sold direct by Beta to outside 
customers. 
The traffic in cigarette tipping paper was only slightly less complicated. 
The marketing of this output in the United Kingdom and Europe was undertaken 
for Beta by a unit at Portway Head Office, called C. P. M. U. and sales to 
other overseas countries we're made through the Export division of 
Kennington Peckham Ltd. at a price negotiated by them less 6.7%. The 
marketing fee charged by C. P. M. U. was negotiated mnually, and for the 
year ended 31st December, 1972 had been agreed at E20,000, a figure 
similar to that charged for 1971. 
Table I su=arises the various intra-company transactions in existence 
when the Beta operation ceased: 
TABLE I/ 
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The 24 ream rate price for Gummed raper transferred to X. P. Ltd. 
is the cheapest. price in the K. P. cataýogue, so that K. P. in effect 
retain any amount in excess of this rate obtained from outside 
customers. An excerpt from the January, 1972 Price List is shown 
below to illustrate the differential between the 24 ream rate and the 
rate for smaller quantities which'was withheld by K. P. Ltd. 
Smooth Butterfly Colour Paper Non-curling'Cuipmed 
Uni t 
Pack 
Ifedium 457 ; rm x 584 um 500's 
1-56- 11 12. - 23 24 rms. 
rms, rms. rms. 
per 1,000 sheets 
E14.630 E13.960 E13.630 E13.300 
D/Crown 508 mrn x 762 mm 500's E21.250 E20.250 E19.750 E19.450 
The intra-company transfer problem was complicated even more by. the 
II- 
fact that a considerable volume of the Base raper (for Coating) and 
Tipping Base (for Cigarette Tipping) was purchased from other units 
within the Portway organisation. For example in the first four months 
of 1972,21% of the Base Paper and 43% of the Tipping Base purchased, 
was obtained from internal sources at prices in excess of those charged 
by outside suppliers. 
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THE HISTORY OF BETA - UNTIL 1963 
In 1921, one of the two woollen weaving mills in the town went into liquidation 
and its property lay empty for over a year, until it was purchased by a 
South London paper coating company. The management of this company 
decided to create a subsidiary company, the Beta raper Coating Co. Ltd. 
and installed the manager of their English paper coating mill as the 
first managing director of the new company. Their investment was 
E50,000, and, showing a remarkably enlightened attitude towards 
decentralisation for the 1920's, they permitted the managing director 
to operate the business as an owner-entrepreneur from the start. I It is 
contended by the Times (5.2.73) that whilst the chairman of the parent 
company, recognised his manager's qualities, he preferred this, individualls 
powerful and persuasive personality to be located 400 miles away from the 
ý, centre of the organisation. It would seem therefore that although allý.. 
the terms of the appointment are not known, complete autonomy inthe 
management of the Scottish operation was one of the conditions made by 
the'manager before accepting týe appointment, 
Conversations with. a cross section of the long teým, employees and other 
members of the co--nunity have confirmed that the managing director of the 
new company was a paternalist autocrat, who was prepared to offer 
benefits such as bonuses for targets achieved and company houses in return 
for personal allegiance. Under his control the company flourished, and a 
high level of return on investment ensured the minimum of interference from 
Head Office. In,, addition to creating a successful organisation which 
offered better than average working conditions to its employees, he 
established a social, reputation for good work in the community by building 
a superior town hall and providing-other amenities for-the townspeople. 
His strength of character can be gauged by the fact that he became provost 
(mayor) of the town within eight years of his arrival in an area not noted 
for its ready'acceptance of newcomers. 
Wh en / 
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When he died in 1963, the company had operated successfully for 
forty-one years, and, with a work force of over 700 people, was the 
largest employer in the area. During the years 1959/63, when the 
company was bearing a considerable share of the social responsibilities 
of the community, it was still able to produce the following results: 
TABLE I 
Return on Inve'stment (Betaand Subsidiary) 
during Years 1959/63 
31.12.59 31.12.60 
years ended 
_31.12.61 
31.12.62 
1. Profit prior to tax E139,457 E224,603 E216,965 E235,441 
2. Capital Invested E425,151 E514,563 E551,762 E658,476 
3. Return on'Investment 32.8% 43.6% 39.3% 35.8% 
4. Earnings after tax E 70,723 E109,914 E 98,125 E110,464 
5. No. of Ordinary Shares 185,964 185,964 185,964 371,928 
6. Earnings after tax 
per El Ordinary Share, 38p 59p 53p 30p 
7. Ordinary Dividend E 34,171 E 39,866 E398,66 E 45,561 
8. Dividend per El Ordinary Share 18p 21p 21p 12p 
*The Capital Invested figure has been tak en as the Share Capital plus 
Reserves less Amounts due to the Company on Current Account from 
Associated Companies, as follows: 
1959 1960 1961 1962 
Capital + Reserves E516,633 E585,749 E643,013 E706,962 
Less- due from Associates 91,482 71,186 91,251 48,486 
31.12.63 
E241,158 
E662,300 
36.4% 
E126,640 
3719928 
** 34p 
E 45,561 
** 12p 
1963 
E789,004 
126,704 
E425,151 E514,563 E5512762 E658,476 E662,300 
On 13.12.1962 a bonus issue of shares, in the ratio of one share for every 
existing share'held, was made. 
Although the above figures must be considered more than satisfactory, 
some criticism has since been directed against him, for failing to look 
to the company's long term future. It is true that Fixed Asset investment 
figures appear to confirm his'-re-pu-tation for make-do and mend rather than 
invest in new plant and machinery, for as can be seen from the following 
table, Dep reciation exceeded the Net Capital Investment in five of the 
last six years under his control. 
TA BLE II 
19,010 
TABLE II 
Investment in Fixed Assets 
Years ended 
GROSS VALUES BEFORE. 
DEDUCTION OF 
DEPRECIATION 
Heritable Property 
plant, Machinery 
Motor Vehicles-and 
Furnishings 
plant and Buildings 
Under construction 
Total 
31 31 31 31 31 31 
12 12 12 12 12 12 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 
344,767 350,541 357,791 3639344 370,157 377,412 
349,574 
694p341 
362,905 379,097 
713,446 736ý888 
386,550 391,595 407,830 
-- 80,014 
749,894 7611752 865,256 
Net Capital Investment 
during year N/A 19JO5 23,442 13tOO6 11,858 103,504 
Depreciation 30,421 29t481 29,050 279862 27$243 27,272 
However, 
- 
it should be emphasised that liew investment should only be made 
when the benefits arising from the investment exceed the additional costs 
incurred. There is no data available to indicate whether or not any form 
of Capital Investment Appraisal was undertaken at this time so that this 
question cannot be resolved. It will, however, be seen from Table II that 
an investment of over E100,000 was made during 1963. According to his 
successors, at least part of this investment should not have been incurred 
because the plant purchased subsequently proved to be unsuitable for the' 
purposes for which it was acquired. 
Even/ 
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Even if this assessment of the situation is correct, it has to be 
pointed out that the records do 'not substantiate some of the criticism 
levelled against him for makingincorrect investment decisions. For 
example, the Labour Editor of the Times in his article dated 5th February, 
1973 states: 
"He caused 'some concern at headquarters with his one major 
technological innovation - in the middle fifties he ordered a 
E500,000 Jagenberg coating machine from Sweden. He was not 
a "technical man", as London put it, and the machine was the 
wrong width, but by the time London heard of it the contract 
was made. " 
As, the figures in Table II show, the gross investment in Plant, Machinery, 
Motor Vehicles and Furniture was only E350,000 in 1958, so that the 
claim that E500,000 was spent on one coating machine is grossly 
exaggerated. , 
In so far as this statement is detrimental to his 
managerial reputation it is; unfortunate that no retraction. of this 
statement has yet been made. It is difficult to understand why this., 
information should have been supplied to the Times for it-infers that,, 
the profits for, -several years were squandered on a rash. investment 
iný 
plant, and this is clearly notcorrect. , 
A more reasonable and relevant area'of criticism-of his management and 
, control of 
the-company at this time, can be directed against-the dominant 
position held by, the informal information system in hii decision-making 
process. Like many other executives in similar situations, the widespread 
, use of ad 
hoc_memoranda, a little black book and his reliance on rule of 
thumb methods and accumulatedýexperience were all prominent, at this time. 
But, there was no formal inforffa-tibn systdm in. th-e sha-p-of regular 
accounting reports. 
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rc-ortc, Whilst informal methods are often satisfactory because the 
executive evaluates the information he has obtained wisely, it is usually 
found, as companies grow, that managers become more and more dependent 
on formal rather than, informal information systems* 'It has been observed 
that the formal system provides a crutch for the orderly succession of 
management and it is in this context that the management of the Beta company 
of the early sixties appears to have fallen down. 
For example, the managing director used his experience and his assessment 
of industry trends to negotiate selling pricesý both, to outside customers 
and to his parent company and other subsidiaries. Similarly, being familiar 
with conditions in the base paper market, he seemed always able to negotiate 
the lowest transfer prices possible from another fellow subsidiary, so much 
so that after he died, his successor was unable to retain the same favourable 
trade rates. No attempt was ever made to crystallise the managing director's 
decision model explicitly in order that the critical data could be built 
into a formal'information system, and as a re'sult much valuable information 
died with him. Although it had been understood for some'time that his son 
would succeed him as managing director, his death left a void because his 
son had never, been given the opportunity to study the data which was critical 
to'the successful management of the company., nor was he ever-p6rmitted in his 
father's lifetime to make and take decisions on his own account. 
After the managing director's death, this lack of critical data was 
particularly important in that no one was certain from which products the 
profits had evolved. He had obviously his own information on this matter, 
but a lack of recorded cost accounting information and his reluctance to 
permit anyone else to see the situation as a whole, ensured that only his 
remembered comments on the reladWprofitability- of one contract compared 
with another remained available to his successor. At this time approximately 
45% of Beta's total output was supplied to other subsidiary/ 
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subsidiary companies and divisions of the parentcompany at transfer 
prices which included a fairly subjective series of "trade" discounts, 
so that the basis of these prices was not readily available from an 
analysis of the copy sales invoices and other sales data. 
It may be that the managing director had no more than a rough idea 
of the relative productivity of the products made by Beta. However, 
his ability to negotiate very favourable buying and selling prices, 
coupled with an emphasis on the minimisation of waste throughout the 
productive process, ensured that the difference between the value of 
actual sales and actual costs did notNary significantly from the 
estimated profits for the periods in question. Ten years after his 
death several employees recalled that rejected output up to a maximum 
of 6% was permissible on any job, but that a figure in excess of this 
amount always incurred his anger and had led to the dismissal of the 
offending employee in several instances. Whilst this rule of thumb 
approach could hardly have been applicable for every job undertaken, and 
employees admitýthat excessive waste on difficult jobs had to be'hidden 
and disposed of with the co-operation of-foremen,. the overall, effect was 
to ensure that every employee was conscious of the cost of excessive waste. 
In this context, it is noteworthy that several shop floor employees linked 
the ultimate decision, to close the mill with the ever, increasing, visits of 
the waste'disposal vehicle in the years, following 1963. (ý 
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THE HISTORY OF BETA - AFTER 1963 
The period from 1964 until the close down in 1972 was highlighted'by 
three events. 
In 1966 Portway Papers Ltd. acquired Kennington Peckham Ltd. and 
as a result took control of the Beta operation. Less than two years 
later in early 1968, the son of the first managing director, who had 
been responsible since his father's death, was displaced as mill manager 
by Mr. Douglas Fowler, a Portway employee of long standing. Then. in 
1970, Portway was itself acquired by Transatlantic Traders Ltd. and 
Mr. Fowler was appointed Divisional*Manager, with the status of Beta 
being officially changed to that of a Profit responsible division. 
In so far as beta had always been a separate limited company the 
significance of this change was not immediately apparent, but it did 
bring with it a considerable increase in the cost of Head Office 
services levied on Beta. 
Significant changes occurred in the manner in which Beta was operated 
immediately after the death of the managing director. Internally his 
son did not operate in the dictatorial ways of his fattier, but looked 
for and received the advice and support of his colleagues in the runninc-, 
of the mill. Unfortunately both Turnover and Profits declined between 
1964 and 1967. In spite of what must have been more acceptable working 
conditions than had hitherto prevailed, absenteeism and labour turnover 
was high and the level of morale declined. It would seem that the loss 
of the managing director's driving force adversely affected the attitude 
of the work force to a greater extent that the benefits from a more 
relaxed disciplinary code. As a result Mr. Fowler was brought in as chief 
executive of Beta and the financial results improved, -Extracts from the 
Annual Accounts for the years 1964 to 1969 reveal the following trends: 
TABLE III/ 
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The rigures over these five years show just how profitable the Beta 
operation continued to be, and how Portway, as holders'of almost all 
of the equity from 1966 onwards, benefited. - Indeed, after the close-down 
the local Member of Parliament criticised the flow of funds from Beta 
to the parent company during these years and the chairman of Portway found 
it necessary to issue the following statement to the press on 5th August, 
1972: 
Paper Mill Closure 
"The statement has been made that Portway transferred funds in 
excess of El million from their Beta mill in Scotland. The facts 
are otherwise. It is true that dividends totalling E1,1279000 were 
declared by the Beta subsidiary in favour of its parent company between 
1966 - 1971, but the dividcnds were never paid, there being no cash 
available for this purpose. on each occasion an amount equivalcnt 
to the declared dividend was immediately loaned back to Beta, and 
became part of its capital funds. In fact, Portway actually increased 
its investment in Beta over these years. " 
Glasgow Herald 5.8.1972. 
If the figures for the period from Ist January 1970 to the close-down 
(Table V) are studied in conjunction with the figures shown in Table III, 
the misleading aspects of the above statement, deliberate or otherwise, 
can be readily seen. What the statement does not explain is that when 
the dividends declared by Beta were credited to the parent company's 
Current Accounts they had the effect of changing a balance in Beta's 
favour into a balance due to theparent company from Beta. Whcr; for 
example, the huge dividend of E757,215 was declared in 1969, it helped 
to convert a net balance due to Beta from Associates of E366,049 into a 
balance due to Associates of E472,010 (see Table IV). A few simple 
book-keeping entries were sufficient to eliminate the need for a dividend 
payraent/ 
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payment from Beta to its parent company. The chairman is correct 
in his assertion that there was insufficient cash at Data to pay the 
dividends - what he does not explain is that if the parent company and 
Beta's other associates had paid their debts to Beta, Beta could have paid 
the dividends. Indeed, no explanation is given for the fact that an 
organisation saw fit to declare large. dividends at a time when their bank 
balances made itimpossible. for them to be paid. The figures show that 
cash payments are not always necessary to clear declared dividends - if 
the recipient of, the dividend is in debt to the dividend payer, the dividend 
and the debt can be set against each other, without any exchange of-cash 
taking place. ý .- 
The second part of the Portway chairman's statement puts his role in the 
situation in its most f. avourable light. In effect what he is saying is 
that the dividends declared were greater than the debts due to Betaand 
that the resulting balance due from Beta to Portway was not cleared, but 
left as Portway's investment in its subsidiary. The fact that this 
. 
investment had to be left with. Beta because Beta had insufficient liquid 
resources t6 clear it-is not disclosed. 
However, it can be seen from Table V how poor Beta's performance was in 
its last two years compared with prior years. Although turnover was 
ma intained at an annual level of E21 million, profits slumped and a huge 
loss was incurred in the six months to 1.4.72. 
TABLE V/ 
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TABLE V 
Return on Investment etc. 1.1.1970 to 
1.4.1972 
9 months Year 
ended 26.9.70 ended 2.10.71 
6 months 
ended 1.4.72 
1. Profit prior, to tax E61,057 A, E13,119 (130,900) 
2. Capital Invested C E813,724 C 926,670 C 1,103,875 
3. Retfirn-, on Investment 7.5% 1.4% - 
4. Earnings after Tax E39,183 B E35,447 
5. No. of ordinary Shares 3710928 371,928 
6. Earnings after tax per 
El Ordinary Share -11P lop. 
7. ordinary Dividend - E38,343 E33,767 
S. Dividend per El 
ordinary Share lop 9P 
A Profit prior to tax for 1971 is after deduction of Redundancy 
Payments of E17,4 44 and Loss on Disposal of Fixed Assets of 
E10,436. 
B Earnings after tax for 1971 includes recovery of Corporation 
Tax of E22,328. 
C Capital Invested fi gures are made up as follows: 
1970 1971 1972 
E E E 
Capital 392,928 3929928 392,928 
Amounts due to 
Group from Beta 420p796 533,742 715,947 
813,724 926,670 1,108_1875 
208. 
The Recovery Plan that Failed 
As the Beta management had submitted a plan for the recovery of the 
mill in 1971, the 1972 results obviously influenced the Ilead Office 
viewpointladversely. The original budget figures for 1971/72 indicated 
that an overall profit could be attained despite the fact that a small 
loss in Printed Tipping seemed unavoidable. An analysis of the variances 
from budget indicates however that coated paper products were the source 
of the losses, and the reasons for these losses were not difficult to find. 
First, at two meetings in. September, 1971, the Beta management were 
persuaded to change the transfer prices on which Gross Sales of Coated 
Papers were to be based. In addition to receiving the Leta product at the 
24 ream rate (the minimum price), a further discount of 10% and in some 
cases 15% had to be allowed, on intra-company transfers. This change 
had the effect of reduciný the budgeted Cross Sales figure for Coated 
Papers for the year by E147,000 witho ut a significant decrease in costs. 
The result of this transfer price change was to convert a ýudgeted profit 
for Coated Papers into a budgeted loss, yet the significance of this 
change appears to have gone almost unnoticed. Beta management accepted 
the change without recording their dissatisfaction, and Read Office appears 
not to have appreciated that Beta was no longer'a viable operation on the 
basis laid'down. The Beta accountant ought to have calculated the 
effect of the transfer price change immediately and advised his management 
accordingly, but he did not because he was already disillusioned and was 
seeking employment elsewhere. These calculations were in fact not made, 
until after the decision to, close down had, been taken. 
A second reason was that the monthly Accounting reports from October , 
1971 onwards were incorrect, and did not disclose the, full effect of the 
losses to Head Off. ice-so that action was not taken as soon as it might 
have been. It can be', seen from the figures in Table VI that the Coated 
Papers loss jas E138pOOO for the six months to 31st,, Marcli, 1972. Much of, 
this loss is attributed to the month of March, but, although turnover is 
below/ 
209. 
below the average for the precceding five months, a good part of the 
loss attributed to March must have been, incurred in these earlier months. 
The loss ofIE56,000 on a,, turnover of, E6,3,000 for March appears to have been 
the factor which convinced the Portway management that the Beta operation 
should be terminated. The writer investigated the figures for this six 
month period and concluded that the monthly information supplied by Beta 
to Portway from October 1971 to February 1972 was suspect, a conclusion 
I 
which was confirmed in'a subsequent interview by a senior member of the 
Beta staff. Until a physical stock check was carried out on 31si March, 
1972 the monthly profit figures were compiled from estimated stock figures, 
and it would appear that these estimates were considerably overstated. 
The physical stock check corrected these errors and revealed that the 
trading results for the six months were considerably worse than the 
monthly reports-had indicated. 
TABLE VI 
Coated Papers 
Total Cost. 
incl. Sell 4ýng 
Net Sales & Admin Loss 
E E E 
6 months October 1971 
March 10.72 495,306 633,641 138,335 
5 months October 1971 - 
February 1972 431,920 514,183 82p263 
March 1972 63,386 119,458, 56,072 
Average Monthly Figures 
'' October 1971 - February 1.972 86,384 102,836 16,452 
A third explanation for the heavy loss was that the budgeted sales figures* 
were not achieved. Until 1971 the annual Sales Plan was the concern of 
the Herchanting Division at Head Office, and Beta was not consulted at the 
Planning stage. Despite Beta's responsibility for profits, production 
schedules were prepared in terms of stock replenishment, for they had little 
information on who the ultimate customers were, what trends existed and what 
price structure existed in the market for their products* Although it was 
generally agreed that technological developillents, which made it possible 
for good quality coloured papers to be produced as part of the printing 
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process, were an increasing threat to the specialists in coated papers, Beta 
were authorised to replace their existing linesýby a new range of colours. 
The Sales Plan for-the new range was prepared by the Beta marketing 
managers who joined the company in 1970., Ile insists-that he was 
required to produce a sales schedule for the new range for 1971/72, 
without the assistance of the Portway sales managers, who declared 
themselves unable to offer any assistance relating to the likely 
response from the market to the introduction of the new products. 
As a result a rather arbitrary basis was adopted and it was not 
surprising therefore that the response was not as great as had been 
hoped for. The situation was aggravated by the inability to supply 
some of the items for which orders were obtained. a matter which appears 
to have resulted from a breakdown in communications within the Beta 
organisation. In so far as Mr. Fowler was responsible for production, 
this failure to ensure that stocks were available when required must be 
attributed'to him. The issue is however-clouded by the fact that in'the 
midst of the preparation of the new Sales Plan, the work force was 
reduced by a redundancy programma'and at least some members of the 
management were convinced that the close down process had already begun. 
It will be realised from the foregoing that the " Be I ta operation was 
not being managed well in the summer of 1971. In addition to the high 
degree of uncertainty and defeatism which I prevailed, the redundancy 
programme was applied almost exclusively to shop floor employees only. 
A study of the figures extracted from the Personnel Department records 
showed that in January 1970 there were 671 hourly paid employees and 
131 members of staff. In mid 1971 the hourly paid'numbers had fallen to 
544, but'the staff remained at 127. Nine months latero in March 1972j 
hourly paid had fallen again to 365 and staff to 106. - It'is clear from 
these figures that the ratio of direct labour'to- indirect labour had'f allen 
considerably, and that as a consequence the overhead cost per ton of paper 
produced must have risen significantly - five hourly paid employees for every 
member/ 
211. 
member of staff in 1970 had been reduced to three to one by 1972. 
Another indication of increasing inefficiency was the rising 
value of the investment in stock at a time when the value of sales 
did not show a comparable-increase. The relevant figures were: 
Annual. 
Value of 
Stock Value 
E 000's rM 
1966 December 316 2.3 
1967 December 312 2.2 
1968 December 316 2.5 
1969 December 462 2.7 
1970 September 558 2.7 
1971 September 521 2.5 
1972 March 555 2. o 
Rising costs account for part. of the increase. in stock values, 
but the stock/turnover ratio has clearly declined. It must also be 
remembered that any reduction in the Match valuation of stock in respect 
of items in the old colours range which are no longer saleable at a 
price in excess of cost will serve to increase the loss to 31&t March, 
1972. 
Finally, the effect of the increased Head Office costs levied 
on Beta has to be considered. In textbook transfer pricing some 
references are made to charges imposed by Head Office to equalise the 
effects of transfer prices which have'given either the internal 
supplier or purchaser an advantage. In Beta's case there seems little 
justification for these charges, but an examination of their accounts 
from 1970 indicate that they were charged for items such as Portway 
Marketing and Orders Processing, Commissions and Discounts to Internal 
Purchasers and Advertising and Warehousing services. -As these items 
cost E55,000 in 1971 and E21,000 for the. six months to 31st March,. 1972, 
the effect on the losses for these periods was considerable. Their 
imposition at this time is yet another indication of how the benefits 
derived by Beta from internal trading were eroded during this period. 
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Conclusion 
In June 1972 both the writer and the other member of the Stirling 
University Staff expressed the view that Portway's decision to close down 
the Beta operation was correct, They considered that the margin between 
operating costs at the 1972 level and the selling prices to outside 
customers and the internal transfer values to other 13ortway companies 
was insufficient to warrant its continuation. The outlook relating to 
future sales at viable prices was bleak, and the local management were 
unable to give any indication that they could change the situation. 
Indeed, their handling of negotiations relating to internal transfers 
and sales to outside customers added to their apparent lack of control 
of costs incurredo indicated that Beta could no longer be regarded as a 
viable operation. As the Balance Sheet at 31st March, 1974 showedo Beta's 
position was highly unsatisfactory: , 
EE 
Assets 000 000 
F ixe4.450 
Current 751 
1,201 
Liabilities 
Current 228 
Other 4 
Amounts due to other 
Portway companies 711 943 
Net Asset Value 258 
A comparison with the situation at 31st December 1966 shows how Beta 
moved from a position of strength to serious weakness in just over five years: 
EE 
000 000 
Aaaa f-c 
Fixed 
Current 
Amounts due from other 
Portway companies 
Liabilities 
Current 460 
0 ther 85 
Mpt Acqpt Valiip 
636 
595 
305 
1,536 
545 
991 
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This change in the Beta Company fortunes resulted from a combination 
of circumstances. A lack of long* term planning and-research of its 
products markets allowed the decline in sales to go unheeded until it was 
too late, and poor local management permitted*profit margins to narrow 
until they ultimately disappeared. Asset stripping by central management 
and pressure on Beta's management to accept lower prices in their 
intra-company trading ensured that the company had not the resourced to 
deal with the serious difficulties facing it. It may be that these 
reductions in the transfer prices to the other Portway companies enabled 
them to make sales to outside customers which would have otherwise been lost, 
thereby improving the overall profitability of the Portway organisation, 
but the manner in which it was done leaves this explanation open to doubt. 
The opinion of the Beta management was that the advent of Transatlantic 
Traders Ltd. saw the need for an increased return on investment from 
each of the Portway ventures, and Beta was sacrificed to enable the other 
operations to survive. This viewpoint does not excuse the defeatist 
attitude which led to the ultimate capitulation of the local management, 
but there is some justification for the feeling that mergers of this nature 
do little for organisations such as Beta, who are remote from the centre of 
activities. 
A company taking over the ultimate responsibility for an operation from a 
given date is more interested in future profitability than in past 
successes, and can be expected to take a firm line if forecasted profits 
are not realised. In this case it is not known how involved Transatlantic 
Traders Ltd. were in the decision to close down, but whilst their 
participation may have been minimal, their policy relating to return 
on investment was probably very important. The case illustrates how 
the application of an arbitrarily based transfer pricing mechanism, when 
combined with other factors, can transform what was hitherto a profitable 
company into an unsuccessful operation. The writer regrets that he was 
unable/ 
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unable to find any evidence*tliat management, at head office or 
divisional level, had considered what ef f ect Euch a mechanism would 
ultimately have on the divisions concerned and the organisation as 
a whole. 
q 
215. 
THE DELTA FURNITURE CO. LTD. BRITISH CASE III 
After the problems of Alpha Engineering Ltd. and the failure of Beta 
Paper Coating Ltd., it is a pleasure to be able to report that the 
transfer pricing system operated by the Delta Furniture Co. Ltd. has 
proved successful to date. It is significant that some of the principles 
evolved'in the theoretical part of this treati'se are being applied in a 
practical situation and are being proved to operate successfully. In 
this final case, the circumstances leading up to the employment of'this 
method and the situation in which it is employed are described. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In mid 1971, the Middlewood Cabinet Co. Ltd., a Yorkshire based 
furniture manufacturing organisatien coamissioned a market research study 
of the future trend in, bedroom furniture. ! Subsequently, they consulted 
the Marketing Services Department of the Furniture Industry Research 
Association, the professional body set up by. the rurniture Development 
Council under the Industrial Organisation and Development Act 1947. 
Whilst the Middlewood management were disappointed by the quality of the 
report produced by the market research consultants, the information from 
FIRA confirmed the findings that the segment of the market in which they 
were interested was expanding quickly. FIRA stated that the boom in 
furniture sales (1971/72) was unprecedented and predicted that this 
situation would continue until 1975, when the growth rate would be 
reduced. Their forecast of the overall situation was as follows: 
Projecteddeliveries of Domestic Furniture - adjusted to 1963_priccs 
Actual Figures Projected FiEures 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1975 1977 
E160 m E183 M E204 m E218 m E237 m E240 m 
A point of particular significance to Middlewood was the claim that 
the percentage of Fitted furniture sales was expected to grow from 50% 
of the E204 million shown above for 1972 to 75% of the E237 million shown 
for 1975. The consultants accounted for the boom in furniture sales in 1971 
by the overall sharp rise in consumer spcnding plus an increased interest in 
furniture for homes, and pointed to the fact that only approximately E5.00 
per annum'per head was spent in England in 1970 as against E8.00 in France$ 
E10.00 in the U. S. A. and E17.00 in West Germany* 
After assessing all of the information available to'themp' the Middlewood 
management came to the following conclusions: 
1. There was P strong trend throughout the United Kinedom tawards built-in 
bedroom furniture, which appeared to be following the same pattern as 
the/ 
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the trend towards fitted kitchens which took place soma years ago. 
2. It was unlikely that the manufacturers of traditional furniture could 
meet this change of emphasis in demand immediately, and would probably 
need two or three years to makebe necessary adjustments. Similarly, 
the pattern of retail selling seemed inappropriate in soveral respects. 
3. It seemed that a key factor in this new market would be flexibility 
in sizes to ensure the image of custom built fitting and to accommodate 
the changing needs of customers during the life of the furniture. 
4. In so far as the individualised aspects of this furniture would be 
much more pronounceds it would be essential to ensure that customer 
satisfaction figured prominently in any proposed strategy - in effect, 
it would be vital to achieve close co-operation between the sales staff 
and the production and installation services. 
AcCordingly, 'the'following strategy was deVised: 
(a) Customers would be offered'a range of -bedroom furnitýre which could 
be made at'any width and with several height and depth variations. 
(b) The Middlewoodorganisation would assume responsibility for sales 
direct to retail customers, and the manufacture and fitting of all 
units. 
(c) Sales would be made via the company's showroom which was located 
in a prominent position in a large citY in South Yorkshire, and 
through advertising in the Yorkshire press. 
(d) As it was envisaged that demand would exceed the capacity available 
at tbe, 11iddlewood Cabinet Factory, it would be necessary to findý 
-additional production capacity in the shape of a s=ller works 
which would act-as a feeder unit to the main factory. 
Two senior executives of the organisation were assigned to the Custom 
built Bedroom furniture project with instructions to implement the above 
strategy/ 
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strategy as quickly as possible. The main difficulty which they 
encountered was in finding suitable premises for the production of 
the additional units and as the marketing and advertising campaign 
got under way this problem became more and more pressing. After 
several possibilities had been rejected one of the executiveg went to 
his management with a proposal which was somewhat different from UP, 
original brief. Through a friend he had established contact with 
an electrical con tractor who had vacant premises in Scotland. This- 
contractor had done a considerable volume of work for local authorities 
but a decline in house building etc. in his area had caused his turnover 
to fall by more than 50% in 1971, with the result that a major part of 
his premises was lying empty. Discussions with the Ifiddlewood executive 
aroused his interest sufficiently for him to consider participating in a 
I 
furniture manufacturing enterprise. After some negotiation, a new company, 
the Delta Furniture Co. Ltd. was incorporated with the Middlewood Cabinet 
Co. Ltd. and Clydesdale Contractors Ltd. (the electrical contracting 
company) sharing the issued capital. It was agreed that Middlewood, would 
supply the furniture manufacturing know-how and Clydesdale the premises in 
which the new company would produce completed fitted bedroom units for 
sale in their region of Scotland and partly completed furniture ordered 
by Middlewood, for transit to Yorkshire where it would be assembled and 
fitted. 
It was recognised that the new company, lacking the Middlewood sales 
force, would not face the same demands as its English associate, but it 
was hoped to augment the work done for Ifiddlewood by sales to retail 
customers, the market research figures having indicated that there ought 
to be a comparable demand in that area. It was also appreciated that the 
costs of transporting the semi finished units would be significant, but 
against that it was felt that the redc-tion of the delivery period to 
customers would induce sales which might otherwise be lost. In addition, 
as/ 
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as Middlewood would purchase all raw Materials and obtain considerable 
quantity'discoUnts, the vehicle employed would carry raw materials north 
and sub-assemblies south, thereby ensuring the economy of return loads. 
In fact several suppliers have been prepared to accept. orders from 
Middlewood specifying delivery to Scotland, without forfeiting the discount, 
so that the volume of raw materials carried north has not been as great'as 
anticipated. The vehicle has however never been required to travel empty 
because equipment, supplies etc. have augmented the loads of materials 
delivered to the Scottish factory. 
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THE IfEnIOD OF TRANSFER 
In the first 18 months of the Delta operation, theac arrangements 
have worked remarkably well. Small9 but regular advertisements 
in the local press have persuaded retail customers to visit a small 
showroom adjoining the works where the finished products are attractively 
displayed. The result has been a steadily increasing stream of furniture 
units which are produced in the factory and assembled and fitted in the 
customers' homes. The process starts with a visit to the customer's 
home by the salesman/estimator. He gives a quotation, which if accepted 
becomes the basis for the preparation of a job order sheet. One copy 
of this document follows the job throughout the production process froul 
the cutting of the raw materials until it is loaded for delivery to the 
customer. A fitting team of. two men is then assigned to assemble and fit 
the unit, obtain the customer's approval and return the documents to the 
office for charging to the customer. 
Nevertheless, the sub-assemblies prepared for completion by Middlewood 
are still an important part of the work carried out by Delta. Until 
now the question of conflict between work for Yorkshire and local jobs has 
not arisen, for the management has stressed the need to ensure a quick 
turnaround if ultimate delivery to cust9mers in England is to be effected 
as quickly as possible. However, when full capacity is reached, comparisons 
of the relative profitability of each type of work may become more significant 
and create work progressing difficulties which are not apparent at present. 
Currently, job sheets are prepared by Middlewood and two copies of each are 
forwarded by post to Delta. In cases of urgency, Delta will accept 
instructions by telephone on condition that the relevant job sheet is posted 
the same day. On receipto Delta record the date on the Job sheet and in a 
job register. One copy of the document is retained in the office and the 
other is passed to the production forpman for execution. When all of the 
operations have been carried out, the work is placed in the despatch 
department/ 
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department for collection by the Middlewood vehicle (which collects 
once or twice weekly) and the job sheet is returned to the off. -ILcep 
where the. agreed unit prices are inserted and the total cost is 
computed. An example of the completed form is shown on the following 
page. 
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MIDDLEVOOD 
JOB ORDER SITEET 
JOB NO. 
CUSTOMER'S NMIE 
ADDRESS 
DATE 
It 2436 
Mr. J. Campbell 
19 Kenwood Drive, 
Sheffieldo E2 
30.11.1973 
DELTA 
DATE RECEIVED 4.12.1973 
AUTHORISED JE 
DATE COMPLETED 6.12.1973 
INSPECTED JE 
CHARGED IT 
WORK DESCRIPTION 
QUANTITY SIZE 
2 4F 
42" 
42" 
84" 
UNIT 
D ROBP 
BRIDGE UNIT 
DRESSING TABLE TOP 
HEADBOARD 
MATERIALS 
QUANTITY DESCRIPTION 
91 MELAMINE 8' x 4' 
2 LACONITE 8' x 41 
150 EDGE BANDING 
45 BLOCKS - It and F 
36 BLOCKS - Modesty 
20 HINGE S 
10 HANGING RAIL 
8 HANGING RAIL END BRACKETS 
2 HANGING RAIL CENTRE BRACKETS 
48 PLASTIC STRIP 
13 DRAWER SIDES 
6 DRAWER CORNERS FRONT 
12 
1 LIGHTING UNITS - Arrowslim 
10 HANDLES 
8 MAGNETIC CATCHES 
DRAWING See back 
WALL TO WALL lit 1011, 
CEILING HEIGHT 8' 
CARPET/ 
SKIRTING 
HEIGHT 41" 
THICKNESS 
UNIT PRICE PER VALUE 
E4.56 BOARD 43.32 
E3.50 BOARD 7.00 
. 005 rT . 75 
. o2 EACH . 90 
. 01 EACH . 36 
. 09 EACH 1.80 
. 10 rT 1100 
. 01 EACH . 08 
. 01 EACH o2 
.0 , 
FT 1.44 
. 09 FT 1.17 
. 03 -EACH ý. 18 
. o2 V. CH . 24 4.00 EACH 4.00 
. 25 EACH 2.50 
. 03 EACH . 24 
65.00 
LABOUR 
OPERATION TDIE RATE VALUE 
CUTTING 51 hrs. . 90 4.95 
EDGE BANDING 41 hrs. . 90 4.05 
ROUTERING 1 hr. . 85 . 85 
BLOCKING and HINGING 51 hrs. . 85 4.68 
DRAWER ASSEMBLING 11 hrs. . 85 1.28 
15.81 
VARIABLE OVERHEADS 11 hrs. . 72 
7.92 
TOTAL CHARGE 88.73 
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It will be noted that the charge from Delta to Middlewood is 
made up of three elements: 
(a) Materials 
(b) Labour 
(c) Variable Overheads 
Material Prices are agreed in advance by the two organisations 
with reviews at three monthly intervals. In so far as Middlewood 
acts as materials buyer for Delta in order to ensure the maximum 
benefits from quantity discounts9 there is a ready check on all of 
these prices. Similarly, standard quantities required for each 
size of unit have been agreed so that Middlewood can easily verify 
that Delta are not charging for excess quantities of materials used. 
Estimates were also agreed for each of the labour operations after 
Middlewood had carried out a'series of methods studies. As a result 
of these method studies Middlewood were able to make a'number of jigs 
available'to Delta, and these have helped considerably in reducing the 
average time taken on each of these operations. ' Owing, to the jobbing 
nature of the work Delta have found it necessary to employ time-served 
men, -but have established two rates of pay according to the operations, 
involved. The cutting and edge-banding operations are carried out by 
the more senior employees who earn 84 pence per hour. Whenrthe 
Employer's share of the National Insurance and Graduated, Pension 
payments are added (El. 28 and on average E1.22 per week) the hourly, rate 
is increased by 6p to 90p. The other operators earn a basic 79p per 
hour, which is increased to 85p per hour when these other elements-are- 
added. 
-Overhead costs chargeable to Middlewood are restricted to the 
variable element. Estimates have been made of the hourly running costs 
of the machinery used and an average of 72 pence per hour has bonn agreed. 
It will be noted that this charge is restricted to the cuttings edge bandinS 
and routering opeiations, the other operat ions being largely non-mechanised. 
'r- I 
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In this context, it has been decided that the depreciation on the 
plant and machinery is largely of a wear and tear nature rather than uf 
an obsolescence nature, so that the whole charge has been treated as a 
variable overhead cost. For example, it has been estimated that the edge 
bander will have a life of 5,000 hours -. o that its initial cost has been 
spread over its*working life according to usage, rather than over the 
length of time it has been owned by Delta, because it is believed that 
the obsolescence factor is not important. 'The remaining elements making 
up the overall charge of 72 pence per hour are mainly the estimated value 
of repairs and maintenance of tIje macbinery and the variable element 6f 
the electricity charges incurred. 
Neither fixed overhead costs nor an addition to total cost to cover the 
profit element have been passed on by Delta to Middlewood at this stage. 
When the question of the transfer price basis arose it was agreed that 
Middlewood should be given every opportunity to quote the keenest prices 
to the ultimate customer, which meant that no profits should be hidden in 
Delta's charge to Ifiddlewood, nor should any attempt be made to recover 
-his work was any costs which would be incurred by Delta whether or not 
done for Hiddlewood. 
It will be rememberpd. from Section A that no matter how the transfer price 
is computed, it is a, wholly variable cost from the viewpoint of the 
purchasing unit. The decision in this case hab ensured that the charge 
to Middlewood is truly variable. This factor plus the fact that lfiddleOod 
is not required to charge Value Added Tax to retail customers has ensured 
that Middlewood's prices are highly competitive. The V. A. T. relaxation 
has been obtained because units are fitted in customers' houses, and are 
not free-standing. It has meant that many' of the traditional bedroom 
manufacturqrs are at a disadvantage, and it may be that their protests 
will result in an amendment to the law as it stands. In the mcantime 
both Middlewood and Delta are in the fortunate position of leing able to 
claim back the V. A. T. paid by them on materials purchased, and as these 
payments are/ 
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are made at monthly intervals, there have been no cash flow problems 
resulting from the imposition of this tax. 
The results of the two surveys indicate that the transfer pricing 
method adopted by Middlewood and Delta is unusual in British industry - 
i. e. that transfer prices based on variable cost only is not usually 
acceptable, particularly to the management of the selling division. 
An explanation for the unpopularity of this method is not difficult to 
find - the overall profitability of the selling organisation is impaired 
by any transfers at prices which only recover variable costs and make no 
contribution to the fixed costs incurred. Where the profitability of 
the part of the organisation within his control is used to assess a 
divisional marager's performance, the imposition of such a transfer 
pricing method must be unreasonable. The management of Delta have 
accepted this situation however because they appreciate that the 
variable cost basis induces the Middlewood management to take as much 
of Delta's output as Delta are prepared-to supply. This basis has 
ensured'that no restrictions'have been imposed on Middlewood which will 
prevent them from achieving the'optimum volume of output and the minimum 
fixed'overhead cost per unit of output. In addition, and probably more 
important, Middlewood have undertaken to reimburse Delta, by making 
quarterly payments based on the contribution margin foregone by Delta 
in their transactions with Middlewood. The purchasing company in this 
case is adopting the role of arbitrator in that it is attempting to meet the 
optimality criterion for the two companies taken together and then assessing 
what fraction of the overall profit is attributable to the efforts of the 
supplying company. 
It is worth noting that the arrangement made by these two organisations'is the 
one which is'put forward by Hirshleifer and others in their theoreticalo 
analyses as being the basis which will achieve the optim= profitability for 
the two organisations taken together, in the circ=stanccs outli". cd. 
Inherent in this situation however is the assumption that the contribution 
to fixed overheads and profit foregone by Delta will be at least recovered 
1) 1A 
by Middlewood in its ultimate selling prices to outside customers. 
If Middlewood are compelled to accept selling prices which do not cover 
the variable costs of both companies-and an adequate contribution to their 
fixed costs and profits, it may be that Delta would do better to confine 
their attention to developing their retail sales and allow the volume of 
work for Middlewood to run down. The present-situation is, however, some 
way removed from these circumstances. Middlewood have been able to 
achieve higher selling prices in the Yorkshire area than Delta in Scotland. 
This may be the result of a more professional and aggressive selling policy, 
but whatever the reason, Delta believe that the maintenance of the. present 
level of output for Middlewood is in their best interests. One. interesting 
feature of the comparison between the two selling areas is that Middlewood 
freely admit that the Delta, finish is superior to their own, yet Delta have 
had to accept lower retail prices than those charged by Middlewood. A 
further difference in selling in the two areas is that Yorkshire customers 
are much more preparedto pay a substantial deposit before delivery of their 
furniture units, to obtain a small discount on the purchase price, than their 
counterparts in Scotland. A study of the sales recorýs of both-companies 
has shown that 38% of Middlewood customers take advantage, of the discounts 
offered whereas lbss-than one in ten of the Scoftish customers are 
pre . pared to pay in advance of delivery of the units. This-factor, which 
has a considerable effect on the amount of working capital required to 
maintain a given volume of sales supports the view of'the Delta management 
that they should continue to transfer semi-finished units to Middlewood, 
rather than stretch their limited resources'in pursuit of a higher level of 
retail sales. 
The superiority of the Delta finish is confirmed by the fact that the 
relative number of after-sales visits required to be made by the Middlewood 
fitting teams considerably exceeds the number made by Delta. B'Cwever, 
evcn allowinS for this additional cost, the higher selling prices in 
Yorkshire. er, --bles Middlewood to produce a higher average profit per job. 
As a result, the quarterly payments from Middlewood have so far produced 
a higher profit level in Delta than has been achieved from their sales to 
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rIetail customers. These quarterly payments are based on the total 
variable cost of work done by Delta expressed as a percentage of the 
total variable cost incurred by Middlewood for the three month period. 
This percentece of Middlewood's contribution margin (i. e. the difference 
between the value of sales and variable cost) less the charge for a 
share of the'transport costs is paid over to Delta. For example, in 
the three months ended 30th November, 1973, Middlevood's Sales of 
Fitted bedroom furniture totalled E104,374 and during this period they 
incurrad variable costs, including the charges from Delta, amounting to 
t 
E65,888. The contribution to fixed costs and profits was therefore 
the difference of E38,486. As Delta's charges to Middlewood during the 
period totalled E10,263, the payment due to Delta was E10,263 expressed 
as a percentage of E65,888 of the total contribution of E38,486 (i. e. 
15.6% of E38,486 which is E6,004). Mien this figure of E6,004 was 
reduced by tl,. e share of the transport costs, it meant that a net E5,724 
was paid over to Delta. 
If this output of partly finished units for Middlewood had been 
completed by Delta and sold in Scotland to retail customers, additional 
variable costs in the form of labour fitting and assembly charges and. 
further variable manufacturing overheads would have been incurred. A 
proportion of the fixed manufacturing overheads and selling and 
administration costs incurred by Delta would also have been allocated. 
The resulting total cost of this output has been estimated by the Delta 
accountant as follows: 
Additional Variable Costs 
E 
(Labour + Variable Manufacturing Overheads) 30805 
Allocation of Fixed Cogts 
(Fixed Manufacturing Overheads, 'ýelling 
and Administration Expenses) 
_5,076 
8,881 
To tal 
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Total costs in respect of this ouLput would therefore have amounted 
to E19,144 (EIO, 263 + E8,881), meaning that a sales valb6 in excess of 
this figure would have to have been achieved to show a profit. The 
Delta management are of the opinion that it would be difficult to sell 
this additional production at the prices obtained in respect of existing 
sales, and consider that it would have been almost imp6ssible to exceed 
the return received from Middlewood. A pro rataallocation of fixed 
costs to the total variable costs charged to Middlewood would have added 
E4,261 making a total cost of E14,524. Payments from Middlewood totalled 
E15,987, giving a profit of E1,463. As this return of 9% on "sales" 
considerably exceeds the profit which they have so far earned on their 
sales to retail customerso the management is in no hurry to bring the 
present arrangement to an end. Similarly, despite the administration 
and transportation difficulties, Ifiddlewood are satisfied with the 
current situation as long as Delta maintain their present level of 
01^4C 
service and quality. do not envisage replacing this sub-contracting 
arrangement , "Yith'increased production in their own area. ' It would seem 
that much of the success of this operation can be attributed to the 
readiness with which both managcments are prepared to supply facts and 
figures relating to sales and costs when required by their partners. 
Indeed, communications between the two con? anies have reached the level 
where each accountant has ready access to all of the accounting information 
produced by his colleague in the other company. Whether or not this 
highly, satisfactory situation. will continue remains to be seen, but it is 
heartening to end this case study on a note of confidence. Delta and 
Ifiddlewood appear to have seen the difficultics inherent in any transfer 
pricing arrangement and have taken steps to minimise the possible adverse 
effects of a situation which could have meant prolonged negotiation or 
ions had not been carefully worse 
if the contract between the two organisat. 
considered in advance. In this context, both sides WeobviouslY tried to 
meet/ 
f), )O 
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meet their obligations re deliveries, paymcnts etc. as quickly as 
possible, so that good customer relations and satisfactory liquidity 
levels have apparently been maintained. Reverting back to the 
three month period ended 30th November, 1973, a summary of the 
Profitability Reports for both companies is shown below to indicate 
how successful the transfer of partly finished units from Delta to 
Middlewood has been - 
Middlewood 
Summarised Prof-irt -and Loss Account for 
3 months ended 30.11.73 
E 
Sales 104j374 
Less - Variable Costs 
(including Delta's invoiced 
charges) 65t888 
Contribution Margin 380486 
Less - Fixed Costs 
(including quarterly payment of 
E5,724 to Delta) 
_29t564 
Profit 81922 
Had the Delta output not been produced, it is estimated that the 
following result would-have been obtained - 
Sales 81,902 
Less -, Variable Costs 52,359 
Fixed Costs 
(after deduction of 
quarterly payment to 
Delta and share of 
transport costs) 23,560 75t919 
Profit 5. tLB3 
The Delta figures are as follows - 
DELTA/ 
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Delta 
, 
Summarised Profit & Loss Account for 3 months 
ended 30.11.73 1 
Sales 22,027 
Less - Variable Costs 
25,462 
Less - charges 
to Middlewood 10,263 151,199 
6,828 
Less - Fixed Costs 
10,480 
Less - Repayment 
from Middlewood_5. L7,2-4- 40756 
Profit 
__2. tO72 
Had the output for Middlewood not been produced, the loss would have 
been - 
Sales 22,027 
Less - Variable Costs 
15,199 
Fixed Costs 
101200 25,399 
Loss 3,372 
Finally, if Delta had completed the semi-finished units 
I 
and sold them 
locally, the situation would have been as already outlined, which is - 
Sales (Estimated value) 41,494 
Less - Variable Costs 
as above 25,462 
Plus - Additional 
Variable Costs 3,805 29,267 
12j227 
Less - Fixed Costs 10,200 
2,027 
c: 3====c= 
As no allowance has been made Afor additional selling and administration 
costs which these extra sales would entail, the present situation is 
clearly satisfactory as far as Delta is concerned. 
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CONCLUSION 
I 
The LUPOIAWLCe VIC PJL1t;! 1Lg IH*--C11a111S1nS eiaployed Lt Lhe Lralisfer or pl-oulucLs 
from one division to another division within the same company lies in their 
effect on the mo, ý! -iation of the divisional management and, as a consequence, 
on the overall profitability of the organisation. Incorrectly based transfer 
prices may motivate divisional managers to take decisions which, whilst 
apparently in the best interests of the divisions for which they are responsiLle 
would not be taken by central management in the same circumstances, becPuse of' 
their adverse effect on the level of overall company profits. Whe-e division4ý 
managers and central management are motivated differently, the trnnsfer pricirg 
system is dysfunctional and may lead to sub-optimisation, the situation in 
which the quantity of output of the supplying division accept2d by the 
purchasing divI-sion is different from the optimal level. The circumstances 
existing in any particular situation must therefore be reviewed and considered 
carefully before the transfer pricing system is implemented. O'therwise tba 
benefits of decentralisation will not be realised to the full, for decisions 
taken by a divisional manager without full information relating to all of the 
factors involved may create a loss in anotlier division which exceeds his profit 
and will consequently lower the overall profit. 
There are, however, dangers in the arbitrary 0 
imposition by central nanagement 
of transfer prices, because this can destroy the autonomy of the divisio. nal 
management and thereby the profit incentive which appears to encourage them 
to increase the level of production more than any incentive based on cost. 
It has been found that where divisions which formerly operated as cost centres 
are converted into profit centres, management continues. to worry about costs, 
I 
but also gives greater consideration than before to methods of boosting 
production and to the needs of their customers. As a results central 
managements are often more successful in achieving goal congruence (ensuring 
that the objectives of their divisional managers are the same as their own) 
through such profit centres, than through cost centres. The advocatcslOf 
profit/ 
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I 
profit ccntres may often therefore be correct in maintaining that the 
responsibility for profit centre performance provides more incentive 
than being responsible for cost performance, because increasing profits 
by improving sales performance is much more rewardine than meeting 
budgeted costs. As the General Appliance case illustrated 
19 if profit 
control is operated on a centralised basis, no one at divisional level is 
greatly concerned if an improvement in quality involves additional costs. 
The divisional manager obtains budget authorisation to offset the increased 
cost, the burden of the quality dontrol department is epsed, and the sales 
force have a product which is easier to market. Even when these personnel 
are aware that the increased quality is not reflected in an increase in the 
selling price of the finished product and that the company is therefore 
I 
wasting money, in a centralised profit control situation, there is little 
incentive for any of them to take steps to eliminate this cost. 
fit maximisation'is however open to at least two interpretations. it ProL 
is likely that a divisional manager whose managerial abilities are assessed, 
at least partially, by the profit performance of his unit will be concernad 
with short run profit maximisation, whereas his central management may take 
a longer view. if promotion prospects ani salary increases are dependent 
on present performance, the divisional manager may take decisions which will 
enhance the short. run profitability of his unit, but may have afi adverse 
effect on the future profits of the division, possibly after he has moved on. 
Difficulties may therefore arise in assessing long term managerial perfnrmance 
if central management. permit divisional heads to become too pre-occupied with 
the present situation and allow them to ignore the long teým objectives of 
the organisation as a whole. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the establishment of. the profit centre is not 
always the panacea. The Kaiser 
2 
experience indicates that a pricing mechanism 
Page 108 
2. Page 132 
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which can be influenccd by personalities and corporate positions may proNyp 
unsuccessful and that a return to a cost basis can eliminate the overhead 
costs incurred by staff engaged in transfer price disputes. Even more C. - 
important, situations do exist in which the creation of profit centres is 
I illogical . Where a supplying division and a purchasing division are so 
closely linked that they must trade, there being no satisfactory outside 
alternatives, the establishment of these divisions as independent profit 
centres is probably. an example of self-deception on the part of the management. 
In such instances, manageýtent control by means of a system of pre-determined 
standard costs must be more realistic. Besides being less harrowing to the 
divisional staffs, because of the elimination of the arguments which are 
inevitable in a captive buyer or seller situation, cost control, involving 
the comparison of actual costs with pre-determined standard costs, enables 
cent'ral management to evaluate the performance of their divisional managers. 
Management by exception, the practice of investigating larb-e variances from 
the pre-determined standards, is widely recognised as a valuable aid to 
pianagement control. 
It should be noted that systems of standard, costing are largely restricted 
2 
to th. -. -c costs which can be classified as engineered co6Ls Eagineered 
costs are those elements of cost for which an acceptable amount that ought 
to be incurred can be estimated in advance. For example, direct labour cost 
is an engineered cost, because once the specification for a product has been 
prepared, engineers can determine the opecations to be performed and can 
estimate the time which should be spent on each of these operations. The 
standard direct labour cost can then be estimated by relating these times to 
the wages rates payable for this work. Although this cost is not necessarily 
the exact amount which should be spent, it is an e. stimate which is sufficielitlY 
1. Page 131 
:, a 162 
Pa 
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I 
accurate to be applied in most situations. 
There are, however, other costs which cannot be classified as engineered 
costs, because there is no scientific way of determining the correct amount 
which ought to be incurred. These costs may be termed managed costs, or 
discretionary costs, because they can be whatever management wants them to be 
within fairly wide limits. For example, in the short run, a divisional 
manager may economise on the costs of maintenance and repairs, without 
detriment to the operation of the plant for which lie is responsible. A 
prolonged continuation of this policy would however ultimately result in 
breakdowns which could prove expensive in the shape of lost production. 
Costs of this nature cannot be monitored by a standard cost system and 
management control and evaluation of performance must therefore be implemented 
by other means. Plant safety may for example be checked regularly by a 
member of head office staff ardq register of repairs and maintenance carried 
out may be subjected to periodical audit by the Group maintenance officer. 
In effect, in divisions operated as cost centres, provision may have to be 
made to divest divisioiýal management of most of the responsibility for 
discretionary costs and place the control in the hands of specific members 
of the head office staff. 
The situations described in the case studies indicate that there is often 
considerable disparity between the practical applications of transfer pricing 
mechanisms and what might reasonably be expected from a study of the 
theoretical analyses of the subject. In some instances, there are particular 
circumstances which account to some degree for this disparity. Where, for 
example 
I, 
an organisation supplies a range. of finished products to the outside 
market and the sales of each are largely dependent on the availability of 
the other products in the range, transfers of intermediate products or 
sub-assemblies will continue to take place internally in spite of the fact 
1. Page 81 
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that these intermediate products might possibly be sold more profitably 
on the outside market. Similarly, there may be justification in isolated 
cases for permitting a transfer price which is not economically viable 
in'the short term, in order to maintain the existence of a division, because 
central management has decided that this dývision has a function to perform 
in the group's long term policyl. 
Whilst allowing that these explanations will account for some of the vagaries 
of transfer pricing mechanisms in practice, there are still mapy cases where 
the transfer price employed cannot be justified on any logical basis. There 
is evidence that managements are influenced by a variety of other factors, 
which may be important in their particular circumstances, but it is disquieting 
to note that questions relating to the optimal internal transfer price have 
often never been posed. Many managements are unaware that sub-optimisation 
is occurring within their organisations and that a change in the transfer 
pricing mechanism could appreciably increase their overall profitability. 
Even in situations where company policy directs that divisional autonomy 
takes precedence over every other consideration, it is important that the 
correct information on all of the factors involved is availablc before 
decisions relating to inter-divisional trading are taken. ' Regrettably, the 
*2 
results of the surveys and the case stddies indicate that the quality and 
quantity of this information is less than might reasonably'be expected from 
many of the management control systems in operation in the mid 1970's. 
Although it is clear that some of the theoretical arguments advanced in favour 
of the concept of marginal cost can be applied in practice, it would seem that 
the relevant cost accounting information necessary to benefit from the use of 
the concept is hopelessly inadequate in maný organisations. if the management 
accounting systems. cannot provide basic information relating to fixed and 
variable costs, there. can be little hope of achieving optimal transfer prices 
1. Page 176 / 
2. Pages 135,155,162,190 and 215 
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owing to their dependence on the cost and revenue functiom Whilst it is 
recognised that companies can only forecast the opportunity cost of 
inter-divisional Pales, because they do not know the precise price 
elasticity of demand for their products 
I, it should not be beyond the 
powers of their accounting staffs to produce reasonably accurate schedules 
of changes in costs at different volumes of output. information of this 
nature and-its proper use would at least ensure that companies were moving 
towards optimal transfer prices. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the three case studies is the wide 
disparity in the bases on which the transfer pricing mechanism is operated 
in these British companies. In the Delta Furniture Co. Ltd. 
2, 
where some 
of the principles evolved in the theoretical part of this treatise are 
being applied, the transfer pricing mechanism has proved successful. The 
management of the Delta company and its ass-ociiate, the Middlewood Cabinet 
Co. Ltd., have recognised that full information relating to all of the costs 
involved must be available to both parties concerned in the transfer of 
partially completed products if the decision which will benefit both 
companies most is to be made. Sincd the completion of the case study 
the Customs and Excise officials have indicated that the companies are no 
longer entitled to disregard Value Added Tax in their transactions, so that 
the former advantage over the traditional furniture manufacturers is no longer 
available to them. Transfers of sub-assemblies between the two organisations 
have nevertheless continued at the same volume as before, for both companies 
recognise the beneficial effect which this trade has on the. overall profitability 
of their operations. In this case the transfer pricing system has ensured that 
none of the benefits of decentralisation have been offset by the disadvantages 
which arise as a result of sub-optimisation, 
Thel 
1. Page 42 
2. Page 215 
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The circumstances encountered in Alpha Engineering Ltd. 
1 
were quite 
different. Much of what is considered to be conceptually unsound was 
found, and as a result the transfer pricing system was "dysfunctional". 
Although it is generally conceded that any form of tranqfer pricing must 
act as a constraint on the degree of autonomy exercised by the management 
of a sub-unit, the absence of any evaluation of divisional managers' 
performances has permitted an unsatisfactory situation to continue in 
this organisation for several years. The new management is aware of 
the shortcomings of the existing arrangements and have welcomed the 
recommended changes in the transfer pricing system. The implementation 
of these changes and alterations to the overall management control system 
should ensure that the profitability of this organisation in future years 
is improved considerably. 
Whilst the transfer pricing system contributed to the downfall of the Beta 
Coated Paper Co. Ltd. 
2 
the third case study, it must be concluded that 
changes in the pricing mechanism would have been too late to prevent 
its ultimate demise. The outlook relating to the future profitability 
of the operation was bleak and the lack of confidence of the local managers 
in their ability to change the situation was evident. The investigation 
showed that they were apparently unable to control the costs for which they 
were responsible and as their handling of negotiations relating to internal 
transfers and sales to outside customers was clearly unsatisfactory, it is 
little wcnder that their p. arent. company decided to terminate the operation. 
If the basis of the transfer pricing mechanism had been investigated two 
years earlier it is conceivable that thq significance of the other factors 
involved would have been noted and the operation might have been continued 
on a profitable basis. 
The/ 
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I 
The investigatioradescribed in the PAse stl. idiies have confirmed a n=bcr 
of the points stated in the ttansfer pricing literature. It can be 
concluded, for example, that both the fixed And variable elements in the 
inter-divisional transfer price become variable from the viewpoint of the 
management of the purchasing division, because the cost to them varies 
directly according to the number of units bought from the supplying 
division. This' means that full cost can never be a satisfactory basis 
for establishing transfer prices because it does not provide a satisfactory 
guide to decision making, and that sub-optimisation may be the outcome, if 
full information relating to the costs of the product transferred are not 
communicated to the purchaser. Secondly, as a marginal cost transfer 
pricing system ignores the divisional performance measurement aspect, it 
cannot be employed without the removal of the decision making autonomy from 
divisional managements. This is because as long as marginal cost transfer 
pricing is in operation, the supplying division will not absorb its fixed 
costs in, the transfer price and will show a loss which will adversely affect 
its overall performance, so that it will not be employed by divisional 
managers who are permitted to decide whathcr or not to trade internally,. 
Similarly, in situations where marginal cost is increasing with volimn--, 
marginal cost will vary according to the total demand of the buying divis. on 
added to the demands of the supplying division's outside customers. In these 
circumstances, neither division can make its decisions relating to output 
independently, so that the complete auto'nomy of the individual divisicn is 
no longer possible. 
Third, because accounting systems do not record the opportunity costs of 
the best alternative rejected, an important aspect of the transfer pricing 
problem is sometimes overlooked in practic6. Where excess operating 
capacity can be eliminated by a small decrease in the selling price of 
I the intermediate product to outside buyers, the opportunity cost Of vel 
I 
the intermediate produc t internally becomes significant, and the profits 
accruing/ 
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I 
iccruing from existing sales of the finished product must be reviewed. 
Each time the forecast of opportunity cost is changed, the optimal 
decision relating to the volume of inter-divisional trading must be revised. 
Then there is the problem of determining the validity of the price at which 
the intermediate product is available from outside suppliers. 
1 Ullern this 
price can be interpreted as a distress price, offered by the outside 
supplier in a desperate bid to retain business in the hope that it can be 
increased later and that subsequent profits will absorb present losses, it 
can hardly be a valid basis for a transfer price. Whether or not a price 
can be termed a distress price must depend on the particular circumstances of 
each situation, and this may be difficult to determine in some cases, but if 
it is acknowledged that the price is unlikely to be offered for any length 
of time in the future, it cannot be a reliable yardstick on which to baLo 
an inter-divisional transfer price. 161here the question of a division ceasing 
to produce an intermediate product because of the availability of a similar 
product at a cheaper price on the open market arises, careful consideration 
must be given to the cost of re-entering this field at a later date, should 
the outside supplier subsequently raise his price. 
In situations where a division is responsible for an error in intra-company 
transactions, it is a general princ. iple that-the division should only be 
required to pay when the error results in a loss of profits to thecrganisation 
as a whole. If a loss of profits to the company has not occurred, then the 
divisions should be placed in the financial positions which they would have 
enjoyed had no mistake taken place. on the other hand, if an incorrect 
make or buy decision results in the profitability level of the whole company 
being put in jeopardy, the reduction in profit should be reflected in the profit 
and loss account of the division responsible for the error. 
Finally/ 
1. Pages 88 and 115. 
i 
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Finally, it should be appreciated that the existence of a market price 
arrived at by arm's length competitive bargnining between an independent 
buyer and seller does not always guarantee the best price for the optimum 
benefit of the organisation as a whole. 
1 Transfer prices agreed in these 
circumstances can motivate divisional managers to take decisions which are 
not in the company's interests, and therefore lead to a lack of Coal 
congruence. 
. it will be appreciated from the foregoing that a nuinber of pitfalls lie 
I 
in the path of the undiscerning when faced with the problem of establishing 
an inter-divisional transfer pricing mechanism. It seems. clear that 
consideration should always be given to the following points: 
1. The opportunity to submit a quotation should always be made available 
to an internal supplying division, when the management of that division 
believes that they can product the required product. The onus should 
be on the buying division to provide facilities which will enable the 
selling division to submit a competitive quotation. In return, as full 
information as possible relating to the cost structure of the prodlict 
being traded should be made available to the purchasing division, in 
order that the effect of their decision on the overall profitability 
of the company may be assessed by the management of that division. 
2. Opportunities to re-quote should be made available to the supplying 
division when its original quotation exceeds the outside competitor's 
quotation which the buying division is proposing to accept. It should 
be recognised however that outside suppliers will cease to submit 
competitive quotations if their quotations are always Unsuccessful. 
3. Transfer prices for any work should always be agreed in advance of the 
work being performed. 
4. Whilst a market price or a market equivalent price, if it existst 
should be the basis of the intra-company price, the variable and fixed 
1. Page 89 
241. 
cost elements incurred in the manufacture of the product ought tolr- 
considered in relation to this price. In particular, it should be 
recognised that a competitor not operating on a decentralised control 
basis may have an advantage and due allowance ought therefore to be 
made. Allowance should also be made for the saving in selling 
expenses normally incurred in making outside salps and the absence 
of collection expenses, credit control and bad debt costs. 
In the absencq of market equivalent prices, a negotiating procedure 
should be adopted by the trading divisions. These negotiations should 
not be permitted to become unduly protracted and whilst head office 
intervention should be restricted to the minimum, arbitration by a 
representative of central management should be available in those 
instances where both parties request it. Otherwise, in the interests 
of autonomy, the offer and acceptance procedure should be left tx)the 
divisional management on the understanding that boýh_parties are fully 
informed on the significance of the transaction in relation to the 
profitability of the company as a whole. 
Prices based on total cost incurred should never be employed except 
in situations when the final contract vith the outsidc, customer is on 
a cost plus basis. 
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